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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM

EIGHTH ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE KOREAN WAR

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BY

W. KENDALL
L. F. O'DONNELL
J. PONTURO

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Technical Memorandum

EIGHTH ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE KOREAN WAR

by

Willmoore Kendall
Lawrence F. O'Donnell
John Ponturo

Operations Research Office
The Johns Hopkins University
G-3, General Headquarters
Far East Command
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THIS IS A WORKING PAPER
presenting the considered results of study by the ORO staff members responsible for its preparation. The findings and analysis are subject to revision as may be required by new facts or by modification of basic assumptions. Comments and criticism of the contents are invited.

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

The problem is to describe and analyze the organization of Eighth Army psychological warfare in the Korean war.

FACTS

The basic organizational pattern for EUSAK psychological warfare places responsibility for its conduct in the G-3 Section within which there is a Psywar Division to which, in turn, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company is attached operationally.

From January 1951, when this organizational pattern was established, the scale of psychological warfare activities has undergone continuous expansion. As of September 1951 the Psywar Division was planning, preparing, and producing with its own facilities, approximately eight million leaflets per month. It was disseminating a total of approximately 48 million leaflets per month (the additional production being done by FECOM)--most of them by C-47 aircraft, some by light aircraft, and a few by artillery shell.

The Division is operating one heavy airborne loudspeaker, mounted in a C-47 (a second has been non-operational for some time), which performs about 55 missions per month, on the average, each involving approximately 100 minutes of actual voicecasting. It is supervising the activities of ground loudspeaker teams furnished by the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company spread out along the entire Eighth Army front: normally, there is at least one team per division in the US I, IX, and X Corps, each averaging one tactical mission per week, but there are sometimes as many as 12 teams in being.

These activities of EUSAK psychological warfare are directed at a wide variety of targets: Chinese and north Korean front-line and reserve troops, civilians in the area of military operations, guerillas and "friendly" civilians in the UN rear.

Radio broadcasting, however, even within the Eighth Army area, is not an Eighth Army responsibility. This is handled entirely through FECOM. In addition, FECOM exercises a considerable amount of control directly and indirectly over EUSAK's psywar activities, particularly on its use of leaflets.

DISCUSSION

The purpose which is intended to be served by the psychological warfare activities in the Eighth Army has an inseparable connection with the organization of those activities, the adequacy of the organization being subject to judgment, in the first instance, only in terms of how well it fulfills the purpose it is intended to serve. Along with this, however, there is another consideration, namely: whether or not the nature of the organization evolved has tended to shape and limit the purpose or task which is or can be assigned to it. In sum, operations research must move back and forth between the purpose and the organizational measures taken to forward it, and must raise questions as to the rationality of the relation between them.

An effort has been made in this study to avoid undue reliance on documentary evidence in determining how psywar actually works in Korea and to include within the study an assessment, as well, of the informal working procedures and relationships within which, in almost any organized activity, are to be found many of its most significant elements.

CONCLUSIONS

1. EUSAK Psywar is conducting what to all intents and purposes is a separate (though not autonomous or independent) operation against the enemy.

2. Although no document officially defines the mission of the Psywar Division, the working understanding of its mission, which is observable in practice, is that of employing psychological measures calculated to induce enemy surrenders.

3. The degree to which FECOM exercises control over the activities of the EUSAK Psywar Division does not appear to be entirely rational.

4. For surrender-mission psywar, no concrete evidence was found to indicate that sufficient integration with hardware plans and operations at army level does not presently exist. However, for psywar efforts geared to a somewhat broader purpose, the present level of integration would not appear to be adequate.

5. Psywar planning is geared to the situation of the target audience rather than to its cultural and psychological peculiarities. Closely related to this is the fact that there is a general tendency to regard the enemy soldier as "just people."

6. The Psywar Division lacks library materials and facilities upon which to draw in developing a more precise picture of their targets.

7. The psywar intelligence process in EUSAK, however, adequate for situational data, is essentially unreliable as a means of determining the crucially important cultural and psychological peculiarites of the target audiences.

8. EUSAK Psywar does not have, either within its own ranks or at its disposal, a qualified area expert on China or Korea or even any American who knows the language of either of the two countries.

9. The dependence upon native translators of varying degrees of bilinguality is a weak link in the chain of preparing psywar output and deprives the psywar organization of any sure means of controlling from moment to moment what it is saying to the enemy.

10. There is no substitute, even in an army-level psywar organization, for at least one thoroughly bilingual US officer.

11. Although, on the basis of T/O and E 20-77, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company has a broader organic mission, by reason of the existence of the EUSAK Psywar Division, and the absorption by it of some of the FLLC's personnel and functions, the FLLC's chief actual day-to-day tasks have been narrowed to the conduct of ground loudspeaker activities under the supervision of the Psywar Division, and the printing of leaflets prepared by and disseminated by units of the Psywar Division.

12. The major objective of psywar in EUSAK has become: to get as many leaflets as you can into the hands of as many soldiers as you can as often as you can with the inevitable result that the facilities of the publications platoon of the FLLC has had to be augmented to keep pace with demands placed upon it.

13. T/O and E 20-77 seriously underestimated the material requirements for army-level psywar, as this is today understood in EUSAK.

14. The production of the large quantities of leaflets presently required in EUSAK has demanded the use by the FLLC of very heavy equipment with a consequent loss of mobility.

15. The present reliance on aircraft delivery of leaflets almost to the exclusion of the use of artillery shells is probably the most rational arrangement in view of the many complex considerations involved. However, if improvement can be made in the tailoring and production time of leaflets to fit particular targets, the present arguments against more extensive use of propaganda shell would no longer be valid.

16. From the standpoint of mechanical performance the voice-plane in Korea has, after modifications introduced in May, greatly exceeded earlier expectations. Nevertheless, the ability of voice-planes to reach their targets with an intelligible message is still subject to very considerable limits.

17. The present number of completed missions per ground loudspeaker team per week, while certainly no reflection on either the competence or the industry of the team's personnel, raises a real question as to whether ground loudspeaker operations are paying their way.

18. There is a necessity for a full-time Psywar Officer at each corps and division. At present there is only one full-time Corps Psywar Officer and only one full-time Division Psywar Officer in Eighth Army.

19. The prevailing notions among EUSAK psywar personnel placing heaviest emphasis upon combat experience as a prerequisite for an individual's successful performance in the field of psywar appear most appropriate to the conduct of surrender-mission psywar. Certain changes in the recruiting of psywar personnel are indicated as well as a possible rotation plan allowing for the continuous introduction of personnel fresh from combat into the psywar organization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Existing arrangements between FECOM and EUSAK Psywar Division should be revised to allow EUSAK greater freedom of action in the dissemination of leaflets produced by GHQ for which tactical dissemination is desired.

2. That continuous attention be given to the problem of whether surrender-mission psywar represents maximum exploitation of this weapon, and that planning for future psywar operations, including the organization, training and equipping

of personnel be such as will not preclude the pursuit of broader missions.

3. That psywar units be equipped to exploit the cultural-psychological peculiarities of their target audiences through better library facilities, through the production in the ZI of area manuals tailored to their needs, through more skillful use of panels of prisoners, and through the recruitment or training of thoroughly bilingual US officers to the extent that there could be at least one such officer at army level.

4. That the present organization and composition of loudspeaker and leaflet companies be reconsidered with a view to revising T/O and E 20-77.

5. That, for planning future operations, cognizance be taken of the fact that reliance in the Korean theater upon C-47 planes as the principal means of disseminating leaflets as well as the tactics employed by the voice plane have been conditioned by the absence of enemy air and anti-aircraft action against them.

6. That a full-time Psywar Officer be included in the T/O of Division Headquarters as a member of the G-3 Section.

7. That a program for the "rotation" of selected officers fresh from combat into slots expressly provided within Psywar units be considered for its possible usefulness in future operations.

EIGHTH ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE KOREAN WAR

PROBLEM

The problem is to describe and analyze the organization and operations of Eighth Army psychological warfare in the Korean war: what the organization is, what its mission is, to whom it is responsible in performing its mission, into what subordinate tasks its mission is broken down, and how those subordinate tasks are parcelled out among its organizational units; also the operations conducted by the organization, with particular reference to (1) the policy guidances, directives, and plans under which it operates, (2) the kinds of intelligence it receives from other agencies and/or develops for itself, and (3) the kinds of psychological warfare missions it conducts vis-a-vis various kinds of targets.

FACTS

On 24 January 1951, responsibility for conducting US combat psychological warfare in the Korean war was shifted from the G-2 Section to the G-3 Section of the Eighth US Army, Korea (EUSAK). In the next weeks, a Chief of Psywar was appointed, and the Psywar Division was continuously enlarged. The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, whose basic contingent had been activated in Korea in November 1950, was attached, operationally but not administratively, to the division, and thus brought under the control of G-3 and the Chief of Psywar. This series of decisions and actions in January and February 1951 established the basic organizational pattern for EUSAK psywar, which still obtains (September 1951).

From the time the Psywar Division was created, the scale of combat psywar in the Korean war, and thus the division's burden of work, has been expanded from near zero to, in the opinion of some EUSAK psywar operators, close to the saturation point. On any showing--given the nature and magnitude of the Korean campaign itself and the limited potentialities of psywar, especially psywar qua tactical weapon as understood in the theater and Eighth Army--the expansion has been spectacular.

A detailed account of the Psywar Division's operations appears in Part II of this memorandum. For the purposes of the first part, and as a preliminary to describing the organization itself, we shall first examine, in broad outline, the size and nature of the job the division is called upon to do or get done.

As this memorandum is being written (September 1951), for example, the Psywar Division is planning, preparing, and producing, with its own facilities, approximately eight million leaflets per month.1/ Including the leaflets it handles for FECOM Psywar, plus those it asks FECOM Psywar to print for it, the division is disseminating approximately forty-eight million leaflets per month2/--most of them by C-47 aircraft, some by light aircraft, and a few by artillery shell. The division is operating one heavy airborne loudspeaker, mounted in a C-47 (a second has been non-operational for some time); it performs, on the average, about 55 missions per month, each involving approximately 100 minutes of actual voicecasting.3/ It is supervising the activities of ground loudspeaker teams spread out along the entire Eighth Army front, where, normally, there is at least one team per division in the US I, IX, and X Corps, each averaging one tactical mission per week,4/ but there are sometimes as many as 12 teams in being. (The variations in the number of teams are discussed in Part II.)

The division, with an eye to current planning of long-term hardware operations, prepares its own long-term psywar plans (some of which involve complicated "phasing"), and then, modifying these plans as the developing situation appears to require, implements them. Less frequently, for reasons to be noted later, it develops, with an eye to current Army-level hardware planning--numerous plans for local missions of brief duration. Again, for reasons to be noted later, it launches most of its operations on its own initiative, though it receives, and carries out, a considerable number of requests"5/ for missions directed at specific targets from Eighth Army headquarters or from subordinate commands, sometimes even from agencies like KMAG or US Information Service. It strikes at a wide variety of targets: Chinese and Korean front-line and reserve troops, civilians in the area of military operations, guerillas and "friendly" civilians in the UN rear.

1/ This calculation is on the basis of June and July 1951 statistics.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Ibid.

4/ Ibid.

5/ See Part II for further discussion of these requests.

The Psywar Division is (since early July 1951) located at EUSAK Advance in Seoul. This maximizes its opportunities for keeping in close touch with EUSAK Intelligence, Plans, and Operations, all of which occupy space in the building in which the division has its offices. From the present location, furthermore, access to the Corps and Division Psywar Officers and to lower echelon staff officers--by telephone, light aircraft, and even jeep--is notably easier than when the Psywar Division was located at EUSAK Main in Taegu. At Seoul, furthermore, the Psywar Division is 15 to 20 minutes flying time from the I Corps front, 20 to 30 minutes from IX Corps, and 30 to 40 minutes from X Corps. It can, therefore, provide better and more timely psywar support than formerly. (It responds to requests, for example, in approximately half the time it needed at Taegu.)

ASSUMPTIONS

Psywar in the Korean war is an organized activity. The individuals who conduct it are not acting at random, each in his own way and according to his own lights. Each is geared into EUSAK's psywar organization, which, as we approach it, we may assume to have dimensions and structure, hierarchy and division of labor, and more or less regular procedures for communicating the commands and information designed to make sure that the members will perform, in the proper order and at the proper time and place, a series of acts that are expected to add up to the accomplishment of some final purpose or purposes. These it is the task of operations research to study and describe.

In any rationally organized activity, there is an intimate relation between the purpose or purposes, whether generated by it from within or defined for it from outside or above, and the form the organization takes. To the extent that the activity is "rational" the purpose or purposes will dictate the size and shape of the relevant organization, its external relationships, the disposition of its personnel, the allocation of duties among them, the instrumentalities for coordination, and the like. Operations research must move back and forth between the purpose and the organizational measures taken to forward it, and must raise questions as to the rationality of the relation between them.

Just as a machine can be described and analyzed *qua* machine in terms of its location and size and shape and parts, so also can an organization. But an account of what a machine or organization is must, if it is to be complete, take cognizance of the motions it and its parts make, and how they make them. (This is properly the subject matter of Part II, but aspects of it will necessarily arise in Part I; nor, despite the

resulting overlap between Parts I and II will any effort be made to keep them from doing so.)

The following booby-traps, inherent in any attempt to fix, describe, and criticize an organization, have been kept in mind by the ORO research team responsible for this report: no organization directs all of its energies into the realization of its purpose, and there is consequently great danger that the outsider will overestimate the incidence of purposefulness in the activity. His account may be twisted in this direction or that because he is in or out of sympathy with the organization's avowed purpose, or with the definition of that purpose. Because documents are easy to extract and human beings are not, the outsider's account may overemphasize formal as against working procedures and relationships; i.e., he may forget that the formal procedures and relationships are never the actual ones. He may treat as conscious decisions or choices to do or not do this or that what are in fact quasi-automatic repetitions of long-standing habitual behavior responses. And he may, lastly, attribute to decision-makers on one echelon a capacity to make decisions that has, tacitly but nevertheless firmly, been withdrawn from them by the next higher echelon.

PART I

DISCUSSION WHAT ITS MISSION IS

No official statement defining the mission of the EUSAK Psywar Division has ever been made; at least, no document exists that includes such a statement. Thus the original order establishing the Psywar Division is silent as to its purpose and operating sphere, and while it has attempted, on occasion, to obtain rulings on these and other related points, none has yet been handed down.

The psywar operators themselves, in the EUSAK Psywar Division and in the FECOM Psywar Section, describe the primary mission of EUSAK Psywar as that of conducting "tactical" psychological warfare in support of UN military operations in Korea. What precisely this means in practice will be made clear in Part II, which describes what the organization actually does and enables conclusions as to what it is trying to do. On the evidence presented there, an accurate general statement of EUSAK Psywar's primary mission would be the following: the "tactical" use, i.e., the use with an eye to the developing tactical situation along the front, of psychological warfare measures calculated to induce enemy soldiers to surrender. This statement, it should be noted, applies, like the discussion in the next paragraphs, only to the period studied by the ORO field team, that is, January to September 1951. Individual members of the Psywar Division's staff have indicated to the field team that they would like to see the mission broadened so as to include attempts to induce types of behavior other than surrenders, so that there is reason to believe that the possibility of so broadening it is receiving careful consideration. But EUSAK's day-to-day operations appear, at the present writing, still to be going forward along the lines indicated in the foregoing statement.

The overwhelming importance that the operators (and the FECOM directives as well, insofar as they are applicable) assign to "surrender-mission psywar" cannot be overemphasized. For this also, however, there is no basis to be found in any existing document or order. The situation seems to be simply that the Psywar Division, in the combat phase of its activities, goes after surrenders rather than, e.g., desertions or

malingerings or reduced enemy effectiveness in actual battle or enemy actions based upon deliberately implanted misapprehensions as to UN intentions, UN capabilities, and the disposition of UN forces, because this is the meaning it--and those to whom it is responsible--assigns to the words "psychological warfare".

This statement of the mission is not intended to imply that EUSAK should attempt to distribute its energies differently, or that higher authority would permit it to do so if it made the attempt. It is not suggested, either, that EUSAK psywar operations do not produce desertions, malingerings, and reduced enemy effectiveness in battle, or that the operators are unconcerned about these things. But what they talk about, both in their councils and in their output for enemy troops,6/ is almost invariably surrenders, and appeals and arguments calculated to cause surrenders. Moreover, most of the characteristic features of the organization and its operations can be understood only in the light of its central preoccupation with surrenders.

The boundaries of EUSAK's operating jurisdiction, i.e., its "frontier" with FECOM psywar, are, by contrast with its mission, easy to define, though here again no document can be cited--in part a matter of different geographical spheres of operations, in part a matter of immediate control of different psywar media. "Strategic" psywar leaflet activities, for example, fall within the sphere of psywar operations reserved for FECOM. In practice, this means that FECOM "works" certain territory, namely, the enemy rear down to about ten miles from the bomb-line (at present down to parallel 38°30'). Leaflet activities south of this boundary, in an area that includes the enemy's immediate rear, the front lines, and the UN rear areas, are the operational responsibility of EUSAK Psywar. (As noted elsewhere in this memorandum, no clear distinction can be drawn in terms of the character of the leaflets dropped.) Similarly, all loudspeaker activities, ground and air, take place within EUSAK's leaflet territory, and EUSAK Psywar has full operational responsibility for them. As for radio broadcasting, however, all US Army psywar transmitting facilities in south Korea are under the direct operational control of FECOM Psywar, so that radio psywar, even in EUSAK's leaflet territory, is a FECOM function.

6/ A sequel to the present memorandum will analyze what EUSAK psywar says to enemy troops, but some of the data to be canvassed in that memorandum are anticipated here, and at subsequent points in the discussion.

FOR WHOM ITS MISSION IS PERFORMED

The EUSAK Psywar Division reports both to EUSAK and to FECOM. It operates, that is to say, (1) as an arm of GHQ, FEC, from which it receives "directives" and for which it performs certain psywar functions; and (2) as an integral part of the field army military system, that is, as one of the elements geared into EUSAK's total effort in Korea.

In the first of these two aspects, while EUSAK Psywar has primary operational responsibilities as outlined above, and in theory receives commands only through EUSAK channels, those responsibilities are discharged under the direct supervision of FECOM Psywar. EUSAK Psywar's relationship to FECOM Psywar, and the form FECOM "supervision" actually takes, require, for the purposes of the present section of this report, detailed examination. This will be followed by a discussion of the second aspect, EUSAK Psywar's place in Eighth Army.

EUSAK PSYWAR'S RELATIONSHIP TO FECOM

The relationship between EUSAK Psywar and FECOM Psywar, at least as understood in FECOM, appears to be as follows: EUSAK Psywar operations go forward in complete subordination to weekly plans and "directives" issued by the Plans and Policies Section, PWS, FEC. In practice, a characteristic of that subordination is that EUSAK Psywar is permitted some freedom not only to act but also to improvise. How much freedom this amounts to is one of the questions this sub-part will attempt to answer.

The FECOM Psywar Section publishes, every Wednesday, a "Weekly Plan for Psychological Warfare Operations." The plan applies to all psywar activities under the theater command. The section of the plan that is relevant to EUSAK Psywar normally takes the form of a list of "themes" that are "to be emphasized" in a certain part (see below) of the week's leaflet operations directed against front-line enemy troops. The plan does not cover leaflet operations against guerillas or against civilians in the UN rear; nor does it cover EUSAK's air and ground loudspeaker operations. It does cover radio psywar in south Korea, but this, as noted above, is not a concern of the EUSAK Division.

Strictly speaking, there is no command relationship between EUSAK Psywar and FECOM Psywar; from a technical standpoint, therefore, EUSAK Psywar is not operationally responsible, in the first instance, to the latter. Thus the Weekly Plan is, in the strict sense, a recommendation, with which EUSAK Psywar complies on behalf of its direct superior in the chain of command, EUSAK G-3. The normal tone of the plan,

however, is that of a command, as is illustrated by the following excerpt from the 30 August issue (underlining added):

Following are the principle themes to be emphasized in psychological warfare operations during the week of 2-8 September...

Leaflets:

2. Front-line Enemy troops:

a. Surrender and good treatment. Include a special message to former ROK soldiers now serving in the north Korean II and V Corps. Recent intelligence reports indicate that a high percentage of the troops in these corps are ex-ROK soldiers who, captured by the enemy, have been serving voluntarily or involuntarily in the NKA. Their morale is believed to be low, and most enemy prisoners taken in recent weeks have been from this category of troops.

b. Futility of a new attack; power of UN artillery.

c. Delay in armistice talks needlessly prolongs the war.

d. Sino-American friendship (CCF only).

e. Unification of Korea (NKA only).

The instruction in (2,a) to include a special message for certain enemy units is, to be sure, a departure from common practice. Such detailed delineation of themes to be emphasized in front-line operations has been attempted in the Weekly Plan on only five or six occasions. The instruction does, however, indicate how far the plan goes, at the margin, in providing point-by-point guidance for EUSAK's operations, and how the relation between FECOM and EUSAK is understood in FECOM.

Ordinarily, the plan follows the form of (2, b, c, d, and e), i.e., it merely instructs EUSAK Psywar to emphasize such and such theme, though in several instances it has gone somewhat further and stated theme priorities in terms of primary and secondary emphasis. It has specified whether the themes are for north Korean troops or for Chinese troops. It has stated (but only since April 1951) whether the themes are for enemy troops in the front lines, i.e., EUSAK's area of operations, or for enemy troops in the rear, i.e., FECOM's area of operations.

As given in the Weekly Plan, then, nearly all of FECOM's instructions as to themes would appear to be on a level of broad

generality. Along with the Weekly Plan, however, FECOM Psywar sends EUSAK Psywar a weekly "Schedule of Leaflet Air-Drops," according to which EUSAK Psywar is expected to disseminate FECOM leaflets.7/ The schedule is in the nature of a supplement to the Weekly Plan: besides reiterating the plan's list of themes to be emphasized for front-line Chinese and Korean troops in the forthcoming week, it selects the particular leaflet that FECOM Psywar deems most likely to represent it effectively, specifies the quantity of that particular leaflet to be disseminated, and names the day on which the dissemination is expected to take place, leaving EUSAK free merely to decide where the leaflet is to be dropped. The schedule of 13 September 1951, for example, gives the following program for 16 and 17 September:

	Chinese Troops		North Korean Troops	
	Leaflet	Quantity	Leaflet	Quantity
September 16				
Warning to civilians .			1105	250,000
Communist prolongation of war	7080	200,000	1101	210,000
Unification and 38th parallel . . .			1100	100,000
Power of UN artillery.	7079	70,000		
Dissipation of Chinese strength. .	7057	170,000		
September 17				
Good treatment and surrender	7076	200,000	1095	100,000
Safe conduct pass. . .	6009	200,000	9016	100,000
Approaching Communist attack.	7083	259,000	1104	100,000
Communist prolongation of war	7080	100,000	1101	100,000

Two points emerge clearly from this schedule: (1) if EUSAK Psywar follows the schedule it automatically takes the appropriate steps, with the context of the FECOM Weekly Plan, as to theme emphases; and (2) in so doing EUSAK Psywar is following not general but extremely detailed instructions. It is the Schedule, not the Weekly Plan as such, that illustrates the degree of FECOM control over EUSAK Psywar.

7/ As this memorandum is written, discussions are under way that may result in a new understanding as to the status of the Schedule, i.e., as to the problem dealt with in the following paragraphs of the text.

Although FECOM Psywar clearly expects the instructions to EUSAK Psywar laid down in the schedule to be given very high priority in EUSAK's psywar operations, the resulting arrangements are not entirely inflexible. EUSAK Psywar has, on occasion, taken exception to the instructions as to which and how many FECOM leaflets are to be dropped on which days (it may question, for instance, the appropriateness of these instructions to the current military situation, or their feasibility), and has been able to obtain informal approval for its counter-proposals. According to EUSAK Psywar officers, however, two or three long telephone conversations are usually necessary before such approval is obtained, and for this and another reason, namely, that the discussions are difficult to conduct without references to classified information, counter-proposals are seldom made.

We must now notice, however, that the foregoing discussion of the Weekly Plan and Schedule applies only to two-thirds of total EUSAK leaflet dissemination.8/ The reasons for this are as follows: First, EUSAK Psywar makes regular requests for certain FECOM leaflets to be shipped to Seoul in certain amounts, over and above those delivered by FECOM for dissemination according to the schedule. These are for that portion of EUSAK's leaflet stockpile that is to be disseminated at EUSAK Psywar's own discretion (currently EUSAK is drawing about one-sixth9/ of the leaflets it disseminates, from this source). Neither the plan nor the schedule is expected to apply to this important flow of leaflets.

Second, an additional one-sixth10/ of the EUSAK leaflet dissemination consists of leaflets prepared and produced by EUSAK itself. With respect to this portion also EUSAK Psywar is free--vis-a-vis FECOM though within policy limitations that will be discussed--to determine the themes to be emphasized, the leaflets to express those themes, the dates on which the leaflets will be dropped, and the size of the drops. Here, in short, as with the portion of its stockpile discussed in the preceding paragraph, EUSAK Psywar makes the choices that FECOM Psywar makes with respect to the FECOM leaflets covered by the schedule. The theory behind this arrangement, and the discretion it leaves to EUSAK, is suggested by a phrase formerly incorporated in the Weekly Plan: it directed EUSAK to emphasize x, y, z themes, and "such other themes as may be appropriate for exploitation of tactical situations" (or, sometimes, of "localized tactical situations"). This seems tantamount to

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8/ These figures are based on June, July, and August 1951 operations.

9/ Ibid.

10/ Ibid.

giving EUSAK Psywar a free hand in deciding what "tactical" themes (on FECOM's understanding of "tactical") are "appropriate." The phrase no longer appears in the Weekly Plan, but the conception underlying it, according to the FECOM Plans Officer, continues to govern FECOM's thinking.

The plan and schedule apply, then, to only two-thirds approximately of EUSAK leaflet dissemination, and govern only the themes and leaflets to be disseminated and (as already indicated) the date and size of the relevant drops. Thus, even when EUSAK Psywar does not decide which FECOM leaflets it is going to disseminate in what quantities on which days, it does select the targets and does plan and conduct the dissemination operations. In doing so, EUSAK Psywar nevertheless acts as an operational arm of FECOM Psywar; i.e., it performs, if largely at its own discretion, cruicial last-minute functions in connection with an important phase of FECOM's psywar activities.

In addition to the Weekly Plan that FECOM Psywar addresses to EUSAK Psywar at regular intervals, and in addition to the dissemination schedule that accompanies it, the FECOM Psywar Section sends the EUSAK Division so-called "Policy Directives." These, formerly entitle "Policy Memoranda" or "Policy Guidances," are issued as needed for all psychological warfare operations in the theater; in practice, over the past year, there have been an average of between one and two a week. The policy directives instruct all subordinate agencies, including EUSAK Psywar, as to (1) topics and themes that are forbidden (e.g., biological warfare); (2) topics and themes that are recommended for continuous exploitation (e.g., the slogan "Peace, Unification, Rehabilitation); and (3) the "line" concerning certain permissible (but not required or recommended) topics and themes (e.g., the summer 1951 cease-fire talks). The policy directives, of which 60 had been issued by the end of August 1951, are a page or two in length, and usually include an extensive discussion of the point at issue.

A somewhat detailed review of policy directives now in force will be provided in Part II, where it will be shown that over the past year most of them--two-thirds or more--have dealt with political questions that fall outside the actual sphere of interest of EUSAK Psywar. EUSAK Psywar has, given the present understandings as to its mission, no occasion to deal in its output with, for example, such matters as the Japanese Treaty, Stalin's interview, or General MacArthur's dismissal. Those directives that deal with matters within the EUSAK Psywar sphere of interest are, on the other hand, binding for so long as FECOM chooses to keep them in force. Here also, however, EUSAK Psywar is free to raise questions with and make recommendations to the FECOM Psywar Section, either by telephone or

by written correspondence. As Part II shows, on one occasion at least EUSAK has been able to bring about the revision of a policy directive that it regarded as hampering its operations.

Thus the Weekly Plan, especially as embodied in the schedule, and the policy directive issued by FECOM Psywar, are the latter's two major instruments for the general supervision of EUSAK Psywar. Apart from these, EUSAK Psywar sometimes submits, on its own initiative, proposed leaflets or psywar plans involving new questions of policy for prior approval by FECOM Psywar. Sometimes, also, EUSAK Psywar prepares leaflets that it turns over to FECOM for "quantity" and "quality" production. As we should expect from the foregoing, however, FECOM feels at liberty to alter the graphics and texts it receives from EUSAK in the light of its own conceptions as to what constitutes a good and effective leaflet.

The EUSAK Psywar Division submits to FECOM a weekly report of its activities, the "Psychological Warfare Bulletin." This report typically includes an account of the week's missions, the psywar themes exploited, and such new developments or plans as seem to merit FECOM's attention. It also summarizes prisoner comments on psywar output as collected, whether at first or second hand, by the Psywar Division interrogators. This report provides FECOM Psywar with its main, and its only continuous, means of post-checking the activities of the EUSAK Division. Because of it, anything EUSAK is doing that FECOM disapproves can, theoretically, be brought to a half at an early moment. Moreover, the necessity of accounting regularly to higher authority for its activities presumably tends to keep EUSAK in line with FECOM's wishes, known or anticipated. Field visits and inspections by FECOM personnel are few and far between, especially since there is no liaison officer who can treat such visits as his major responsibility. Visits to Tokyo by EUSAK personnel for extended consultations are also infrequent. Liaison activity goes forward, therefore, mainly in the form of written communications and telephone conversations.

According to the relevant organizational chart, the channel between FECOM Psywar and EUSAK Psywar for the interchange of information, the interpretation of plans and directives, and the transmission of requests, instructions, or suggestions, is a EUSAK Liaison Officer in the Psychological Operations Branch of the FECOM Section. Apparently, however, this post has never been filled. Another official channel has therefore been used for these purposes, namely, the FECOM Operations Officer.

In summary: the FECOM Psywar Section, though a thousand miles removed from EUSAK's field of action and largely out

of touch with its personnel except for formal communications, is the source of numerous and important decisions concerning the shape of EUSAK psywar activities. It sends EUSAK Psywar a Weekly Plan and an accompanying dissemination Schedule that embodies detailed instructions affecting two-thirds of EUSAK's total leaflet dissemination. It sends EUSAK Psywar frequent policy directives. If EUSAK Psywar regards these documents as "guidances" or "recommendations" or "suggestions" or "requests" rather than as "commands," it nevertheless treats them, in practice, as mandatory until rescinded, and as subject to negotiation only in exceptional circumstances.

Evidently, this relationship between FECOM Psywar and EUSAK Psywar does not conform to the general relationship between Theater and Army: in fields other than psywar, theater does not attempt to direct the subordinate army activities in nearly so great detail. The doctrine underlying this general relationship appears to be that theater can, without infringing upon the autonomy Army needs in order to perform its mission as a tactical unit, tell Army what it wants Army to do; e.g., it states that such-and-such a military objective is desirable. But rarely if ever does it, according to this doctrine, tell Army what tactical measures to adopt in order to take that objective, e.g, when and where to strike, with what forces and what weapons, and so on. Psywar in the Korean war appears, by comparison with this conception of Theater-Army relations, to be highly centralized at theater level. The question thus arises: Is the present degree of centralization rational? From the standpoint of US military operations as a whole, do the disadvantages involved in withholding from EUSAK Psywar the freedom of action normally enjoyed by a tactical unit count less than the advantages that present arrangements confer on theater-level psywar? And this raises the further questions: Is there a conflict, as regards the conduct of "tactical" psychological warfare operations, between army-level interests and theater-level interests? And, if so, on what principles does operations research mediate such a clash?

It would be a mistake, in discussing these questions, to assume either that theater-level interest should automatically prevail in all cases over army-level interests since theater accomplishes its mission through army. But it would be equally a mistake to assume that the division of control that is most rational from the standpoint of Army's mission would necessarily be the most rational from the standpoint of theater's (although if it were not this would raise questions about the rationality of the relevant allocation of missions).

If, for example, we were to assume:

1. That "strategic" psywar is an exclusive responsibility of FECOM;

2. That the successful conduct of "strategic" leaflet psywar calls for the dissemination of leaflets over enemy troops at and close to the front;

3. That there are sound operational reasons for having "strategic" leaflets disseminated to such troops by media physically situated at army; and

4. That there are questions of timing involved in the dissemination of "strategic" leaflets that must be decided by the officers responsible for planning their content,

then there would be a prime facie case for retaining control over army's dissemination operations at theater, insofar as such retention were demonstrably necessary for timing the operations correctly. But this would tell us nothing about the consequences retention of control at theater would have for other dissemination tasks that need to be performed by those same dissemination media. In order to discuss the questions posed above, therefore, we must first answer the questions: Do FECOM Psywar and EUSAK Psywar have separate and distinct psywar missions? Do these missions have different implications as to the rational division of control over army-level leaflet dissemination?

These questions are, in the present context, less difficult to answer than they might appear. EUSAK, as we have seen above, does have the separate and distinct mission of conducting surrender-mission psywar with an eye to the developing tactical situation on the Eighth Army front. FECOM has the separate and distinct mission of conducting "strategic" psywar operations well behind the enemy lines. The missions overlap, however, insofar as both FECOM and EUSAK are responsible for preparing materials for "tactical" dissemination by EUSAK, and thus have a proper interest in their being disseminated in a timely and sense-making manner. This being the case, the question of control over the dissemination does not necessarily call for a prior decision as to whether FECOM's mission should take precedence over EUSAK's or vice versa. It would do so automatically only if the grounds on which FECOM control of dissemination is supported had to do exclusively or primarily with its separate and distinct major mission of conducting strategic psywar operations. Beyond this point, the relevant considerations appear to be as follows:

1. The grounds on which FECOM-control dissemination (i.e., the present degree of centralization) is supported, as explained to the ORO field team, do not appear to have to do

with FECOM's strategic psywar mission, but with that part of its total mission that overlaps with EUSAK's psywar (i.e., the preparation of leaflets for "tactical" dissemination).

2. The urgent question, therefore, is whether the present arrangements regarding control of EUSAK dissemination are those most likely to forward the achievement of a common purpose, namely, optimum "tactical" dissemination of leaflets, most surrender leaflets, some of which are prepared by FECOM and some prepared by EUSAK.

3. The present arrangements, when considered from this point of view, do not appear to be completely rational, and can be justified only on the palpably absurd grounds that optimum "tactical" dissemination is unnecessary for GHQ-prepared leaflets. They cannot be justified on the grounds that FECOM is in a better position than EUSAK to plan optimum "tactical" dissemination, because the logic of this would be not only to withdraw from EUSAK control over where GHQ-prepared leaflets are to be dropped, but also control over where EUSAK-prepared leaflets are to be dropped.

4. The presumption in favor of treating optimum dissemination of all leaflets intended for "tactical" use as a purely tactical problem, thus fully within the competence of Army as a tactical unit, is consequently very strong.

5. Existing arrangements should either be revised so as to take away all of EUSAK's freedom of action with respect to the dissemination of GHQ leaflets (whether on the grounds that they are so different from EUSAK leaflets as not to require "tactical" dissemination and/or on the grounds that GHQ, because of superior resources and/or know-how of whatever kind, is in better position than EUSAK to plan tactical dissemination of leaflets), or EUSAK should be given a completely free hand in disseminating at least those GHQ leaflets for which tactical dissemination is desired. This free hand should extend not only to the question of what leaflets are to be dropped on what days in what amounts, but also (since otherwise GHQ leaflets might silt up indefinitely in the stockpile because EUSAK regarded their dissemination as tactically unwise) to an equal voice in decisions as to what quantities of what leaflets GHQ is to pass along to EUSAK for "tactical" dissemination. A different arrangement, leaving GHQ greater authority, might be contemplated for GHQ leaflets for which general, not "tactical," dissemination in and close to the lines is desired.

This conclusion is reinforced by the consequence of GHQ control over "tactical" dissemination of GHQ-prepared leaflets as seen from the point of view of EUSAK itself. The consensus of opinion within EUSAK psywar is that FECOM frequently gets

in the way of EUSAK's ready adaptation of surrender-mission psywar measures to the fluctuations of the military situation, and without compensating gains as regards the accomplishment of FECOM's mission. The reasoning underlying this opinion appears to be as follows:

In the first place, EUSAK Psywar's compliance with the FECOM schedule tends to give scheduled drops first, not second, priority claims on its facilities. Day in, day out, it must disseminate nearly 1,000,000 leaflets for FECOM,11/ and has, as we have seen, little or no choice in the matter. If a temporary reduction in EUSAK's available facilities (personnel and materiel) occurs--if, say, a plane becomes non-operational and another is not immediately available--it is the psywar program under EUSAK's control that suffers, whether or not the military situation calls for a reduction in that phase of its effort.

Secondly, even when its available facilities do not vary and no reduction in EUSAK-controlled dissemination is necessary in order to comply with the schedule, EUSAK's commitment of a large proportion of man- and equipment-hours to the schedule sets upper and lower limits to EUSAK Psywar's "tactical" flexibility. Maximum exploitation of a given military situation might conceivably require the concentration of all of EUSAK Psywar's resources on an operation of a certain type (e.g., a comprehensive "anti-morale" campaign, as an attempt to cause mutiny in a vulnerable enemy unit), and at best EUSAK Psywar can devote only half of its operational resources to the project. By the same token, the military situation might call for no leaflet drops at all for a time, but EUSAK Psywar would, given present arrangements, be obliged to carry out the FECOM schedule at the rate of 1,000,000 leaflets a day.

Thirdly, "tactically"-oriented surrender-mission psywar requires careful decisions, based upon recent intelligence about the enemy and accurate if not intimate knowledge of prospective friendly operations, as to when and in what quantities the various kinds of leaflets should be disseminated. The consensus of opinion in EUSAK Psywar is that FECOM, in scheduling leaflets and quantities and dates, tends to make the relevant decisions on other grounds which, however valid in themselves, may and often do result in EUSAK's disseminating leaflets that it regards as "tactically" contra-indicated. In late September 1951, for example, EUSAK Psywar regarded the front as "saturated" with safe-conduct passes and believed that the prevailing military situation could better be exploited by other types of leaflets. It was nevertheless

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obliged to continue dropping the passes--on, in its view, the best of the relatively poor targets it could discover--according to schedule.

Fourthly, the careful decisions contemplated in the preceding paragraph need, at the margin, to be taken and implemented quickly, that is, in the light of not merely recent but up-to-the-minute intelligence. Such decisions, it is felt in EUSAK, are out of the question for FECOM, because it is too far removed in point of time from the relevant intelligence. Moreover, the mere fact that FECOM is willing to make such decisions for a week in advance (while EUSAK makes its decisions for only 24 hours in advance and holds itself ready to revise them throughout the day) suggests that FECOM is making them on other than "tactical" grounds.

Fifthly, it is felt in EUSAK that even if FECOM were to make its scheduling decisions for EUSAK dissemination on "tactical" grounds, and even if detailed tactical intelligence reached FECOM without a time-lag, the present arrangements would nevertheless often place EUSAK Psywar in a difficult situation vis-a-vis its direct client, Eighth Army. A recent example may help clarify this point. In late September 1951, the enemy in Korea was known to be preparing for a possible major attack. FECOM Psywar decided that the attack was imminent, and scheduled drops of leaflets on front-line troops in accordance with its picture of the military situation; i.e., it set out to inform enemy soldiers that their commanders were about to launch a new attack, to give them warning of the impending casualties, and so on. EUSAK G-2, however, decided that while such an attack was probable at some time in the future, it was not imminent. In complying with the FECOM directive, EUSAK Psywar would disseminate a leaflet that, according to EUSAK G-2's estimate, was inappropriate to the existing military situation; and as an Eighth Army organ it should, of course, tailor its dissemination activities to EUSAK G-2's expectations. FECOM control over those activities, in short, may in this kind of situation keep it from performing the mission for which it was created, namely, serving Eighth Army in the Korean war.

None of the above considerations, it should be noted, is inconsistent with the presumption that the resources and personnel at the disposal of a theater psywar section are superior to those at the disposal of a field army. This presumption, indeed, appears to be generally accepted in EUSAK's PWD. The case against theater control over tactical dissemination of leaflets at army level rests, as stated in EUSAK, exclusively upon the latter's immediate access to fresh intelligence, to current UN tactical planning, and to the dissemination media themselves.

THE PSYWAR DIVISION'S RELATIONSHIP TO EUSAK

Besides being subordinate to the FECOM Psywar Section, in the manner and to the extent outlined above, the EUSAK Psywar Division is formally integrated into Eighth Army. Organizationally, it is a division of the G-3 Section, reporting directly to G-3. Proposed leaflets and operational plans must receive G-3 approval, and G-3 is kept informed of the Psywar Division's activities by means of a daily written report, the weekly report to FECOM Psywar (which carries the G-3's signature) and frequent unscheduled briefings.

All the evidence available to the ORO field team, most particularly the testimony of psywar operators, appears to indicate that G-3 has proved a congenial home for the Psychological Warfare Division: the latter's requirements and problems have got prompt and sympathetic consideration; and psychological warfare's potentialities as a weapon seem to have been freely accepted from the first. There has been, that is to say, no struggle for "status" vis-a-vis other weapons, and the Section's officers have at no time shown any tendency, of the kind psywar officers frequently ran up against in their dealings with "hardware" personnel in World War II, to treat the idea of dropping pieces of paper on the enemy as slightly absurd and, in any case, irrelevant to winning the war. Indeed this seems to have been true, from an early moment, in Eighth Army as a whole; the wisecracks and chuckles that psywar officers heard ad nauseam even as late as 1945 have been nowhere in evidence. Psychological warfare officers at EUSAK have not, in a word, been obliged to assume, in addition to their other responsibilities, that of justifying their existence; and if there has been a continuous shortage of psychological warfare personnel and equipment, there is no evidence that psywar has received unequal treatment, in this regard, with other weapons.

The Psywar Division's chief contact with G-3 is the G-3 Executive Officer, who supervises psywar activities for G-3. This supervision is, apparently, not a formality by any means. The G-3 Executive Officer gives, in general, considerable attention to proposed leaflets and plans, takes time from other matters to discuss them when they are submitted for his approval, and occasionally, though as we have noticed he seldom withholds his approval, says what he likes and what he dislikes about them. From time to time, indeed, he visits the psywar offices, and submits proposals of his own for consideration by the psywar officers. On at least one occasion he has turned over to the Psywar Division the responsibility for conducting the staff work for G-3 on some special operation which had psywar aspects.

The location of the Psywar Division within G-3 is, according to Army doctrine at least, in one sense, an organizational anomaly. The division is not a purely "staff" agency; it engaged in some operations, and has therefore certain command responsibilities; yet it is not organized as a special staff section, as psywar now is in Tokyo and has been for some time in Washington. Whereas in theory the special staff sections report directly to the Chief of Staff, EUSAK Psywar is part of G-3, and is "coordinated" by G-3 for the Chief of Staff.

The feeling in EUSAK on this matter seems to be that army-level psywar can better perform its functions from inside G-3 than from outside as a special staff section. It is felt, in other words, that the direct access to the Chief of Staff enjoyed by the special staff sections, though a valuable asset, would not compensate for the disadvantage of greater remoteness from G-3. The chief advantage claimed for the present arrangement is that it promotes the integration of psywar into army operational planning, and thus facilitates the handling of psywar as an element in the field army weapons complex.

It should not be concluded from the above, as we shall see in greater detail in Part II, that the integration of psywar into G-3 Plans and Operations has been or is at the present time by any means complete. In mid-August 1951, for example, when for the first time the Psywar Operations Officer began to be present at meetings and discussions in the G-3 Plans Section, EUSAK psywar personnel welcomed this development as a great forward step. The relationship had previously been one in which psywar plans at army level were added, incidentally and at a late day or hour, to already formulated "hardware" plans, and added principally on the Psywar Division's own initiative. Whether the presence of a psywar officer at meetings and discussions will have the expected results, i.e., whether it will mean psywar plans geared more fully and at an earlier moment into hardware plans, and will thus genuinely affect the character of EUSAK psywar operations, it is too early to attempt to say.

In the absence of full integration with army-level plans and operations, EUSAK Psywar, as regards most of its activities, has been for some purposes a virtually independent agency vis-a-vis EUSAK, pursuing its own course of action against the enemy. It has enough access to EUSAK G-3 to be able to keep in touch with EUSAK's operational plans, to be sure, and is close enough to EUSAK G-2 to be able to get the most accurate and recent situational intelligence about the enemy that is available in EUSAK. Moreover, the G-3 Executive Officer is cognizant of all psywar activities, and is in

a position to see to it that these activities do not get out of step with operational plans. But "full" integration with army-level "hardware" plans and operations evidently requires a great deal more than this. It requires that no hardware plans reach the stage of formulation without full consideration of the potential contribution of this or that psywar demarche, and this in turn requires extensive consultation early in the planning stage.

If EUSAK Psywar were organized as a special staff section outside G-3, the psywar operators believe, their chances of improving psywar integration at army-level would be considerably reduced. The reasons underlying this belief appear to be as follows:

1. It is by no means certain that psywar would gain appreciably in status simply by becoming a staff section: as a special staff section it would be largely on its own as far as prestige and influence are concerned, while as a division of G-3 it has the backing of perhaps the most powerful of the army staff agencies.

2. Direct access to the Chief of Staff, which psywar would presumably obtain as a special staff section, might remain, because of competing claims on the Chief of Staff's time, in large part nominal; and even if it did not there is no assurance that access to the Chief of Staff would produce a notably different situation as regards integration with hardware from that which now exists.

3. Even as a special staff section, psywar could achieve "full" integration only via intimate relations with G-3 and G-2, and there is no reason to assume such relations could be developed and maintained more easily from outside G-3 than from inside G-3.

All the preceding discussion is predicated on the premise, which EUSAK psywar operators certainly tend to take for granted, that more complete integration of psywar into Army plans and operations than now obtains is highly desirable; and it remains to ask whether this assumption is warranted. The relevant considerations would appear, from the standpoint of army-level psychological warfare doctrine, as follows: Even if we take for granted (1) that more complete integration into hardware plans and operations would confer great gains upon psychological warfare (and, conceivably, on hardware warfare as well), and (2) that these gains vary directly with the degree and genuineness of the integration, we must bear in mind the fact that integration involves <u>costs</u>, and that these also vary directly with the degree and genuineness of the integration. In order to make integration work both hardware and psychological warfare

personnel must devote scarce time and energy to it, and it is of the first importance that no time and energy be devoted to it that could be more productively employed in other activities. From this it follows that integration should be carried just so far as considerations of efficiency and effectiveness dictate, and that a general principle calling for more and more complete integration of psywar into hardware activities has no place in psychological warfare doctrine. The real question, therefore, is whether either psychological warfare or hardware activities in Eighth Army are being hampered by the fact that integration of the former into the latter is not more complete than at present; and the correct answer to this question would appear to be as follows:

The ORO field team responsible for the present memorandum found no concrete evidence that EUSAK Psywar's surrender-mission activities are being hampered by insufficient integration into hardware plans and operations at army-level, or that hardware plans and operations are being hampered by insufficient integration of surrender-mission psychological warfare. If EUSAK Psywar is to continue to assign overwhelming importance to the use of psywar techniques to induce enemy soldiers to surrender, its present degree of integration would seem to be as complete as the circumstances warrant. In those instances in which EUSAK Psywar has attempted, or been permitted to attempt, operations calculated to induce types of behavior other than surrendering, the necessary integration with hardware plans and operations appears to have been achieved easily via ad hoc arrangement.

The question that needs to be faced in EUSAK, on the above showing, is not, therefore, whether to integrate the PWD more completely into G-3 plans and operations, but whether the conception of the PWD's mission that now prevails in EUSAK is one that enables psywar to make its full contribution to hardware operations. Insofar as that conception tends to exclude the use of psywar to get enemy soldiers to do--short, and in the marginal case far short, of surrendering--this, that, or the other thing that would facilitate the realization of Eighth Army's plans, there are compelling reasons, both theoretical and historical, for believing that it is not fully exploiting the offensive potentialities of psychological warfare. As we have seen above, the case for adopting a broader conception enjoys a certain amount of support within the PWD. But, however that may be, the ORO field team found no evidence of such support among the hardware officers it was able to consult: they, without exception, tended to equate psywar with surrender-mission operations. It is, therefore, not surprising that Operation Tomahawk, where psywar was used for purposes of deliberate deception, is the one conspicuous departure from the prevailing narrow conception of psywar that was brought to the team's attention.

The following conclusions appear to follow from the foregoing considerations:

1. Eighth Army, particularly Eighth Army hardware officers, should reconsider the mission of the Psywar Division, giving careful attention to the possible advantages of shifting emphasis, in some degree, away from surrender-mission operations and toward operations of the general character of Tomahawk.

2. Decisions as to the degree to which psywar is to be integrated into hardware plans and operations should be made pari passu with decisions as to the breadth of the Psywar Division's mission.

3. The present relation between the Psywar Division and G-3 should be considered satisfactory for the purposes of surrender-mission psywar.

Even for surrender-mission "tactical" psywar, to be sure, the operators need to know what there is to know about enemy vulnerabilities, and they need to know what new vulnerabilities are likely to be exposed or created by prospective "hardware" operations. They need, in short, to adapt psywar actions to the tactical situation as of each given moment. In the main, however, as we shall notice repeatedly, EUSAK's psywar operators appear to be adequately briefed in these regards, despite the fact that they do not participate in the planning and execution of hardware operations.

It cannot be overemphasized, however, that the pursuit of a different mission would make different organizational demands upon psywar, and that these might indeed call for closer integration with army plans and operations. In this connection we may note, in passing, that the restrictions imposed by FECOM upon EUSAK's operational discretion, as described above, might well render difficult if not impossible the army-level integration of psywar that a broader psywar mission might require. This danger would remain so long as FECOM control over tactical dissemination continued to be conceived to terms of surrender-mission psywar, and so long as only one-third of EUSAK Psywar's leaflet dissemination were regularly available for gearing into army hardware operations.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PSYWAR DIVISION

The Psywar Division is headed by a Chief of Psywar, through most of the organization's history a colonel, and an Executive Officer, at present a lieutenant colonel. They direct not only the Psywar Division proper but also the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, which, though attached

to EUSAK Special Troops for administration, is under the control of the Psywar Division for operational purposes. The Chief of Psywar and his Executive Officer have the further responsibility of supervising and coordinating the work of the Corps and Division psywar sections in Eighth Army.

The Psywar Division consists of four main "groups," each reporting directly to the Chief of Psywar or, in his absence, to the Executive Officer: (1) the Intelligence Group, headed by a major; (2) the Projects Group, headed by another major; (3) the Media (or Operations) Group, also headed by a major; and (4) the Administrative Group, which is temporarily headed by the Executive Officer of the Division. (For a chart of EUSAK psywar organization, see Figure 1.)

The operations of each of the above groups, as well as those of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, are discussed in Part II. The following is merely a brief sketch of their organization and duties, as defined in the relevant official documents and/or in interviews conducted by the ORO field team.

1. The Intelligence Group, according to the informal T/O authorized by EUSAK G-3 in February 1951, is assigned one major, 1 captain, 1 intelligence sergeant (E-6), and one intelligence clerk-typist (E-4). Its actual military complement, as of this writing, consists of one major, one first lieutenant, and two enlisted clerk-typists, one private first class, and one private. It has, in addition, five civilian translator-interrogators, two of whom speak Chinese and three Korean.

The duties of the group as described in the above document, are: (a) the maintenance of situation maps in the Psywar Division; (b) the detailed scanning of G-2 files and publications for reports of units cut off, reports of surrenders and the reasons therefor, and causes of dissatisfaction, desertion, and unrest in the enemy's ranks; (c) the psywar interrogation of key prisoners; (d) the supply of recommendations as to time, place, and means of taking advantage of psywar opportunities indicated by intelligence; (e) the procuring of intelligence items pertinent to psywar from psywar officers in lower units, and, conversely, the dissemination of such items to those officers; (f) the distribution of information as to the results of all psywar operations.

It will be observed that the preceding list of official duties makes the group responsible for procuring and distributing four main things: (a) up-to-date information on tactical developments and prospects; (b) available intelligence on the background and composition of enemy units, as that develops



Figure 1.--Eusak Psywar Organization

from day to day: (c) advice based on a and b as to the vulnerability of specific enemy units and as to the feasibility of contemplated psywar operations directed at specific targets; and (d) evaluations of the effectiveness of past psywar operations. (The functions that the Intelligence Group performs in accomplishing these tasks is described in detail in Part II.)

2. The Projects Group, whose chief task is the preparation of psywar materials, is authorized the following military personnel: one lieutenant colonel, chief of the group; one major and one captain, assistants; one E-6, Projects NCO; and one E-4, clerk-typist. As this memorandum is written, the group is actually staffed as follows: one major, chief of the group; one second lieutenant, assistant; one first lieutenant, assigned to the group from the Propaganda Platoon of the FLLC; two enlisted artists, also assigned to the group from the FLLC; two civilian Chinese translators; one civilian Chinese writer (ideographs); three civilian Korean translators; and one Korean writer (ideographs).

The duties of the group, as originally specified in February 1951, include: (a) the initiation and preparation of pertinent staff studies; (b) the preparation of long-term studies; (c) liaison with G-3 in re-planning the psywar side of future operations; (d) the preparation of leaflet texts and "art work," themes for loudspeaker broadcasts, etcetera, to meet current operational developments; (e) liaison with GHQ, USIS, ROKA and Air Forces, for the purpose of establishing unified policies and programs; (f) making recommendations for policies and programs within the framework of the above; (g) liaison with media personnel, for the purpose of learning their capabilities for future projects; (i) turning over completed plans to the Media Group for execution.

As originally envisaged, the Projects Group was evidently intended to be the central psywar planning unit, which was to turn formulated plans over to the Media Group for execution. In point of fact, however, all but one of the chief planning responsibilities of Projects have been transferred to the Executive Officer or to Media, namely (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) except for leaflet and loudspeaker themes, (g), and (h). Projects' chief task has come to be that of preparing psywar materials, i.e., leaflets and voicecasts (texts, illustrations, recordings, etcetera). For this purpose, it has associated with it a permanent POW panel of 16 persons, and it also has close working ties with the Intelligence Group with respect to its prisoner interrogations, as is described in Part II.

3. The Media Group, sometimes called the Operations Group, is authorized: one lieutenant colonel, chief of the group; one major, assistant; one captain, air-ground liaison

officer; one E-6, operations NCO; one E-4 clerk-typist. Its actual complement, as of this writing, is one major, chief of group; one captain, air-ground liaison officer; one first lieutenant, assistant air-ground liaison officer; one operations NCO; one enlisted clerk-typist; and ten civilian Chinese and Korean linguists.

The duties of the Media Group as originally defined are: (a) execution of plans prepared by the Projects Group; (b) staff supervision over and liaison with all media for dissemination of psychological warfare material; (c) briefing pilots of planes used in leaflet distribution and in broadcasting with airborne loudspeakers; (d) taking staff action, as needed, to insure timely procurement of psywar supplies and/or services; (e) liaison with G-3 and G-2, and with psywar officers at corps and divisions, to insure last-minute coordination of current operations; (f) making suggestions to the Projects Group for new psywar materials with which to meet emergent or newly discovered situations in the enemy lines.

As noted above, this original list has been considerably expanded through the months since the establishment of the division. A full and specific list of Media Group responsibilities on the staff side would now include, according to the SOP recently prepared by the Psywar Division for its own use: (a) supervision of dissemination media, (b) planning the implementation of psywar programs, and (c) checking on field operations to insure compliance with policy directives. These responsibilities in turn involve: (a) recording target flight requests from corps psywar officers; (b) determining the identity of enemy concentrations; (c) checking with Intelligence to get the latest information on enemy concentrations; (d) checking with Projects to determine the most appropriate themes with which to attack selected targets; (e) arranging themes for voice-plane broadcasts; (f) planning and scheduling leaflet and voicecast flights; (g) planning improvements in the use of psywar planes; (h) getting and transmitting ground loudspeaker material; (i) scheduling the movement of teams for special psywar missions; (j) maintaining a running inventory of leaflet stocks; (k) controlling leaflets that have been selected for reproduction; (l) analyzing leaflets (by theme) to insure availability of proper leaflet stocks; (m) transmitting leaflets to superior and subordinate psywar agencies; (n) controlling scheduled leaflet drops of GHQ materials; and (o) controlling leaflet shells.

The operating (as distinct from the staff) personnel of the Media Group (including here the air-ground liaison officers) are responsible for: (a) scheduling planes for leaflet and voicecast missions; (b) briefing pilots and flight crews on the character and importance of psywar; (c) loading

planes with leaflets; (d) briefing psywar plane crews as to where leaflets are to be dropped and when the several available voicecasts are to be used; (e) training indigenous announcers for voicecasting; (f) keeping records of plane availability: (g) storing and accounting for leaflet stocks; (h) packaging leaflets for drop; (i) loading of leaflets in artillery shells; (j) shipping leaflets to corps and divisions; (k) preparing a daily report of operational activities; and (l) briefing the Psywar Division staff on operations.

The long and varied list of responsibilities of the Operations Group make abundantly clear its key position--along with the Chief and his Executive--in the planning and conduct of psywar operations. The group maintains the major contacts with G-3 Plans and Operations; it combines the work of Intelligence, Projects, and the FLLC into actual psywar missions; it stays with the missions until they are completed. It coordinates--with the missions for which it is responsible--those of the corps and division psywar officers, and fits the resulting complex of activities into army-level plans and operations on the one hand and FECOM Psywar plans and operations on the other.

4. The Administrative Group is authorized one captain, one administrative NCO, and two clerk-typists. At present, since the first of these posts is vacant, the duties of the administrative officer are being performed by the Deputy Chief of Psywar; and the group itself consists of one NCO and one clerk-typist. Their prescribed duties are (a) maintaining the division's files; (b) maintaining the division's library; (c) maintaining necessary personnel records; (d) performing the manipulative operations in connection with staff studies; and (e) typing for the Chief of the Division and the Deputy Chief.

EUSAK Psywar has little or no library[12], and produces, at present, no staff studies; (b) and (d) are not, therefore, current responsibilities of the group. Its major duties at present are to prepare the daily and weekly psywar reports,

[12] There is actually no library for the division as a whole. The Projects Group does, however, have a small collection of materials and books. These include three Hong-Kong newspapers, Chinese and Soviet picture magazines, several books on China and Korea (e.g., Crow's Five Hundred Million Customers, Osgood's Ethnology of Korea), Chinese and Korean dictionaries, Army psywar manuals, Linebarger's Psychological Warfare, a college textbook on psychology, and collections of the speeches of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, as well as official reports of various kinds.

which have already been discussed, and to requisition the division's supplies.

The following additional facts about the Psywar Division, as described, may be noticed at this point:

First, the Psywar Division is, at the time of this writing, somewhat under T/O strength; not only are the key positions filled by officers of lesser rank than the T/O calls for, but the division is two officers and four enlisted men short of the total twenty authorized military personnel.13/

Second, the organizational pattern has, for the most part, undergone only minor changes since the Psywar Division was created (February 1951). The major exception is the shift of several major duties from the Projects Group to the Media Group. Other modifications have been made, of course, but they have been of a relatively minor character.

Third, some of the division's staff are members of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, specifically its Propaganda and Intelligence Sections, working as integral parts of the division. This will be clarified subsequently.

1st LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY

In contrast with the EUSAK Psywar Division proper, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company entered psywar in the Korean war with a well-defined mission. The relevant document is T/O and E 20-77, dated 1 September 1950, which states the mission of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company as: "To conduct the tactical propaganda operations of a field army and to provide qualified psychological warfare specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate staffs." The company, according to the T/O, was to be assigned to a field army, and was to be capable of (1) conducting tactical propaganda against the enemy by the use of leaflets, news-sheets, and loudspeakers; and (2) conducting propaganda to friendly elements in enemy-held territory contiguous to the army front. The impact of experience in the Korean war has resulted in several significant modifications of the ruling interpretation of the FLLC's mission, its capabilities, and its disposition. These modifications are of interest because of the light they shed upon the nature of EUSAK psywar.

According to the T/O, the FLLC was to be organized into four platoons: (1) Company Headquarters, to consist of a captain as company commander and 27 enlisted men, including

13/ See final section of Part I for detailed discussion of EUSAK personnel and personnel problems.

administrative clerks, supply men, cooks, mechanics, and air and artillery liaison sergeants; (2) a Publications Platoon, to consist of a lieutenant, in charge of reproduction, and 30 enlisted men, including photolithographers, multigraph operators, leaflet rollers, drivers, etcetera; (3) a Propaganda Platoon, consisting of two lieutenants, (one foreign language propaganda officer and one intelligence officer), and 13 enlisted men, including artists, writers, linguists, intelligence specialists, and drivers; and (4) a Loudspeaker Platoon, with a lieutenant as platoon leader and three lieutenants as section leaders, and with 29 enlisted men (announcer-linguists, radio-mechanics, and drivers). This, personnel-wise, gives a total company strength of 8 officers and 99 enlisted men.

The existing organization of the FLLC differs in important respects from the T/O, both as to the structure of the organization and as to the rank and numbers of its personnel. The chief differences hinge ultimately upon the tacit alteration of the FLLC's mission since it became operational in the Korean campaign.

1. For other than housekeeping purposes, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company consists of a company headquarters and two, not three, platoons. The field army functions of an FLLC Propaganda Platoon, originally expected to consist of an Intelligence Section and a Propaganda Section, are actually in the hands of the Psywar Division, and are performed by it. One incidental result of this is that a few of the personnel nominally assigned to the FLLC actually work in the Projects and Intelligence Groups of the division. The FLLC's Propaganda Platoon has, moreover, disappeared to all intents and purposes. In the present context of EUSAK psywar organization and operations, the FLLC does not itself use artists, writers, or intelligence specialists. Those it formerly had have been absorbed by the Psywar Division, which itself procures and processes psywar intelligence, and composes the leaflets to be printed.

2. The FLLC has become a subsidiary and subordinate psywar organization rather than the central psywar operational organization at army level that it was intended to be. Its official mission as stated in the preceding paragraph, duplicates in large part the working mission of the Psywar Division itself, which as this memorandum shows, seeks to conduct the tactical propaganda operations of a field army and provides qualified psychological warfare advisors to the army, and subordinate staffs, so that if the FLLC actually attempted to perform its official mission one or the other would be a fifth wheel. The FLLC's chief actual day-to-day responsibilities have come to be: the conduct of ground loudspeaker

activities under the supervision of the Psywar Division, and the production of leaflets prepared by and disseminated by units of the Psywar Division. These current responsibilities are evidently much narrower than the official mission. Another way of putting the same point is to say that the Psywar Division, far from being merely the army-level psywar "staff," directly conducts the bulk of the psywar operations, i.e., leaflet dissemination.

3. The reduction in the FLLC's load of duties has not resulted in a reduction in personnel. The unanticipated growth of EUSAK psywar, besides seeming to require the organization of a large Psywar Division over and above the FLLC, has also led to marked expansion of the work of the FLLC's Publication Platoon. The platoon, as is shown in Part II, is called upon to print eight or even nine times the number of leaflets it was initially expected to print. The augmentation of the Publications Platoon has compensated for the virtual elimination of the Propaganda Platoon, so that the total personnel complement of the FLLC is 6 officers and 86 enlisted men. The company uses, in addition, a varying number of civilians.

Officer ranks in the company differ slightly from the T/O authorization. The present commanding officer of the FLLC is a major; the platoon leader of the Loudspeaker Platoon is a captain and his three section leaders are lieutenants; the platoon leader of the Publications Platoon is also a lieutenant. The one remaining officer is a lieutenant, who lives with the FLLC but works in the Psywar Division's Projects Group, writing leaflet texts.

The internal organization of the Publications Platoon and the Loudspeaker Platoon are, in general, what the T/O calls for. The former has a Camera and Plate Section, a Press Section, and a Processing Section, each of which is responsible for some phase of leaflet production. The Loudspeaker Platoon is divided into three sections, each serving one of the three US Corps in the Korean war, and each consisting of three loudspeaker teams, one for each division in each corps. (Up to 12 teams have been available; but two or three are usually inoperational, or held in reserve.)

The main organizational problems of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company are whether the FLLC should be re-organized so as to provide the operating personnel for army-level psywar, in which case, for a psywar campaign like that in Korea, it would require an added contingent for leaflet and air loudspeaker dissemination; and whether ground loudspeaker personnel should be organized as a separate company.

If the basic conception of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company at army continues to be that of conducting all psywar operations for army, or at least providing the personnel and most of the equipment for that purpose, then an air contingent to handle both leaflet and voice dissemination should be part of the company. This does not mean that it would not then, if convenient, operate in practice as an integral part of the Psywar Division's Media Group, that is, in the so-called psywar "staff" at Army headquarters. It means merely that for book-keeping purposes, including the provision of trained men and equipment and related services, formal inclusion in the company might be desirable.

Whether a separate ground loudspeaker company should be formed depends to a great degree upon the extent of contemplated ground loudspeaker operations. Ground loudspeaker operations and leaflet production have little in common that requires company-level coordination, apart from the feeding and housing of personnel and the supplying of equipment from a single source. The Loudspeaker Platoon's operations are, in any case, directly supervised by the Psywar Division's Media Group, and if the platoon were to become too large to function well in the company--e.g., because it placed too great an administrative burden on company headquarters--it could easily function independently of it. Whether loudspeaker activities should be increased to this extent, however, is a question to be determined only in the light of loudspeaker operations, and the incremental gains of a large number of teams functioning in an army. This question is considered in Part II.

The major recommendation to which this section appears to point is that psychological warfare planners at The Pentagon level should reconsider, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the present organization and composition of loudspeaker and leaflet companies.

Corps and Division Psywar Officers

The foregoing account of the organization of Eighth Army psychological warfare would be incomplete without a discussion of the organizational role of the Corps and Division Psywar Officers, who serve the EUSAK Psywar Divisions in roughly the same fashion that EUSAK Psywar serves FECOM Psywar:

Corps and Division Psywar Officers are situated in the G-3 Sections of their respective headquarters. Both are, in part, operations officers, in close touch with the Psywar Division, and in immediate control of some phases of psywar operations. Both are, also in part, advisors, responsible for making recommendations about the tactical use of psywar: to the Psywar Division at Army, to the Corps and Division commanders,

respectively, and to lower units and unit commanders. As Part II shows, it is here that integration with "hardware" tactics has been most fully developed, to the extent that it has been developed at all, in the Korean war. Here also the psywar nexus with intelligence enables the most rapid exploitation by the Psywar Division of transient and localized tactical situations, not only at corps and division, but even at regiment and battalion. The Corps and Division Psywar Officers play, therefore, a crucial role in the psywar network.

While the broad responsibilities of the Corps and Division Psywar Officers are similar, there are differences, mainly of degree, between them. The Corps Psywar Officer, to a greater extent that the Division Psywar Officer, is a communications channel, funnelling the information and requests upwards and orders downwards, and helping to coordinate the arrangements necessary for psywar activities in his corps. By the same token, the Division Psywar Officer is more actively engaged in psywar operations than his counterpart at ccrps. What the situation is with respect to each varies from corps to corps and division to division, and further varies with respect to the different psywar media.

In the first place, at the time of this writing there is only one full-time Corps Psywar Officer in Eighth Army, and only one full-time Division Psywar Officer. Other Corps and Division Psywar Officers have psywar as only one of their responsibilities, not necessarily the major one. Some of the consequences of this fact are discussed in Part II. Here it should be pointed out that one of the Corps Psywar Officers is also the G-3 Operations Officer, and that the latter assignment requires the major part of his time and attention. In another corps, the Psywar Officer is able to give nearly his whole time to Psywar, but he happens to be a junior officer in the corps G-3 Section, and presumably is at a disadvantage when dealing with his high-ranking colleagues. In both corps, the situation is further aggravated because, in the absence of full-time Division Psywar Officers, the responsibility for selecting targets and helping coordinate operations falls largely upon the corps officers.

The usual practice at division level is the appointment of the G-3 officer with the fewest other responsibilities as Psywar Officer. In several cases the appointment has been made outside G-3, and a favorite appointment is the Chemical Warfare Officer. There is little assurance that these officers are able or willing to devote much attention to psywar: there is some evidence that psywar has not yet captured their interest, and that they have not yet informed themselves about its nature and potentialities. Section leaders of the Loudspeaker Platoon reports that much of their time is spend in conducting

public relations for psywar, even with Psywar Officers, and the division's staff members that in the absence of continual urging on their part cooperation from the divisions lags.

There is considerable agreement in EUSAK about the necessity for a practically full-time, if not full-time, psywar officer at each division, if psywar is to be maximally useful to Eighth Army. If he can give prompt and full attention to psywar needs, his divisional contacts--with division -2's and -3's, with prisoner interrogation teams, and with unit commanders--can bring psywar operations into extremely close association with "hardware" operations. The evidence available to the ORO field team fully supports this contention.

There is considerable agreement also that the divisional psywar officer should be in G-3, or, exceptionally, in G-2. These are the agencies at division level with which a psywar officer must be allied, and with which he must have daily contact. He should be near operational and intelligence activities, and preferably in the same location, if he is to do his job well.

Besides the corps and division psywar officers, officers at regiment and even battalion are sometimes designated as psywar officers, in addition to their other duties. Usually these are S-2 or S-3 personnel. Their role, as will be seen in Part II, is minor with respect to psywar operations, except for ground loudspeaker activities. Loudspeaker operations are best suited to extremely localized contexts, and in the nature of the case the picture is best seen in the requisite detail at regimental or battalion level. For the ground loudspeaker activities, therefore, the division psywar officer is and should be an assimilator and a passer-on of information whose sources are the regimental or battalion level. As far as air loudspeaker and leaflet psywar are concerned, however, regimental and battalion psywar officers do not appear to be giving this kind of support to the divisional psywar officer. Steps should certainly be taken to strengthen their performance in this regard.

EUSAK PSYWAR PERSONNEL

The Psychological Warfare Division of EUSAK came into existence when the Korean conflict was more than six months old, and Eighth Army was already a going combat outfit. From its earliest moments, therefore, it was obliged to cope with the difficulties that normally confront a new agency created within an already existing organization that is actively engaged in the operations for which it has been designed and already has developed relatively well-defined and stable procedures and relationships.

During the early months of the division's history, moreover, Eighth Army itself was operating under extremely adverse conditions, among which were conspicuous shortages of men and materiel. It was not, therefore, a matter of taking staff and equipment that had been readied in advance, and fitting them into the going army program. Staff particularly had to be built starting from nearly zero: out of "scrounging" for both, and of improvising where "scrounging" failed. The initial nucleus consisted of one major and one enlisted man on TDY from GHQ Psywar, plus 3 officers and 20 enlisted men in the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. Had the attempt been made to draw trained personnel from the ZI, the division would not have become operational for many months at best; and, this being the case, there were only two sources from which additional bodies could be drawn: Eighth Army itself or GHQ whose most crucial hardware operations lacked adequate personnel, and SCAP, which had already been stripped of officer personnel by the demands of the Korean war.

A canvass made in January and February 1951, when the Psywar Division was being staffed, indicated that no trained and/or experienced psywar personnel could be supplied to EUSAK Psywar from theater or Eighth Army rosters. The division therefore instituted a search for officers who, despite lack of experience or training in psywar, possessed certain aptitudes regarded as relevant to psywar. The "qualities" desired, as reported to the ORO field team, were: good formal education, preferably in the social sciences, and experience in a psywar-related activity, such as intelligence, censorship, information-education, or public relations. The division promptly found four officers able to meet these two requirements in line divisions and two in G-3 Operations, and it succeeded in getting all six assigned to psywar. The search continued, with diminishing returns, over the next months. The limiting factor seems to have been all along the scarcity of personnel of the necessary calibre, not the difficulty of obtaining its reassignment.

The ORO field team, in its attempt to answer the question, "What kind of personnel does EUSAK Psywar now (September 1951) have at its disposal?" was able to obtain the following data concerning 14 officers in the Psywar Division and the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. Their education background appears, in general, to satisfy the standards originally established (see preceding paragraph). Nine of the 14 had completed four or more years of college; three had completed one, two, or three years of college; only two had no college education at all.14/

14/ Four of the 14 officers had attended no military schools at all, six had attended OCS only, and the remaining four one service school in addition to OCS--e.g., in intelligence, language and area study, military government, and command and general staff.

Of the 12 who had had some college education, nine had attended liberal arts colleges, and three technical (e.g., engineering) institutions. Eight of the 12, had majored in one or another of the social sciences and were divided about equally among psychology, sociology, political science, economics, and history; two had majored in English, and two in business administration.

As a group, however, these officers, in their responses to an ORO questionnaire, gave a low rating to social science training as background for the conduct of psywar operations. When asked to say what qualifications they would recommend for their replacements in their present posts, they assigned a weight of 16 percent to social science training as compared to 27 percent for formal education as such, 22 percent for experience in psywar or related fields, and 35 percent for combat experience.

The responses to the ORO questionnaire seem to indicate either that the final selections of EUSAK Psywar personnel were made with an eye mainly to the first of the two requirements listed above, or that the division's search brought to light very few available officers able to meet the second. Only 3 of the 14 had had psywar-related backgrounds in civilian life, if this is understood to mean work in the communications field. Six listed no significant civilian occupational experience, three had done sales work, one had been a teacher, and one the proprietor of a resort hotel. Of those with psywar-related occupational experience, in the sense intended here, one had had some newspaper experience, one had worked in radio, and one had worked in an advertising firm. The showing is, however, somewhat different if we take into account occupational background within the Army itself.

Apart from combat and prior to their assignment to EUSAK Psywar, three officers had had some experience in military psychological warfare, four in PIO work, two in military government, and one in administration. Four of the group had had no previous military experience that seemed relevant to the field team's inquiry.

The present EUSAK psywar operators were selected, then, with an eye to their educational background and/or psywar or psywar-related experience, whether in civilian or military life. Because, however, the selection was made among personnel available in Korea, a conspicuously high percentage of the officers selected can point to greater or lesser but in almost all cases significant amounts of experience in actual combat. Two-thirds of the group had had combat experience of some sort, either during World War II or in the Korean war itself. All but five had had World War II combat experience,

six as infantry, tank, or paratroop platoon leaders or company commanders, one as an artillery battalion commander, one in front-line ground loudspeaker activities. Four of the group had had non-psywar combat experience in the Korean campaign, three as infantry platoon leaders or company commanders, and one as a tank reconnaissance platoon leader. One officer had served in the G-2 and G-3 sections of a combat division, and one had been a PIO officer in an Eighth Army regiment.

Alike in the questionnaires and in conversations with the ORO team, most of EUSAK Psywar's officers tend to insist upon the value of previous combat experience as background for the conduct of psychological warfare. As has already been noted briefly, of the four choices presented in the questionnaire--extent of formal education, training in social sciences, experience in psywar or related fields of activity, combat experience--the officers as a group gave the highest rating (35 percent) to the latter. In the informal discussions, the two reasons most frequently cited for this preference were:

1. First-hand combat experience, especially as a unit commander, gives psywar officers a grasp of tactics and tactical situations that is indispensable to the psywar side of integration into the weapons system.

2. One of the most important tasks of any psywar officer is to "sell" psywar (either psywar in general or specific psywar actions) to those without whose understanding and cooperation psywar cannot go forward, namely, the unit commanders. Psywar officers with combat experience can fairly be expected to "talk the language" of the front-line officer and soldier, and can better conduct psywar's public relations. (Some EUSAK psywar operators, indeed, are convinced that any intelligent combat officer can become a good psywar officer, and would choose such an officer in preference to one trained for psywar but without combat experience.) There is, moreover, general agreement that, as background for psychological warfare operations in a given war and with a given field army, combat experience in <u>that</u> war and with <u>that</u> army is notably more valuable than combat experience in previous wars and/or with other field armies.

The personnel of a given military operation are not necessarily the best possible judges of the personal qualifications that make for optimum performance: to suppose otherwise would be to overlook the danger of their judgments being governed by "built-in criteria." The staff members of an osteopathic clinic, if asked to name the personal qualifications that make for optimum therapeutic performance, can fairly be expected to list

the characteristics of "good" osteopaths, not good medical practitioners. The staff members of a psychological warfare operation proceeding in terms of a given conception of the role and potentialities of psywar, if asked to name the personal qualifications that make for optimum psywar performance, can similarly be expected to name the characteristics of the men who have excelled in the operation as they conceive it.

On the other hand, insofar as we are prepared to take for granted the prevailing conception of what a given operation can and should do, i.e., insofar as we have no quarrel with that conception, there is a proportionally stronger presumption in favor of listening attentively to the opinions of its personnel as to the personal qualifications that make for optimum performance within it. EUSAK Psywar, as this report clearly shows, proceeds in terms of a conception of "tactical" psywar that tends to confine it to the exploitation of current tactical situations for the purpose of inducing enemy surrenders. Its personnel, in naming the personal qualifications that make for optimum performance in psychological war, i.e., that kind of psychological warfare, not only put previous combat (not psywar) experience at the top of the list, but also stress the importance of combat experience in the particular war and with the particular army in question. For the reason just stated, their judgment in this matter merits careful consideration, and all the more careful consideration, because it has surprising implications for current US psywar doctrine and practice.

We may notice, in this connection, that there are reasons, other than the two cited by the operators themselves, why we might fairly expect a high degree of correlation between combat experience in this war with this army and performance in "tactical" psywar as it is understood in Eighth Army. As is made clear in Part II, tactical dissemination of leaflets calls for a knowledge of local terrain and, e.g., local weather, not unlike that required by the infantry or artillery officer; and the man who has recently participated in hardware operations in that terrain and that weather has a presumptive advantage, in planning dissemination, over the man who has not. Again, and entirely apart from "selling" psywar, the officer who is attempting to elicit cooperation from hardware personnel corps and division can give evidence of his knowledgability of their mission and their problems, more still the man who has developed personal relations with them in actual combat and can speak to them as one of them, will presumably have the inside run over the man who cannot. Still again, the current flow of tactical intelligence must, in planning both leaflets and dissemination, be "interpreted" with a view to determining what they imply in this kind of war: a given datum does not

necessarily have the same meaning it would have had in another war against another enemy, and ability to interpret it would presumably vary, other things being equal, with the extent and depth of the given officers' understanding of the current tactical situation and current tactics; the man with recent combat experience in this war in this sector would therefore have the edge over the man without it.

The foregoing considerations would appear to point to two conclusions, one of which goes rather further than even the maximum implications of the opinions of EUSAK psywar operators as set forth previously.

1. Planners of future army-level psywar operations should reserve a certain number of slots to be filled, as opportunity provides, with officers with combat experience in the war and with the army in question. Such men are especially needed in the "media" or "operations" section (or its equivalent).

2. The recruitment of such officers for service with psywar should not be regarded as a once-only measure: there should be, in a prolonged tactical operation, a periodic "freshening" of the psywar organization with officers who have participated in the most recent tactical developments.

To these conclusions we may add a third, projected on another level, where we contemplate the possibility of a broadened mission for army-level psywar, with closer integration with hardware operations.

3. To the extent that future army-level psywar operations are expected to involve attempts to induce types of enemy behavior other than surrender, the need for personnel with recent combat experience will be all the more urgent. This is in part because current training of specialized psywar officers is primarily training in surrender-mission psywar, in part because psywar operations, proceeding in terms of a broadened conception of psywar would call, even more imperatively than current operations in Korea, for understanding of the existing tactical situation and existing tactics.

As pointed out elsewhere in this memorandum, none of the EUSAK psywar officers is a Far East area expert. When questioned as to whether this constituted, in their opinion, a serious handicap to EUSAK's psywar operations, seven of the officers stated that it was not a handicap at all, four considered it to be a handicap of some significance, and only two considered it to be a very serious handicap. The lack of an officer linguist in the group was felt to be a somewhat more serious handicap: only three thought it was no handicap at all, and eight thought it was a definite handicap, though not a serious one. With

respect to both the area expert and the officer linguist, the main argument was that the availability of indigenous civilians, on the one hand, and prisoners of war, on the other, compensated in some degree for EUSAK Psywar's deficiencies in this respect. This issue is discussed at length in Part II.

PART II

HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN EUSAK

The problem is to describe and analyze the operations conducted by Eighth Army Psywar, with particular reference to: the policy guidances, directives, and plans under which it operates; the kinds of intelligence it receives from other agencies and/or develops for itself; and the kinds of psychological warfare missions it conducts vis-a-vis various kinds of targets. Attention will be fixed, as opportunities present themselves, on the operational demands upon the Psywar Division's complement of personnel (thus supplementing the discussion of personnel in Part I), and on the equipment and facilities at their disposal.

PLANS AND POLICIES

Psychological warfare operations in EUSAK are planned within policy limitations laid down in "policy guidance memoranda" prepared by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ, FEC, in Tokyo. These memoranda, which are addressed to all psychological warfare units in the Far East and United Nations commands, are designed to provide guidance and direction for the planning and preparation of psywar materials for dissemination by all media and to all target groups within the theater. They are therefore devoted in large part to psychological warfare themes deemed appropriate to the medium of radio, with which EUSAK Psywar is not concerned, and/or to themes aimed at rear area, civilian, and non-combatant target groups rather than at EUSAK Psywar's primary targets (front line enemy troops and enemy troops in immediate rear areas).15/ Many of the policy guidances are thus largely inapplicable to EUSAK Psywar, except as they may influence the premises underlying its treatment of the remainder. (One reason for this is that the themes EUSAK Psywar normally employs against its combat-oriented target audiences seldom touch upon political issues.)

15/ A certain small percentage of EUSAK's leaflets, and a somewhat larger percentage of its airborne loudspeaker missions, are directed against enemy guerrilla forces in friendly rear areas. These we might call its secondary targets.

As of 25 August 1951, for example, a total of 60 policy guidances and directives had been issued, of which 35 appear to have been still in force on that date. Of these 35, 11 had been issued between 30 June and 25 August, and dealt with the policy problems posed by the armistice negotiations at Kaesong: they discouraged references to the US rather than to the United Nations; they reiterated the prohibition (see Policy Memorandum No. 35 of 20 March 1951) concerning references to the 38th parallel except by way of refuting the Communist claim that the parallel should be used as a cease-fire line;16/ they recommended, as a divisive tactic vis-a-vis the Chinese and north Koreans, continued insistence that the former had borne the brunt of the battle while the latter were hogging the spotlight in the negotiations, etcetera. These may serve as examples of FEC directives concerning topics with which EUSAK Psywar has little or nothing to do, as the accompanying prohibition against threats and/or propaganda themes that could conceivably be interpreted as evidence of bad faith on the part of the UN illustrate those that affect EUSAK psywar in some degree. Of the other 25 memoranda, 17 were clearly political: they dealt with UN political objectives in Korea and various anti-Communist themes (e.g., No. 21 of 12 December 1950, summarizing the secret Sino-Soviet Treaty), and offered suggestions as to how to counter enemy political propaganda. Of the remaining 8 guidances, 3 were concerned with the use of prisoners' names and photographs in psywar output, and 5 suggested or prohibited measures appropriate to frontline enemy troops. Memorandum No. 7 of 11 August 1950, for example, reads as follows: "Prisoners of war should not be named in leaflets or broadcasts. If a proper noun is essential, use a fictitious or 'John Doe' name. Many enemy prisoners have asked the International Red Cross to refrain from notifying their families of their capture, for fear of Communist mistreatment of them."17/

16/ Planners were instructed to emphasize the fact that the actual battleline bears no relation to the parallel.

17/ Five other items were treated in this memorandum, viz., civilian evacuation, liberation day, Communist "great lie" propaganda, democratic prosperity in south Korea, and humane treatment for PWs.

Memorandum No. 24 of 16 January quotes a GHQ Command Letter as follows:

"1. The following types of material will not be used in psychological warfare media:

a. Information or speculation on future movements of enemy prisoners, or ultimate disposition of them.

b. Names of prisoners of war.

c. Details of guard or security system in prisoner camps or enclosures.

d. Statements derogatory to prisoners as individuals or groups.

e. Information concerning courts-martial or punishment of prisoners of war.

2. The following restrictions will apply to the use of photographs of prisoners of war.

a. Faces must be masked or obliterated to prevent identification, except when voluntary consent of prisoners concerned has been obtained for underfaced photographs.

b. Photographs which would convey information of the types described in paragraph 1 above will not be used."

Memorandum No. 25, issued the following day, modified the directive, at paragraph 1b, to read: "... names of prisoners of war except with voluntary consent of the prisoners and with prior approval by the Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2, FEC." These policy memoranda on the use of photographs and names of prisoners seem to have imposed definite limitations upon EUSAK operations until, at EUSAK's own request, they were revised. As of this writing, EUSAK psywar has a routine form by which prisoners can authorize the Psywar Division to make use of their names and photographs in propaganda materials, and the necessary signatures are apparently being obtained without difficulty.18/

18/ The original impulse behind the policy changes in this matter appears to have been certain PWs, who strongly urged abandonment of the practice of masking photographs, and reported that Communist political officers were citing the blacked-out eyes as evidence that the UN blinded surrenderees, thus undermining confidence in UN "good treatment."

The five memoranda recommending, whether explicitly or by implication, measures appropriate to front-line and immediate rear-area enemy troops were as follows:

Memorandum No. 23 of 3 January 1951, Forraging by CCF in Korea:

> While the north Korean soldier is at the front, fighting for Russia and China, Chinese soldiers far to the rear are making his family's life harder by extorting food from them.

Memorandum No. 33 of 10 March 1951, Disease:

> Psychological warfare media will not, for the present at least, assert that widespread epidemics exist in north Korea, or that Chinese troops are spreading disease in Korea... (This is primarily a problem of credibility. Themes of this type cannot be used in overt propaganda without detailed supporting evidence that they are factual. Until this is produced, the policy set forth...will apply.)

Memorandum No. 34 of 15 March 1951, Food for the CCF:

> The CCF drain on food supply is placing great hardships on the families of north Korean soldiers, and in some cases confronting them with actual danger of starvation.

Memorandum No. 43 of 17 May 1951, Biological Warfare:

> Communist propaganda has frequently charged the United States or the United Nations with waging biological warfare and chemical warfare in Korea. ... such propaganda emphasizing the following subjects, etc. ...(That portion of paragraph 4-b of Policy Memorandum No. 33 which prohibits the suggestion that Chinese troops may have brought disease into north Korea is rescinded...[But the theme is to be used with discretion] as a possible explanation for persistent reports of disease in north Korea; it must not be advanced as a flat assertion nor as an allegation by the United Nations Command.)

Memorandum No. 44 of 6 June 1951, Personal Attacks:

> The provisions of Policy Memorandum No. 39 (9 May 1951), subject: Anti-Communist Propaganda, do not alter the basic policy that psychological warfare should not engage in personal attacks on enemy leaders whose

> personal prestige and popularity are known to be great. ...[Such Communist leaders as] Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao are considered less desirable [targets] than the Chinese Communist leadership as a group. ...For entirely different reasons, it is considered preferable also to attack the USSR and Soviet leadership as a group, without specifying Premier Stalin. ...[The] considerations discussed above ... [do not apply] to Kim Il Sung, and there is consequently no objection to personal criticism of him.

We may conclude: (1) that the policy memoranda are primarily intended to provide a framework of general policy for EUSAK Psywar among other agencies; (2) that insofar as they address themselves to the policy problems faced by army-level psywar as such they have sometimes tended to postpone action that later proved to be desirable; and (3) that they are regarded, both in FECOM and in EUSAK, as subject to re-discussion at any time.19/ Machinery exists by which EUSAK can submit new policy questions to FECOM as they arise, but it seems that such questions, as also questions as to how to apply existing policy to novel situations, are infrequent. This, given the character of EUSAK"s psywar operations, is not surprising: these operations are mostly a matter of reiterating and elaborating a brief list of "appeals" calculated to cause enemy surrenders. The appeals do not, in practice, vary perceptibly from week to week: the policy memoranda treat their indefinite perpetuation as a matter of course and there is no evidence of dissatisfaction with them on the part of EUSAK psywar personnel. The memoranda say, in effect, Keep on doing what you have been doing--which is what EUSAK wishes to do. The result is a maximum of understanding on both sides as to EUSAK's policies, and a minimum of friction. Here, however, as elsewhere, we must notice that any broadening of EUSAK Psywar's mission of the kind contemplated in this memorandum20/ might dispose FECOM to make day-to-day use of its power to impose new directives, and that this could easily lead to dissatisfaction in EUSAK comparable to that occasioned by FECOM control over dissemination (see following paragraph). Should such a broadening of mission take place, and be accompanied by closer integration of Eighth Army psychological warfare into hardware operations, attention should be given to the possibility that continued subordination to FECOM might, on occasion, keep EUSAK Psywar from playing the role assigned to it in an army-level operational plan. Here also the general principle that theater tells army what to do but not how to do it would appear to be applicable.

19/ See Part I for the difficulties that stand in the way of renegotiation of directives.

20/ See Part I.

The GHQ Weekly Plans for psywar operations[21] relate exclusively to EUSAK dissemination of GHQ leaflets; they do not, in theory at least, affect the content of EUSAK's own psywar output. But they are policy directives in the two-fold sense that they proceed in large part by recommending and/or directing themes to be stressed during the week, and they implement these recommendations and/or directives with specific instructions that have the effect of determining, as regards the bulk of EUSAK's actual communication to the enemy, what policies it will in fact embody. The themes thus recommended or directed, of which there were 25 or more between 31 December 1950 and 31 August 1951, appear to fall into three categories:

1. Surrender-mission themes that largely duplicate those already in use in EUSAK's own psywar output (heavy enemy casualties, UN firepower, the hardships of winter, the need for following such and such instructions in order to surrender safely, the past friendliness of Sino-US relations, etcetera).

2. Political themes, which as we have seen EUSAK tends to avoid in its own output (the Sino-Soviet treaty, the USSR's vested interest in large Chinese losses in Korea, the UN as a means of assuring World peace, the necessity for guarantees against renewed Communist aggression, etcetera).

3. "Anti-morale" themes, which tend to be less general than the surrender themes noted under (1), and frequently embody new emphases (the famine conditions in China at a moment when Mao is shipping rice to India, civilian hardships in China, the high incidence of conscripts among the CCF "volunteers," the callous attitude of the CCF leadership as regards providing adequate medical care to wounded CCF soldiers). In other words, the plans, together with the GHQ leaflets to which they relate, are a further means by which GHQ can and does inject its policy conceptions into the campaign as a whole.[22]

Within Eighth Army itself, psychological warfare operations are planned within limitations arising not out of policy guidance in the sense in which we have been using this term, but out of PWD's relations with G-3. There is some evidence, as of this writing, that the relationship between the Psywar Division Operations Officer and the G-3 Plans Section may be entering a new phase, in which psywar plans will be integrated far more closely into Eighth Army strategic and tactical planning at the highest staff level than they have been in the past. The

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[21] Ibid.

[22] We may note in passing that the plans, unlike EUSAK leaflets and GHQ leaflets as well, seldom give a surrender-mission "twist" to anti-morale themes.

shape the new integration will take, however, is not yet sufficiently clear to justify any statement concerning its detailed implications for day-to-day psywar operations. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the relationship that seems to have obtained in the past, which was approximately as follows: the psywar operation was not represented at meetings and discussions in the G-3 Plans Section; psywar plans were accordingly developed in large part without prior first-hand knowledge of projected hardware operations; the G-3 Plans Section became associated with each psywar plan only as of a moment just prior to its actual adoption and application, and then only in the sense that the projected operation was subject to a veto--which appears to have been seldom exercised--by a senior officer of the G-3 Section. Psychological warfare, though organizationally within G-3, and controlled, advised, and supervised by the G-3 officer to whom the psywar chief reports, had not been brought into the skein of working-level relations that constitutes what we may call the G-3 process. (In this sense, as we shall see, it has had closer relations with G-2 than with G-3.) It conducted what to all intents and purposes was a separate (though not autonomous or independent) operation against the enemy. An account of psywar planning at EUSAK is, therefore, necessarily an account of planning functions that take place almost entirely within the division, and concern almost exclusively the division's own personnel.

Plans and policies are developed within the Psychological Warfare Division at a daily staff meeting--the 1000 hours briefing--the purpose of which is to discuss and develop proposals looking to the psywar exploitation of the current tactical situation. The first half of each of these meetings is given over to (1) a review of the current tactical situation by the intelligence officer and the assistant intelligence officer; (2) a summary of the psywar effort during the preceding 24-hour period (leaflet drops, voicecasts, ground loudspeaker broadcasts, corps and division psywar activities) by the operations officer and the air-ground liaison officer; (3) a statement of the plans for the next 24-hour period by the operations officer and air-ground liaison officer; and (4) a review of current psywar "projects" (e.g., new leaflets or new loudspeaker recordings in process of development, leaflet stocks on hand, etcetera) by the projects officer and the operations officer. The second half of the briefing, when it proceeds according to the book, is given over to discussion of potential psywar missions suggested by the developing tactical situation, and of possible new techniques for eliciting enemy surrenders. This part of the meeting, however, is notably less formal than the first, and is often extremely brief: it appears to have been used by the Chief of the Division, in the past, as his primary means of

canalizing and directing operations, and of keeping them in line with his own views regarding psywar objectives and psywar tactics. When this happens, the briefings of course cease to be a planning device. Even then, however, they perform the valuable function of keeping all members of the staff fully informed of what is going on; and the consensus among the staff appears to be that the discussions do influence the shape of actual operations week by week.

EUSAK Psywar plans, as the above paragraph implies, are often formulated and even executed in the intervals between briefings, e.g., when, on the basis of new spot intelligence, one or more strategically situated staff officers get a "go ahead" on a new theme or target chosen in the light of a previously unrecognized enemy vulnerability that appears to require immediate action. Such improvisation usually calls for detailed understandings among key staff officers, which are arrived at via informal consultations. The same procedure obtains, to some extent, for long-term plans and/or projects as well: they are often developed, at least in the initial stages, by officers of the Intelligence, Projects, and Operations Sections meeting in small conferences, often held around the desk of the Psywar Chief. Although such plans finally have their day in the briefings, they are by that time already at an advanced stage of development, and a considerable number of the officers present are already familiar with them.

The preceeding paragraphs carry the discussion of planning as far as is practicable at this stage of the present memorandum. It should always be borne in mind that plans for the utilization of psywar media are often developed and executed by corps and division psywar officers, and/or by loudspeaker platoon section leaders and team chiefs. The character of improvised planning for media operations differs significantly according to the echelon of command initiating the plan, and according as leaflets, ground loudspeakers, or air-borne loudspeakers are utilized in its execution. It is therefore more convenient to discuss planning for each of the media separately, as we do in the final sections of this memorandum, along with the data relating to target selection and planning.

CONCLUSIONS

Planning of psywar in EUSAK goes forward within three primary sets of limitations: (1) policy limitations laid down by GHQ, which are generally political in character and little affect the conduct of Eighth Army psywar operations; (2) planning and policy directives, usually not political in character, which either produce or inhibit specific Eighth

Army psywar activities (e.g., by prohibiting speculation on future movements of enemy prisoners, or their ultimate disposition, or by assigning high priority, through a certain period, to such and such a theme); and (3) the limitations imposed by higher authority within Eighth Army, usually via G-3 control.

Within the above limitations, EUSAK Psywar employs three primary planning procedures: (1) scheduled daily briefings; (2) unscheduled consultations among officers within sections or officers from key sections; (3) processing and taking action on reports and requests from subordinate echelons of command (usually the corps and division psywar officers). A more accurate picture of how the more important irregular planning procedures work will emerge from the remaining parts of the present section, where irregular planning for each of the three chief media of EUSAK psywar operations is discussed under the sub-heading "Target Selection and Planning."

INTELLIGENCE

The present section is concerned primarily with EUSAK Psywar's "operations" in the technical sense of this term, i.e., the activities of the Operations or Media Section. However, Operations relies upon the Projects Section for the psywar materials it disseminates. The Projects Section relies mainly for its knowledge of the enemy upon the Intelligence Section. The problem of the present section is to describe and analyze the latter of these two supporting organizations, with a view to showing how it procures its intelligence, and the character of the "intelligence picture" of target groups that it makes available to the planners and executors of psywar missions, to guide them in selecting targets and determining how they are to be exploited.

In order to develop a picture of the enemy that will meet the planners' and executors' needs, as these are understood in EUSAK, the Section must first of all keep itself fully informed of the movements, concentrations, and general disposition of enemy units along the Eighth Army front and in the immediate rear.23/ At the same time, it must process and evaluate available intelligence concerning the moods and opinions and, in general, "morale" of enemy soldiers (e.g., their grievances and "gripes," their attitude toward their leadership, etcetera). In performing the first of these tasks it depends mostly upon G-2 EUSAK and KMAG as collection

23/ EUSAK Psywar also conducts operations against guerrilla groups in friendly rear areas. Thus the Section must also process and evaluate such tactical intelligence concerning these groups as is available.

agencies, although it adopts toward the data a point of view, regarded as appropriate to the waging of psywar, different from that of routine and tactical intelligence.24/ In performing the second, it relies as much as it can upon G-2, but acquires a considerable proportion of its raw data through its own efforts.

The chief day-to-day chore the two officers of the section perform in connection with the first of the two tasks just stated is that of keeping the division's situation map current for the daily briefings. This map, however, is merely a graphic exposition of the results of their other activities in the collection and processing of tactical intelligence, which, as has been pointed out in Part I, are greatly facilitated by the proximity of the Eight Army G-2 Section (the latter's own situation map is a few doors down the hall from the Psywar Division's office). Intelligence posted on G-2's 1:50,000 map must be continuously embodied, along with such supplementary data as can be obtained within the time limits set by operational demands, in overlays for the Psywar 1:250,000 map. Getting the supplementary data is mainly a matter of consulting G-2's back files of the Periodic Intelligence Reports (PIR), its Order of Battle (OB) files, its captured documents, and its miscellaneous archives of intelligence materials. This greatly economizes its own time and effort, much of which it would have to devote to maintaining large files if G-2's were not accessible.25/

More concretely, the supplementary data from G-2 are derived from the following sources:

1. ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpretor Section) Reports and ADVATIS (Advanced Allied Translator and Interpreter) Reports. These contain data obtained through prisoner of war interrogations and/or from captured enemy documents.

24/ The difference appears to be primarily a matter of different tacit definitions of "vulnerability." Intelligence for the kind of psywar waged by EUSAK finds vulnerabilities at those points in the line where there are enemy soldiers who seem to be ripe for surrender appeals, which is by no means necessarily the same as the points of tactical weakness that intelligence for hardware is looking for.

25/ For example: the section receives a copy of the G-2-produced daily PIR, but keeps on hand only the 14 most recent issues.

They provide, along with supplementary Order of Battle Intelligence, a certain amount of information about enemy attitudes (on, for example, UN weapons, UN psywar, and UN treatment of surrenderees.)26/

2. IPW (Interrogation of Prisoner of War)Reports. These contain the bulk of the tactical intelligence available to Eighth Army at all levels. They are a rich source of data on enemy casualties, enemy security measures, enemy food and medical supplies, the identity of enemy units in line and in reserve, enemy personalities and leaders, the composition of enemy units (e.g., the number of former CNA soldiers in the CCF and/or former ROKs in the NKPA), and the effects of UN psywar on various enemy groups).

3. PI (Periodic Intelligence) Reports. These, as noted previously, are published daily by G-2 and distributed to all interested agencies. They contain a situation map, IPW selections, Order of Battle highlights, Spot Intelligence Reports with evaluations, and miscellaneous intelligence from CIC agents and other G-2 sources.

4. Spot Intelligence Reports, which are normally single-page documents prepared and distributed as new data become available that may be of interest to operating personnel. For example, Psywar might learn from such a report that large numbers of surrenderees are coming in from such and such an enemy unit, and thus might be able to take appropriate action many hours sooner than would have been possible if G-2 had held back the information until the next PIR. All information from spot reports is subsequently presented in summary form in the PIR, which also evaluateit in the light of the total budget of available intelligence.

The G-2 Order of Battle files contain all intelligence available to G-2 on enemy strength, materiel, personnel, security, etcetera, classified by unit. The Psywar Intelligence Section can turn to them on receipt of a request from the planners and/or operators for complete, up-to-the-minute data on particular enemy units, to be used in selecting targets and in tailoring themes to the vulnerabilities of targets already selected.

As already noted, G-2 channels do not provide all the tactical data needed for the conduct of psywar operations. Most intelligence concerning the character and location of

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26/ Information about attitudes relates to the second of the section's two tasks as defined previously.

guerrilla forces, for example, is supplied by KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) and/or by the Korean National Police (KNP), through the KMAG psywar officer.27/

The second of the two tasks noted arises out of the fact that there are certain types of intelligence that the Psywar Division urgently requires (e.g., data on the effectiveness of psywar operations, on the intelligibility of psywar materials, on enemy vulnerability vis-a-vis various themes, on the state of enemy confidence in past and current psywar output, on enemy reactions to current symbolic and graphic presentations, on the audibility of air and ground loudspeakers), but cannot, under present Army practice, obtain in adequate amounts from any sister organization or its files. These types of intelligence, which it is now common, both in Eighth Army and elsewhere, to call "psychological warfare intelligence," tend to be subordinate in G-2 and KMAG to hardware intelligence. PWD was therefore authorized, at an early moment in its history, to increase the flow of such intelligence by tapping directly the major source of all forms of intelligence in the Korean war, namely PW interrogations. Over the past months, particular since PWD's move to Seoul, it has gradually developed its own large-scale interrogation program. Before the move to Seoul, progress in this direction had been arrested by a number of factors: the nearest usable POW enclosure was at Pusan, which meant that Psywar intelligence officers could visit it infrequently at best, they did not have at their disposal the number of interrogators and translators needed for the type of interrogations they now conduct. They attempted, through an early period, to obtain the needed intelligence from responses to "canned" questionnaires, which they prepared at Taegu and submitted, via remote control, to the PWs at Pusan. Later, when this procedure had been written off as unsatisfactory,

27/ Information on the UN's own operations is obtained (with the Psywar Intelligence Section sharing responsibility with the Psywar Operations Section) from the Eighth Army G-3 Section, which like the G-2 Section is a few doors removed from the Psywar Division's office. The Psywar Division, as a part of G-3, is automatically briefed on all UN operations and operational plans at some stage; i.e., the Chief of the Division is informed of plans either (a) at the moment that they have been adopted, which however is often long before they are to be implemented, or more rarely (b) before they have been adopted, e.g, where the Psywar Division is to perform part of the staff work required. The effect of the Sections' working-level relations with G-3 is to keep the Division more promptly and/or more fully informed than it would be if it relied exclusively on these automatic briefings.

the Division tried for a time to meet its problems by influencing the form and content of the eight or ten psywar intelligence questions in the routine EEI (Elements of Essential Information) for interrogations.

Procedure in connection with the "canned" questionnaires appears to have been as follows: copies of a given questionnaire were printed at Taegu and shipped to Pusan, where they were distributed among a "random sample"28/ of prisoners with a "request" that they be filled out and returned to the camp authorities. The prisoners were not required to answer all of the questions; moreover, each was permitted to write as much or as little as he wished in reply to each question. The completed forms were returned to Taegu for translation, classification, and analysis. This meant, in the most favorable circumstances, a delay of several days between preparation of a questionnaire and preliminary access to the responses; and what with the long interval between the capture and interrogation of most responding prisoners, there was scant likelihood of obtaining timely information. Experiences showed that the prisoners tended, in general, to neglect questions on other topics in favor of those dealing with UN treatment after surrender. The Intelligence section, as noted above, had abandoned this procedure some while before the move to Seoul. Its major weaknesses, apart from its inherent slowness, were reported to the ORO field team as follows: that it automatically excluded illiterates, and thus left out the most numerous PW group in which psywar is interested; that it made extravagant claims on the time and energies of the section's personnel; and that the PWs, because free to write what they pleased, tended to turn their responses into "bitch sheets." Some critics would add a fourth objection: that the questions on the effectiveness of psywar did not sufficiently conceal the fact that the questionnaire had been drawn up by someone interested in the answers and likely to prefer this answer rather than that one.

After removal to EUSAK Advance at Seoul, the Division was only an hour's ride by jeep from the large forward PW enclosure at Yongdungpo, through which almost all prisoners taken along the Eighth Army front are channeled before being sent to Pusan (a few prisoners taken in the ROK I Corps area, on the extreme East Coast, are sent directly to the rear by boat). Most of the prisoners who come through the camp are

28/ The term "random sample" is used at EUSAK in its popular sense, i.e., to denote a selection which the selector regards as not having been influenced by any conscious bias on his own part. It should not be understood to mean that attention is given to guarantees of randomness, as these are practiced by statisticians.

relatively "fresh," having been taken into custody not more than two weeks before their arrival; the practice is to hold them there until there are enough of them to fill a train, then ship them to the rear. This means that when the front is fairly stable, and UN and enemy units are out of contact except for isolated small-scale engagements (this was the situation through much of July and early August), prisoners arrive and move on so slowly that even a small team of interrogators based at Seoul can, as the Section now does, conduct intensive interviews with almost all of them. If in the future the front were to become more active, however, the flow of PWs would presumably increase, and the Intelligence Section would be able, with its present personnel, to tap a smaller percentage of the total.

As of this writing, the basic psywar interrogation EEI consists of approximately forty questions, which can be modified or replaced from day to day as operational needs require. A staff of two Chinese and three Korean translator-interrogators,29/ all of them civilians employed by the Division, conduct the interviews, each of which takes two to three hours. Prisoners are encouraged to talk "freely" in response to the questions put to them, and the present EEI is certainly less open than the earlier one to the objection that its attempts to elicit data regarding the effectiveness of psywar invite the prisoner to give a desired answer. Each interrogation, when completed, is promptly translated, typed, and filed--along with other pertinent OB materials on the unit to which the PW belongs--in a working file maintained in the Intelligence Section's office. EUSAK Psywar personnel consider the new procedure much more "scientific" than the earlier one, and have greater confidence in the results it produces. Moreover, the fact that the section now has its own staff of civilian translator-interrogators is deemed a major organizational advance.

The Intelligence Section conducts three other types of interrogation, all of them designed to provide information about the probable (not necessarily future) effectiveness of leaflets, and all conducted in close cooperation with the Projects section. One of the three attempts to estimate the "understandability" of leaflet illustrations30/ or, sometimes, of entire leaflets (i.e., illustrations plus texts).

29/ Toward the end of September, the Intelligence Section hired three additional Korean translator-interrogators, but it is too early to estimate the effect the strengthened staff will have on the section's capabilities. Most of the time of the new personnel has thus far been taken up with learning interrogation procedures.

30/ The emphasis on illustrations reflects the determination to use leaflets that will be intelligible to illiterates.

The material to be tested is submitted to each individual in a random sample[31] of the available prisoner population. The interrogator asks each prisoner such simple questions as "What does this mean to you?" or "What do you get out of this?" The gist of the prisoners' responses is taken down and translated, and the results are tabulated. Officers from the Projects section are often present during the testing to supervise the questioning and to learn, at first hand, how the prisoners react to their output.

Another of the tests, conducted initially by the Projects section but now administered entirely by the Intelligence section, has for its purpose the "rating" of leaflets on the basis of PW responses. It is sometimes administered in conjunction with the test for understandability. It is conducted approximately as follows: a translator-interrogator submits four or five leaflets, all designed to put across a given theme, to each individual in a random sample of prisoners. He asks each of them, in turn: "Which leaflet do you think is best?" "Why?" "Which leaflet do you think is worst?" "Why?" The gist of the answers is noted, translated, and tabulated. As of this writing, the test has been in use for only a short time, but the officers responsible for administering it are highly skeptical of its value. They suspect that "best" and "worst" mean different things to different prisoners, some of them very remote from "most likely to be effective" and "least likely to be effective," which are the extreme points on the scale in which the interrogators are really interested. Good treatment leaflets constantly "win" over threatening leaflets, which evidently may mean merely that the prisoners have pleasant associations with good treatment and unpleasant ones with strafing, napalm, and artillery.[32] An officer from the Projects section has tried repeatedly to get the interrogators to ask "Which one of these leaflets would have influenced you most to surrender?"

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[31] See footnote 28.

[32] This example, which involves competing themes, is out of date, since the Intelligence section, as already indicated, does not now test leaflets with different themes in the same group. Concretely, the new "rating scale" survey tests groups of different leaflets which are on the same theme, and printed on the same kind of paper with the same color ink and, if possible, the same kind of lettering. It nevertheless illustrates one of the many difficulties which the section has encountered in its attempt to provide the operating sections with the kind of intelligence they are understood to require, and its willingness to try something else when a going procedure has proved faulty.

"Why?" He believes, however, that the interrogators have yet to capture the desired nuance. One of the interrogators contends that any adjectives other than "best" and "worst" would produce biased answers. Difficulties of this kind would presumably be minimized if EUSAK Psywar had at its disposal US officers or enlisted men thoroughly conversant with the relevant languages.

A third test is designed to measure the prisoners' visual recognition of symbols and pictures for possible use in projected leaflets, or extracted from leaflets already in stock. The procedure appears to be as follows: translator-interrogators go into the prisoner cages and select, on a first-seen-first-taken basis, a sample of prisoners. The prisoners are lined up single-file and are led, one at a time, to the interrogator, who asks each of them which among an array of symbols (e.g., the Eighth Army patch, the death's head, the hammer and sickle), of photographs (e.g., Stalin, Mao, Kim Il Sung), and drawings (e.g., a CCF soldier, Stalin, a dragon boat) he can identify. (The minimum number of prisoners for an adequate sample is assumed to be fifty.) The results of these surveys to date have been, in the opinion of the officers conducting them, surprising: for example, the prisoners recognize only a very small percentage of the illustrations.33/

A further source of information and guidance which, at the margin, yields more or less useful intelligence is the Chinese PW panel maintained by the Projects section. It is made up of 16 PWs, highly heterogeneous in point of education: two have had some college training, five have had some high school training or its equivalent, the remainder, including one illiterate, this or that number of years of grammar school or its equivalent. They are also heterogeneous in point of rank: one is a lieutenant colonel, one a major, one a captain, one a medical officer, two are lieutenants, and the remainder (10) cadremen. The panel normally operates in response to requests for comment on leaflet texts from the standpoint of understandability, make-up, graphics, probable effectiveness, etcetera. It discusses the questions referred to it in an atmosphere of easy informality, and apparently with the agreed and clearly understood purpose of reaching a consenus, then writes its own brief summary of its conclusions. The Projects section makes use of the panel for pre-testing psywar materials primarily in connection with "rush" jobs, but apparently finds its advice less and less useful as time passes.

33/ Some of the specific findings are mentioned in a later sub-section, under the heading "Intelligence Picture of the Enemy."

The panel, it is believed, tends increasingly to reflect the opinions of one or two key members; its members are increasingly far-removed, in point of time, from front line conditions, and consequently less and less familiar with the personnel, the units, and the shared experience of CCF members. The officers of the Psywar Division regard regular and rapid rotation of panel members as a promising way around these difficulties, but have not yet been able to initiate the procedures such rotation would require. A similar panel made up of Koreans is projected, but has not yet been formed.

This, then, is the machinery upon which EUSAK Psywar depends for the bulk of the intelligence collected not by G-2 but by itself, in terms of which it attempts to tailor its output to its target audience and/or audiences, and attempts to estimate the current and past effectiveness of its operation, which it must do as it goes along if only in order to decide whether to keep on doing pretty much what it has been doing or to try something else. Evidently, therefore, the well-nigh exclusive source of such intelligence is that sample of the enemy troop population that happens to turn up in the PW compounds and, at the margin, merely the sample of that sample that happens to turn up in conditions that enable a certain kind of sustained interrogation. This is especially true of what is called throughout this memorandum non-situational (i.e., cultural and psychological) intelligence. For, as we shall notice repeatedly, EUSAK Psywar does not have, either within its own ranks or at its disposal, any qualified area expert on China or Korea. Neither does it have access, as we shall also notice below, to any of the existing scholarly or intelligence research literature that might at least point the way to answers to questions, as they arise, as to how to tailor output to the mentality, tastes, habits, prepossessions, etcetera, of the members of a known target audience. It can and does, to be sure, turn in a pinch to its civilian interrogator-translators, and ask them. But experience seems to have shown that the translator-interrogators have themselves become reluctant to offer judgments that cannot be directly supported by evidence drawn from the interrogations, and the translator-interrogators are selected on the basis of their availability and their language skills, not for their area expertise.

The following conclusion is equally evident: EUSAK Psywar, to the extent that it does not rely on PW interrogations (whether directly, via its own efforts, or indirectly, via G-2), or on an occasional hint from its civilian employees, for the information it needs in order to tailor its output to the cultural and psychological characteristics of specific audiences, is obliged to depend either upon guesses or

upon a working hypothesis that would run more or less as follows: since people in combat situations are all pretty much alike, it is safe to talk to our target audiences as if they were "just people" or, more concretely, as if they were US soldiers wearing Chinese or Korean uniforms.

While it is impossible to estimate the extent to which, in practice, EUSAK Psywar does, for output-tailoring purposes, rely upon each of the alternatives noted (interrogations, civilian interrogators, guesses, the premise that the target-audience are just people), the following further observations seem to be in point: (1) even the most cursory examination of EUSAK Psywar's actual output (leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts) reveals that it does, in the large, address enemy soldiers as "just people," caught up in such and such a situation whose peculiarities have been duly listed in a unit file; (2) similarly, as the observer of EUSAK Psywar's activities quickly discovers, the major decisions arrived at in the organization in the course of a typical day or week or month, have to do with such questions as: What units do we hit next? What leaflets, among those in stock, do we hit them with? What change could we make in this or that leaflet that would better adapt it to the predicament in which this target audience finds itself? What are the peculiarities of this target's environment that appear to call for a new leaflet? And (3) there is, as we shall be in a better position to see after examining EUSAK Psywar's "intelligence picture of the enemy," and intimate connection between its emphasis on questions of the type noted under (2) and its tendency to treat enemy soldiers as "just people."

We may, before concluding the present discussion, note three further sources of miscellaneous but sometimes significant intelligence at other than army level, upon each of which the Intelligence Section sometimes draws in its attempt to provide the data that psywar plans and/or operations require.

1. The Daily Psychological Warfare Intelligence Summary, prepared by the Intelligence and Evaluation Branch of the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ, in Tokyo. This document contains political, strategic, tactical, and foreign radio broadcast intelligence in summarized and evaluated form. Although much of the material included is of scant interest to EUSAK operations, the summary sometimes provides "leads" that the Intelligence Section can develop by drawing upon G-2 files or upon corps and division intelligence and psywar officers, as well as new themes that can be used in exploiting enemy vulnerabilities already indentified.

2. Intelligence procured by corps and division psywar officers from the corps G-2's and G-3's or from division -2's and -3's is frequently relayed to army, whether on army's request or in conjuntion with a target request from the corps and/or division. The corps and division -2's are, of course, the main source of the intelligence that corps and division psywar officers utilize in their operations. The relevant procedures parallel those at army, except that changes in the situation are reported more rapidly and in greater detail in direct proportion to proximity to the front.

3. Intelligence data pertinent to loudspeaker operations are often procured, and relayed to the Intelligence Section, by the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company or its teams. They are obtained either by direct interrogation of the prisoners who surrender to the teams, or by on-the-spot liaison with forward IPW teams. The latter often assist loudspeaker operations by including specific items pertinent to psywar in their EEI's, or by turning prisoners over to the loudspeaker team translator-interpreters for tactical psywar interrogation. Most of the intelligence procured by the teams is, to be sure, pertinent only to their immediate tactical problem, but a certain amount of it is information of greater or lesser interest to echelons further to the rear; and such information, under present practice, is promptly telephoned back to one or another of the higher headquarters as well. It should be borne in mind, however, that the IPW teams do not generally include psywar questions in their EEI. The latter is inconveniently long in the most favorable conditions, and the teams are required to give priority, in the limited time available for interrogations, to "hardware" matters.

The Intelliegence Picture of the Enemy

From the variety of sources described above, but mainly from its own and G-2's interrogations, the Intelligence section has pieced together a "picture of the enemy audience," which PWD personnel believe, correctly or not, to figure prominently in their decisions as to what to do and how and on what scale to do it. The picture's main outlines appear to be as follows:

1. The percentage of illiterates among Chinese enlisted men tends to be high by US standards: in some units, it is believed, as many as four out of five do not know how to read and write. There is a numerically considerable "middle" group, between the literates and illiterates, who can work their way through a sentence with varying degrees of difficulty and incomprehension. In the north Korean army the incidence of illiteracy is notably smaller, but may in some units approach 50 percent.

2. Chinese and north Korean troops in general are "slow on the uptake," and can come to grips only with written and/or spoken matter that is "simple," "straightforward," and "concrete." Their first immediate concern is with survival, and therefore with those things that affect survival most directly, e.g., adequate food, clothing, shelter, and warmth. Their second immediate concern is to cut down the day-to-day demands on their energies--i.e., to slow down, or better yet stop altogether, their endless round of digging foxholes and marching throughout the night. They tend to turn a deaf ear to facts and ideas that have no bearing upon these immediate concerns.

3. Chinese and north Korean troops tend to a type of mentality that cannot be counted upon for certain intellectual and cognitive operations that US soldiers, for example, perform easily enough. Two photographs side by side, one of a Chinese contentedly wolfing white rice in a PW compound, one of Chinese soldiers' corpses blackened with napalm, do not convey to them the notion of choosing between surrender and death--according to one PW intelligence officer, the whole concept of "choice" tends to elude them. They identify such familiar faces as those of Mao, Chou en Lai, and Stalin much more readily in photographs than in drawings, and much more readily in drawings than in cartoons. Even the carefully chosen symbols that have been most widely used by EUSAK Psywar--the Eighth Army patch, the UN emblem, the death's head, etcetera--are meaningless to large numbers of them.

4. The typical CCF cadreman is obedient and docile before authority, is devoid of leadership qualities, and is reluctant to assume responsibility for determining his own course of action when he finds himself, in whole or in part, on his own as far as orders are concerned. He is genuinely intimidated by the political control system: he does not, for example, talk over the content of psywar materials that reach him with his comrades unless they happen to be close and trusted personal friends.

5. Many CCF cadremen have extremely vague notions regarding the identity of the enemy they are fighting. Some do not even know that the current hostilities are taking place in a country called Korea. Most have been put through the paces of an intensive political indoctrination, but this

does not appear to have made them knowledgeable about the issues in the Korean war, even as these are presented by Communist propaganda.34/

6. The cadreman's morale is usually at its highest through the days and hours immediately preceding his commitment in battle. It gradually deteriorates during battle, in part because of insufficient supplies of food, equipment, and munitions, in part because of the heavy casualties inflicted by UN firepower, which the cadreman sees at first-hand as the battle proceeds.

7. The cadreman fears artillery, as a rule, more than any other weapon. He understands the tactics of both individual and collective defense against enemy air, but finds the chores it imposes (moving supplies and digging entrenchments by night, remaining under cover by day) almost unbearable.

8. CCF cadremen, in general, are "unattached" religiously and ideologically: for example, relative few of them, by comparison with NKPA cadremen, cherish beliefs and attitudes that are recognizably Communist. They are like NKPA-men, however, in that their major emotional commitments are to home and family ties. They are highly responsive to promises of good treatment, despite continued efforts on the part of their political officers to convince them that the UN tortures and kills surrenderees. They tend to be unresponsive to the propaganda stick as compared to the propaganda carrot: threats of certain death at the hands of UN artillerymen and airmen, for example, are likely to produce the opposite of the desired behavior response, because they suggest that surrendering safely is difficult. A considerable percentage of them, it is believed, tend to hold US troops in high regard, because of happy recollections--first and second hand--of the US soldiers stationed in China during World War II.

34/ In the course of its PW interrogations the Intelligence Section has found some indications that US Psywar has succeeded in "educating" the enemy over the past few months. It estimates that as late as June less than one percent of enemy soldiers understood either what the UN is or what the UN symbol stands for, while between 20 and 30 percent of the enemy today understand the idea and recognize the symbol. It attributes this change to the impact of US psywar.

9. Large numbers of CCF cadremen are former Chinese Nationalists and, it is believed, are peculiarly available to invitations to surrender.35/

10. Large numbers of both Chinese and north Korean soldiers remain at their posts, instead of surrendering, because they fear they will be caught moving forward and shot by their own officers and/or political commissars, or because they are unconvinced that UN forces spare the lives of surrenderees and capturees--not, in short, because of loyalty to their leaders or to the "cause" for which they are fighting.

The following comments on this "intelligence picture" seem warranted.

This is not the entire "intelligence picture of the enemy" that EUSAK Psywar has at its disposal: i.e., the picture, as stated here, abstracts from all data pertaining to particular units and particular tactical situations along the front, and fixes attention on the Chinese and north Korean armies as wholes. We may, therefore, speak of it as the "intelligence picture of the enemy in the narrow sense of the term," by contrast with the "total intelligence picture of the enemy," which would include the full budget of unit-by-unit tactical intelligence.

The picture reflects and confirms what has been said previously about the Intelligence section's reliance on interrogations, and what has been implied about the bias of the EUSAK interrogation process, including that part of it that is the responsibility of the section, against cultural and psychological data. At very few points, for example, does it enable us to form a distinct picture of the Chinese over against the Koreans, and vice versa, although the cultural remoteness of Chinese and Koreans is notorious. It

35/ The numbers of Chinese surrenderees seems to have fallen off considerably, even in units known to include a high percentage of former CNA, during the weeks immediately preceding the writing of this memorandum. Some EUSAK psywar operators regard this as the result of the inability of psywar, due to the policy limitations within which its campaign has gone forward, to promise former CNA now in the CCF that they will be sent to Formosa after surrendering. Former ROKs serving with the NKPA, by contracts, can be promises reintegration in the ROKA after they have surrendered, and the same operators attribute to this fact the continued large flow of prisoners from north Korean units.

is, in short, a series of generalizations based upon evidence accumulated in interrogations of prisoners and, from the scientific point of view, reliable to precisely the extent that the interrogation process itself is reliable.

Because it pays scant attention to cultural and psychological matters, the picture leaves unanswered most of the questions that would have to be explored before output could be meaningfully tailored to the cultural peculiarities of the target audiences which EUSAK Psywar must influence. It has, in other words, scant implications of any kind with respect to the question, how do you go about persuading the soldiers in the lines opposite to surrender? Do you talk to them as if they were Americans? If not, in what relevant respects are they different from Americans--if not as Chinese or Koreans, then at least as "Orientals"? Psywar, of course, needs to know, and the picture does tell it, that a high percentage of the target audience is illiterate, and that in one of two parts of the target audience the incidence of illiteracy is higher than in the other. Psywar can perhaps infer from these statistics that it should use more leaflets whose entire content can be surmised from the accompanying graphics than it would otherwise have used, and should channel more resources into voice-planes and ground loudspeakers than it would have in a campaign against a different enemy.

But before we can begin with any confidence to tailor the content of our leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts to the target audience, we need to know a great deal more, even about its illiteracy, that the "intelligence picture of the enemy" does not tell us--some of it information that, in the nature of the case, is unlikely to be obtained from PW interrogations under combat conditions. We need to know the extent to which, despite intimidation by political commissars and superior officers, the illiterates in the target audience rely primarily upon the literates for information, for new ideas, etcetera; for the literates perhaps tend to be also the better-educated, and the units in the target audience may be sufficiently structured as communities to be readily influenceable by written messages despite the incidence of illiteracy. We need to know how the propagandists who know the target audiences best, that is, the manipulators of mass communications among their own fellow-countrymen, square off to the high incidence of illiteracy in the target population--a question that could be answered satisfactorily only in the course of extensive research operations in the US. We need to know not only whether the illiterates do happen to be open to influence by graphics, but also whether a (for them) meaningless accompanying text--and EUSAK leaflets normally include both a graphic and a text--tends to confuse them, e.g., to undermine their confidence in their

ability to infer the meaning of the entire leaflet from the graphic. In short, incidence of "illiteracy" means different things in different cultures, and before we can tailor psywar content to a relatively illiterate target audience we must set its illiteracy in its own cultural context.

The same kind of point can be urged in connection with the alleged low incidence of religious and political commitment among the target audience--which, taken in conjunction with what the picture has to say about the audience's major preoccupations, would seem to require content devoid, in the main, of religious and political appeals. Here also, however (entirely apart from the question whether the statements referred to are supported by adequate evidence), the picture leaves off precisely where the leaflet writer's need for guidance evidently begins: if religious and political appeals are not likely to produce results, what type of appeals, aside from that of sheer self-preservation and/or self-interest, can be used in their stead? If the target audience is without religious beliefs, by what standards do its members pass judgment on, and thus give or withhold approval for, the behavior of their fellow-men? The leaflets repeatedly accuse the commanders of the enemy armies, for example, of placing a low value upon human life. Are leaflet writers to press the point exclusively in terms of the individual enemy soldier's self-interest, or can they attempt to achieve their purpose (lowering his morale) by enlisting on their side his "moral" disapproval of such behavior? The picture of the enemy does not tell us. The leaflets refer frequently to the driving and overworking of enemy troops by their "Communist masters," and sometimes to Communist "exploitation." Here again, if anything is intended except an appeal to the individual soldier's wish not to be overworked, we need the fullest information possible as to the specific moral appeals to which he can be expected to respond. Again, however, the intelligence picture of the enemy is silent, and we are stopped from tailoring our content to the particular target audience.

A similar issue arises in connection with the following further problem, demonstrably inherent in the conduct of combat psychological operations. The psywar campaign described and analyzed in this memorandum is "white" psychological warfare; i.e., no attempt is made to conceal the source from which it emanates. Every statement that it makes to its target audience, every argument that it employs, every invitation to surrender that it extends, every promise of "good treatment" that it makes, is known by the recipients to come from an "enemy," at least in the strict military sense of this term. Why should the target audience give credence to

that enemy's statements, or receive his arguments as other than reasons for adopting the opposite of the conclusion to which it points the way? Why should it believe that the invitations to surrender are extended in good faith, or that the promises will be kept? Why should the salutation "Friends," which recurs frequently in EUSAK's leaflets, not merely arouse the target audience's suspicions? Insofar as it is agreed that these are not easy questions to answer, we are obliged to conclude that the difficulties pointed out in the preceding paragraphs (those of communicating to, and influencing the behavior of representatives of a strange culture) are enormously increased when the relevant communications are known to proceed from the same quarter as the artillery fire and the strafing planes. The questions therefore arise: how, in writing leaflets, is it possible to get around these further difficulties? Does the target audience possess cultural peculiarities that would have to be kept constantly in mind in order to get around them? The present picture of the enemy offers, and attempts to offer, none of the data needed for answering these questions, which, unlike some other questions bearing upon tailoring of content, do perhaps better lend themselves to investigation in combat conditions than in research projects in the Zone of Interior.

The essentially unreliable character of the findings of the psywar intelligence interrogation process as conducted in EUSAK cannot be overemphasized. The interrogation process, like the translation process in the Projects section, involves the use for a crucial psywar function (i.e., getting at the opinions, feelings, ideas, preferences, etcetera, of the prisoners) of men who are far from being thoroughly bilingual. The Intelligence section officers and the prisoners upon whose information they rely must, therefore, communicate over a considerable language barrier. The prisoners may, for whatever reason, deliberately falsify their answers to questions, or the questions may be questions that they are not competent to answer, either because they do not know the correct answer or because they do not know how to articulate it. Generalizations about the enemy army based on PW answers involve, as a matter of course, extrapolating from the PW population drawn from the army to the army as a whole, and are valid only to the extent that the PW population is representative (the prisoners, or a certain percentage of them, may have surrendered precisely because they are <u>not</u> typical). In normal battle conditions, moreover, the psywar intelligence process has access to only a sample drawn from the PW population, which may or may not be representative of that population. Even, however, if all of these reasons for questioning the findings of EUSAK psywar intelligence were set aside, and even if the bias of the interrogations against data needed for cultural-psychological tailoring were corrected, there would remain the

following reason for skepticism about the "intelligence picture of the enemy": the conduct of interrogations, and the processing and interpretation of the data they produce, is today a highly developed professional skill. When these functions are performed by officers trained only (or at most) in the US Army's traditional interrogation procedures, the results arrived at must, from the scientific point of view, be regarded as merely impressionistic. This, as the present memorandum repeatedly points out, does not mean that they should be ignored by, a field army PWD that has no other picture of the enemy to which to turn. It does mean, however, that the planners of future army-level psywar operations should assign a high priority to the need for entrusting the psywar intelligence function to officers professionally trained in interrogation procedures.

OPERATIONS

We shall discuss EUSAK psywar operations under three main headings, each corresponding to one of the three distinct psywar media they employ: propaganda leaflets, air loudspeaker broadcasts, and ground loudspeaker broadcasts. We shall distinguish four operational phases common to all three: a) target selection and planning, b) preparation of psywar materials, c) physical production of psywar material, and d) dissemination of psywar materials. Primary responsibility for the conduct of psywar operations in EUSAK is divided among the Operations (or Media), and the Projects sections within the Psywar Division, and the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, which from an organizational standpoint, as we have seen, is outside it.

Leaflets

EUSAK Psywar dropped an average of more than 14,000,000 leaflets per week during the months of June, July and August 1951. Approximately 15 percent of the leaflets dropped were prepared and produced at Eighth Army itself; the remaining 85 percent by the Psywar Section, GHQ, in Tokyo. The leaflets prepared at GHQ are, as a rule, elaborations of one or another of a few standard themes -- e.g., the possibility of surrendering safely, the strength of UN firepower, the virtues and attractions of UN objectives in Korea, the good treatment the UN gives to prisoners of war, etcetera, written for one or the other of the enemy forces as a whole, thus without any particular enemy unit in mind, or any particular tactical situation. Those prepared at EUSAK tend, by contrast, to one form or another of "pinpointing": they tend to be written with an eye to their use against particular units or at least particular groups (e.g., truck drivers) in the enemy army, and in the light of the latest tactical intelligence about those units

or groups. At least in theory they are aimed at, or intended for use against, smaller or more narrowly defined targets than GHQ leaflets. The line between GHQ and EUSAK leaflets is, however, difficult to draw any more precisely. It does not, correspond, for example, to the line between "strategic" and "tactical" psywar as it is currently understood:36/ EUSAK often makes tactical use of leaflets prepared at FECOM; some EUSAK leaflets are recognizable "strategic" in character; many EUSAK leaflets have some "strategic" content.

All leaflets disseminated south of parallel 38° 30', whether produced by GHQ or by EUSAK, are dropped upon targets selected by EUSAK Psywar's Operations officer. Thus Eighth Army selects and hits all targets along the enemy front and in the immediate enemy rear, together with all such targets as by-passed enemy units, guerrillas, and Korean civilians (usually refugees) in friendly rear areas.

Eighth Army normally maintains a stockpile of GHQ leaflets, in which, theoretically, all types likely to be of use are represented in quantity. During the months of June, July, and August, for example, EUSAK dropped an average of approximately 10 million stockpile leaflets per month, i.e., about 18 percent of all the leaflets it disseminated over enemy targets. (About 67 percent of the leaflets dropped were dropped in compliance with the GHQ weekly schedule.)

36/ It would do so, however, if the line between strategic and tactical were a matter of the size and duration of the intended target audiences, i.e., if we conceived of a continuum stretching from the leaflet planned and written for an enemy squad at a moment when it finds itself in such and such a tactical situation and intended to influence the military outcome of that situation, to the leaflet planned and written for the enemy's troops in general, and intended for use wherever and whenever there is an opportunity to get it in their hands. Many, perhaps most EUSAK leaflets would lie closer to the tactical end of such a continuum than any FECOM leaflets; a few EUSAK leaflets would lie at the other end of the continuum, at the same point on the line as most FECOM leaflets. The "line" between strategic and tactical could be drawn arbitrarily at any point on the continuum; or it need not be drawn at all, in which case we could speak of this leaflet as "less tactical" than that one. This is the conception that underlies the present memorandum, in which the words "tactical" and "strategic" are frequently placed in quotation marks when they are used in some other sense.

EUSAK production facilities are highly limited; therefore, it cannot count on producing from week to week enough leaflets for a given purpose to fill all its needs, and so cannot hope to build up a reserve of its own leaflets from which deficiencies can be met. Inadequate storage space, on the other hand, has made it difficult to maintain the needed stockpile. Although EUSAK, as noted in Part I, is free to select targets for all the leaflets that it disseminates, the GHQ leaflet schedule has tended in practice not only to prevent EUSAK from conducting a comprehensive and integrated psywar campaign for the entire army front, but also to keep it from stockpiling quantities of each kind of situational leaflet large enough to meet its dissemination requirements. Since it has been obliged to drop particular GHQ leaflets on specified dates, whether or not the tactical situation along the front has seemed appropriate to the scheduled leaflets, some two-thirds of the leaflets disseminated along the Eighth Army front have borne little relation to the kind of situational psywar that EUSAK thinks of itself as waging, i.e., to its attempts to adapt leaflet operations to UN hardware plans and to exploit enemy vulnerabilities in a timely manner as they develop. Two million safe conduct passes, for example, may be scheduled at a time when UN and Communist forces are out of contact, and numerous enemy surrenders are improbable. The schedule thus greatly reduces the extent to which GHQ production facilities can be counted on to supplement EUSAK's own, since GHQ must use its facilities, in large part, for the production of leaflets for scheduled drops. If all types of leaflets likely to be useful were represented in adequate quantity in EUSAK's stockpile, so that a situation could hardly arise in which a needed type of leaflet would be in short supply, the stockpile would contain forty-million leaflets, approximately the number of leaflets that GHQ delivers to EUSAK for stockpiling in three months.

Target Selection and Planning

In order to understand how psywar planning and target selection proceed for Eighth Army leaflets, we must distinguish three kinds of operations: "routine operations," that is the preparation and subsequent large-scale dissemination of surrender-mission leaflets designed to fit this or that type of recurrent and general tactical situation (normally, in other words, routine operations involve relatively little pin-pointing, either at the planning-writing or at the dissemination stage, although the relevant leaflets are of such character that they cannot be dropped on just any enemy soldiers at just any time[37]; "operations of opportunity," that is, the preparation and relatively pin-pointed dissemination, usually on

[37] Leaflets asking enemy soldiers to surrender because they are dog-tired must not, for example, be dropped on units that are in reserve.

the basis of "hot" intelligence, of leaflets designed to exploit a momentary or at least fresh vulnerability at a particular spot in the line (frequently, therefore, such leaflets are addressed to a particular unit); and "special psywar operations," that is, the preparation and dissemination of leaflets, often series of leaflets, that require careful advance planning, sometimes with sometimes without an eye to some intended UN hardware operation (insofar as they are pin-pointed, they are pin-pointed at an echelon or occupational grouping in the enemy army, or at a sector of the front chosen not because of its peculiarities as revealed by intelligence but because of its relevance to a UN tactical plan). "Operation Tomahawk", in support of the drop of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, and "Operation Nutcracker," directed at the political commissars in the enemy army, are the major examples of this kind of operation to date.

Target selection for routine operations proceeds as follows: Through the 23 hours preceding the daily briefing the Operations officer, consulting at brief intervals the latest intelligence and the latest information concerning UN activities along the front, seeks that allocation of his scarce dissemination resources that seems calculated to produce maximum results in terms of future enemy surrenders. This is a matter, in the first instance, of matching available leaflets to available targets, or vice versa. The Operations officer must keep constantly in mind what leaflets are on hand in what quantities, as also the prevailing estimates as to what each leaflet can be expected to accomplish in what kinds of tactical situations. He must move back and forth between this knowledge and the current tactical intelligence, in terms of which, as the 23 hours pass, he must form a judgment as to what tactical situations are "there" to choose among, and what ones are relatively the most promising for psywar exploitation. It is a matter of matching the matched leaflets and targets to the available media of dissemination. If the Operations officer's decisions are taken wisely, no leaflet will be dropped, during the ensuing 24 hours, that might fairly have been expected to accomplish greater results over some other available target; no leaflet will be left in stock that might fairly have been expected to accomplish more than some leaflet that is actually being disseminated; no vehicle for dissemination will have been used to carry the wrong message or hit the wrong target.

Target selection for operations of opportunity proceeds as follows: Corps or division psychological warfare officers are normally the first to recognize targets for operations of opportunity, the reasons for this being that they have their attention fixed almost exclusively upon the enemy sector in front of their corps or division, and can follow the

intelligence relating to that sector in greater detail and with a lesser time-lag than anyone else (they can lay hands on it as it reaches the -2 tents from forward observers, IPW teams, etcetera), and they are closer to the forward G-2 sources themselves, and thus, through on-the-spot liaison, able to acquire significant data even before it reaches the -2 tent. (The psywar intelligence section at army level, by contrast, must wait until the data are summarized, mimeographed, and distributed via G-2 channels in the form of spot intelligence reports, by which time the "opportunity" may no longer exist.)

When a division or corps psywar officer, drawing upon the sources noted above, identifies an enemy unit whose situational peculiarities indicate that it is highly vulnerable, for the moment at least, to psywar exploitation (e.g., large numbers of prisoners are coming in from the 32nd North Korean Division, and speak in the interrogations of a possible mass surrender due to severe casualties, battle fatigue, and general low morale), he reports in by telephone, describes the target to the psywar Operations officer, and perhaps recommends such-and-such action. Definitive target selection then proceeds. The Operations officer, who other things being equal assigns a high priority to operations of opportunity, weighs the claims of this newly-discovered target against competing claims on his scarce resources for the next 24 hours, bearing in mind the fact that optimum exploitation of a target of opportunity often calls for preparation and production of a new leaflet tailored to its situational peculiarities. He must put to himself, among others, the following questions: Does the target's promise justify calling the leaflet writer and artists and printers away from what they would be doing if this target of opportunity were passed up? Is the target likely to remain vulnerable long enough to permit preparation and production of a new leaflet? Is the target such that it could be exploited by leaflets drawn from the stockpile? with broadcasts from an airborne loudspeaker? from a ground loudspeaker? If the Operations officer decides wisely, no resources will be committed to the preparation and production of a new leaflet that might better have been devoted to the preparation and production of routine situational leaflets; no leaflet designed in terms of the situational peculiarities of a target of opportunity will be dropped after those situational peculiarities have ceased to obtain; no medium of dissemination will have been used on a target when another medium could fairly have been expected to accomplish better results.38/

38/ In several isolated instances, presumably when army-level resources were unavailable, corps and division psywar officers have designed and mimeographed small quantities of leaflets for dissemination by organic aircraft over targets of opportunity.

Target selection for special psywar operations, unlike that for the other two types of operations, follows no set pattern; the term "special," as used here, means irregular. There have been, to date two major examples of such operations, and these have been essentially dissimilar from beginning to end. We shall discuss each of them separately.

The procedure employed in selecting targets for "Operation Tomahawk" was as follows: EUSAK G-3's plans section notified the Psywar Division, toward the end of February, of a projected airborne operation (mission: to capture Chunchon) that was to take place when UN ground forces reached certain positions known as "Line Buffalo." The enemy units in the area were known to be Chinese. The Psywar Chief directed that a special leaflet be prepared, tailored to the situation in which the Un operational plan would, as a matter of course, place the target audience (i.e., that of troops with paratroopers descending on them in overwhelming numbers.)39/ Shortly after the initial alert, G-3 requested a combined voice-cast leaflet-drop mission (as a cover for an aerial reconnaissance mission over the proposed airhead), using psywar materials of a "general nature". This mission was performed as directed, and should be regarded as part of the special operation; such an operation must adjust itself readily to changes in the basic operational plan, as the subsequent developments further show. When, however, it became apparent that Chunchon could be taken by ground forces without airborne support, the target of the projected airborne mission was shifted to a point near Munsan-ri, held by the North Korean I Corps. If psywar was to play the role assigned to it, a new leaflet -- in Korean, not Chinese -- was required, which meant further bout with the equipment and supply shortages that had made it difficult to produce the leaflet for Chunchon. During the three days prior to the jump, Psywar flew three diversionary voice-leaflet missions, each agreed upon between it and G-3, on the West Coast; and between 22 March and 26 March it undertook seven missions in support of the drop, including two on the day of the action, 23 March: one directed against elements of the North Korean I Corps in the target area, the other against elements of the 40th and 42nd CCF Armies on the north Korean unit's flanks. These missions, again after detailed negotiation with G-3, emphasized the surrender theme, surrender instructions, the good treatment theme, and the "paratroopers descending on a vanquished enemy" theme.

39/ The required leaflet was designed by the Projects section and successfully produced by the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, despite extreme shortages of equipment and supply.

The characteristic features of this "special" psywar operation, then, were as follows: Psywar was "in" on a tactical plan, almost from its inception in the planning stage of the hardware operation. It was assigned responsibilities comparable to those of any other weapon or weapons system.40/ Once the plan went into effect, Psywar -- like the other weapons concerned -- stood ready to abandon or modify its own plans, as the needs of the over-all plan might dictate. Targets were pin-pointed from the first, but the points on which operations were to be pinned shifted as the over-all tactical plan moved along to its new target. Such psywar pin-pointing as occurred was planned with an eye not primarily to the flow of new intelligence, but to the Un tactical plan. And the leaflets actually dropped were tailored with an eye not to a situation pieced together out of intelligence, but rather to situational peculiarities that a UN hardware operation was about to create.

Target selection for "Operation Nutcracker" proceeded as follows: key officers of the Intelligence, Operations, and Projects sections had become concerned about the apparent effectiveness of the Chinese political control system in inhibiting largescale CCF surrenders. They decided, in a series of conferences with the Psywar Chief, upon a "double-barreled" psywar campaign directed at working-level personnel in that system, namely the CCF's political commissars. The operation was double-barrelled in several senses: it had an immediate purpose quite different from its ultimate purpose; the ultimate purpose seems to have been the two-fold one of stepping up the rate of soldier -- not commissar -- surrenders along the front, and of preparing the way for an attempt by UN Psywar to bring about a mutiny in the CCF; the immediate purpose was the two-fold one of stepping up the rate of surrenders among political commissars themselves, with or without their charges, and of encouraging anti-Communist and/or non-politicals in the CCF to shoot their commissars when and if the opportunity presented itself (if the campaign could make such shootings seem a realistic possibility, this would become a further reason, in the eyes of the commissars, for surrendering); and even those parts of the resulting leaflets that are ostensibly addressed to the commissars themselves were clearly intended for consumption by their charges as well; i.e., besides the ostensible immediate target (the nut) there was a concealed immediate target (the intended nutcracker). The pin-pointing to a particular group in the enemy army (the

40/ The Navy was "in", at first, for comparable participation -- it was to bombard the West Coast as part of the same deversionary mission that psywar assumed -- but did not finally participate.

commissars), in other words, was in part deceptive, and the leaflets were aimed at a much wider audience than most of their manifest content would suggest.

We must note that the point of departure for the operation as a whole was situational intelligence that the intelligence section had collected from PW sources. It indicated that large numbers of CCF officers and men would, if political control inside the Army were removed or even relaxed, readily surrender. It became a "special" operation, however, when PWD personnel recognized that the psywar mission to which this intelligence clearly pointed was so difficult and complex as to call for a series of leaflets, carefully planned in advance, each thoughtfully related to the others, and each taking up the propaganda task where the preceding one might fairly be expected to leave it. Four "phased" leaflets were produced, the first two of which were ostensibly addressed to the political officers, and sought to convince them that they were hated by both officers and men in their respective units, that their attempt to keep their charges from surrendering must fail in the long run, that they would be shot by their superiors for having failed, and that the only way for them to save their skins was to surrender to the UN forces and bring their charges, already eager to surrender, along. The third leaflet of the series was addressed to the "Officers and Men of the CCF", and urged them to shoot their political officers and come over to the UN lines.41/

We may note, in conclusion, that at the dissemination stage targets for this kind of special operations leaflets

41/ Like nearly all EUSAK leaflets, the series is open to the objection that it is based exclusively upon situational intelligence: There is no evidence of tailoring of content to the Chinese political officer as a peculiar breed of man, whom we may assume to have been selected by his superiors because he possesses personal characteristics that render him inaccessible to ordinary propaganda appeals (e.g., complete willingness to lose his life in the struggle for Communism). There is no evidence of tailoring to Chinese cultural peculiarities that might dispose Chinese soldiers to regard the role of the political officer in an army as hateful. The tailoring is, as might be expected from the above account of EUSAK psywar intelligence, to the situation of the commissars vis-a-vis their charges and vice versa. EUSAK psywar addressed itself to both as if they were "just people."

are chosen like those for routine operations leaflets, just as those for special operations leaflets like Tomahawk are selected like those for targets of opportunity leaflets.

The Preparation of Leaflets

The Projects section of the Psywar Division, which "prepares" almost all the leaflets produced in Eighth Army, has four major tasks, namely: (1) the selection of leaflet themes, (2) the drafting of leaflet texts, (3) the pretesting of leaflet content, and (4) the translation of draft-leaflets into Korean and Chinese. These task are divided among a staff of three officers, three enlisted men, and six civilians.

In performing the first of its four tasks, i.e., developing themes likely to appeal to enemy soldiers, the Projects section has been greatly handicapped at all times by the inaccessibility of certain background materials it clearly needs. Its library, the only one in the PWD, is a brief shelf of books which includes a volume on advertising, a popular textbook on psychological warfare, and a few Chinese Communist publications aimed at US and UK readers. The section has at its disposal none of the standard reference works, including here the better-known "country studies" produced by US government intelligence (e.g., the NIS), with which it might brief itself concerning the two alien cultures whose representatives it is called upon to influence.

This state of affairs by no means reflects indifference on the part of the section's officers (or the Division's) toward source materials: there seems to be general agreement that it would do better work if it had access to some books and periodicals bearing upon its problem, and the need for at least a few clearly indispensable items appears to have been called to the attention of higher authority, both in Eighth Army and in the PWS in Tokyo, on several occasions. Eighth Army procurement funds, however, are almost exclusively in won, i.e., they are usable only in Korea, where the materials required are of course not available. The PWS appears to have taken no action on the requests forwarded to it.

The section, in short, is aware of its need for information concerning the non-situational peculiarities of its target audiences. Having no books to turn to, it seeks such information, in the form of verbal advice, from those persons it has access to who seem likely to have it. The prisoner of war panel, discussed at some length above, provides information of this kind when it recommends new themes, drafts,

leaflets, and/or offers opinions as to the probable effectiveness of the Projects section's leaflet-drafts.42/ The section also receives advice, suggestions, and information bearing upon the preparation of leaflets from KMAG, in Taegu, although liaison with the latter's office has become more difficult since the Psywar Division's removal to Seoul. It has occasionally received (via the Chinese Embassy in Korea) guidance from as far away as Formosa, despite major difficulties of communication. Finally, the United States Information Service (USIS) of the Department of State is sometimes able to supply intelligence or information needed in the preparation of leaflets. None of these sources except the POW panel could, however, be fully or regularly exploited without first considerably improving the Division's present liaison arrangments.

There is one other source to which the Projects section can and does turn in search of guidance insofar as it attempts to tailor its leaflets to its target audience, namely, its own staff of translator-interrogators.43/ The latter's claim to be listened to as area experts is open to grave doubts. At the same time, however, they are undoubtedly the best source of background (i.e., cultural, historical, political) information EUSAK Psywar has at its disposal; there is no reason to suppose that it has been within EUSAK Psywar's power to gain access to any better source; to the extent, therefore, that they have been intelligently used, they constitute a further instance, given the meager support PWD has received from the ZI, of its ability to make do with whatever resources it has at its disposal. The question of what constitutes intelligent use of translator-interpreters as a substitute for area expertise (whether in the form of

42/ As noted in the foregoing discussion of intelligence, however, Projects section officers rely on the panel less and less as time passes, on the grounds that its members are now too far removed from the actual experiences of CCF soldiers to be useful. Strictly speaking, remoteness from these experiences should not affect unfavorably the panel-members' capacity to provide the genuine background (as opposed to situational) data here in question.

43/ We return below to some of the problems posed by the presence within an Army-level psywar organization of low-level indigenous civilian employees possessing a virtual monopoly not only of the linguistic skills required in the operation, but also of the relevant area expertise.

area experts or in that of a good area library) is not, however, easy to answer. At most we can point to certain considerations that would have to be taken into account in arriving at a decision as to whether or not the Projects section has used them intelligently.

1. The central problem may be stated as follows: How does a combat psywar operation whose personnel do not regard themselves as area experts go about deciding who, among the persons to whom it has access, deserves to be listened to about enemy culture and psychology? How does it go about deciding when to listen, e.g., to such "natives" as it has been able to associate with its work (they have lived in the enemy country; they speak its language; they have read greater or lesser amounts of its literature; they know something at least of its history, its customs, its politics, etcetera) and when to rely rather on its own "educated guesses", formed in the course of PW interrogations? Does not this decision itself call for area expertise of an extremely high order?

2. The central issue involved in the above statement of the problem can perhaps be stated more clearly by means of a hypothetical illustration: Suppose a field situation roughly comparable to that of EUSAK Psywar (no library, no permanent staff-members who are area experts, etcetera), except that the Projects section has access to a distinguished academic expert on the enemy's mass communications.44/ Suppose the expert has made an intensive study of the problem of "readability" in the enemy language, based on "scientific" peacetime studies conducted inside the enemy country. Suppose the expert declares that the text of a proposed leaflet includes no words that even the most ignorant private soldier in the enemy army will fail to recognize. Suppose, finally, that when the text is pre-tested before the organization's PW panel, the latters' members insist that it contains words they do not know. To whom does the Projects officer listen -- to the expert? or to the prisoners? Does the section re-do the text, in an attempt to simplify it? Or does it order it into production? And how does it decide which to do, i.e., to whom to listen?

44/ The distinguished academic expert is of course much more an "area expert" than, e.g., EUSAK's native translators. But each, in point of knowledge of the enemy's culture, history, politics, etcetera, has the average psywar officer in the average army-level "projects section" (or its equivalent) at the same disadvantage. The problem emerges the more clearly by being stated in terms of that one of the two who is really an area expert.

3. Up to and including the moment at which this memorandum is written, EUSAK Psywar's bets, as between expertise and interrogations, are on the latter, and to an extent that would make it extremely difficult to fit much genuine area expertise into the picture even if it were available. This is, however, less a matter of its accepting PW judgments in preference to those of the best available area experts, than of its fixing attention, for leaflet-tailoring purposes, almost exclusively upon what it picks up from the interrogations. Intelligent use of native translators as a source for background data, in this context, would appear to be a matter of turning to them only as a last resort, i.e., for answers to questions that the interrogations have left unanswered. This appears to be the PWD's actual practice.

4. EUSAK's EEI (Elements of Essential Information) for PW interrogations, like that of Eighth Army intelligence in general, tends to go after situational data as opposed to background data (as previously defined). Insofar as EUSAK Psywar fixes its attention on data gleaned from interrogations, then, it ends up without information concerning its target audience's internal (as opposed to its situational, or environmental) characteristics, and has no realistic alternative to almost exclusively situational tailoring of its leaflets.

5. The question of what kind of human beings you are addressing (as distinguished from the question of what kind of situation these human beings find themselves in) nevertheless cannot be side-stepped, even by an army-level psywar operation which has no area experts on its staff. The Projects section must, with whatever degree of consciousness, make decisions that presuppose answers to the questions: How do you say this kind of thing to this kind of people? What kind of thing do you say to this kind of people? And in order to make these decisions it must, as a matter of course, adopt premises of some kind as to what kind of people they are and what kind of messages will appeal to given kinds of people (e.g., deciding to address the enemy as if they were Americans commits one to the premise: they are like Americans.)

An example or two based upon EUSAK psywar's actual experience will perhaps help to clarify this point, and to suggest the major conclusion of this section of the present memorandum.

There are two artists in the Projects section, both of them US Army enlisted men from the propaganda platoon of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. Though both are demonstrably competent draughtsmen, their drawings of Chinese

faces have frequently failed to be recognized as such when submitted to PW surveys (e.g., leaflet 8537). Drawings by Korean artists, made available to EUSAK through KMAG, met the test no better (e.g., leaflets 8512, 8516). But a Chinese artist, whose assistance became available through the Chinese Embassy, promptly turned out a drawing that met the test easily (e.g., leaflet 8556). Despite the limitations of the PW interrogation process, as these have been noted above, the Projects section was evidently obliged to regard the drawing of the Chinese artist as a better bet than the drawings the surveys rejected.

Reference has already been made to current efforts by EUSAK psywar to cope with the problem of symbol recognition, and to the fact that the symbol surveys conducted to date seem to indicate that some of the symbols now in use (e.g., the death's head, the UN emblem, the hammer and sickle) do not communicate the intended meaning to the target audience. The surveys also seem to indicate that photographs are a better means of communication than drawings, and drawings a better one than cartoons. The clear implications are: abandon the unrecognized symbols; use photographs in preference to drawings, and drawings in preference to cartoons. And, given the present resources of EUSAK psywar, there seems to be no rational alternative to its adopting these implied rules of action.

The conclusions to which the above considerations point are:

1. The PWD should re-examine the grounds on which it is letting its PW panel fall into disuse in the light of the distinction, drawn repeatedly in this memorandum, between situational data and cultural data. It should also seek to develop skill at using the interrogation process in general as a means of finding out what kind of people its target audiences are made of, i.e., as a means of testing the tacit premises about the target audiences that can be shown to underlie its leaflet output.45/ This would call, first of all, for a maximum of conscious clarity as to what those premises are. Most particularly, in this connection, it should put to itself constantly the question, To what extent are we assuming, in our leaflet output, that the Koreans and Chinese are pretty much like Americans? The interrogation process, including the panels, could provide much useful

45/ An attempt will be made to tease these premises out of the content of EUSAK's leaflets in a sequel to the present memorandum, to be entitled: What EUSAK Psywar Says to the Enemy in its Leaflets.

guidance in the search for the correct premises if it were used more intensively as a source for cultural-psychological (i.e., non-situational) data.

2. Pending development of the skill in question, EUSAK psywar should continue to confine itself, in the main, to situational tailoring of its leaflets, i.e., to themes calculated to induce enemy soldiers to surrender by making them fully aware of the situation they are in.

3. US psywar planners should recognize that the interrogation process is at best a poor means of obtaining reliable answers to the cultural-psychological questions that arise in the course of preparing psywar output (e.g., What characteristics does a drawing of a face have to possess in order for a Chinese audience to recognize it as a drawing of a Chinese face? What symbols can a mass target audience of Chinese be counted upon to recognize? What type of art work is likely to produce the greatest propagandistic effect upon a Chinese audience?)

4. US psywar planners should further recognize that the questions that arise in the course of preparing psywar output as to what kind of people the target audience is made up of, and what appeals are likely to influence them, can to a large extent be put into words long before a given psywar operation is undertaken, and they are questions which, in the very nature of the case, lend themselves to the normal procedures of academic research. In short, future US army-level psywar operations should not be left to try to find the answers to these questions via the interrogation process, and the hopeful alternative to their doing so lies in the forehanded preparation of area manuals[46] to which the psywar operator can turn for authoritative guidance about the problems of method that he encounters.

The manuals in question should, at least for army-level psywar purposes and perhaps for all combat psywar purposes, have little in common with the country studies produced in recent years by US and allied intelligence operations. The army-level psywar operator does not, if EUSAK experience can be taken as a fair test case, need an exhaustive knowledge of the target nation's domestic politics, its economic system, its ideology, etcetera. Even in the province of the Projects

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[46] Not, therefore, in the recruitment of area experts for the psywar operation itself.

section,47/ at whose personnel the area manuals should be primarily aimed, questions do not arise about these matters that call for guidance on a relatively high level of expertise. The questions that do arise, furthermore, are not questions that the competent area expert, as such, is competent to answer, for they are highly technical questions which, for the countries which will presumably provide the target audiences for future US combat psywar operations, have never been adequately researched. Typically, they are questions that fall within the narrow field of specialization called mass communications, and relate to one aspect or another of the general problem: What is sound propaganda practice vis-a-vis representatives of this alien culture?48/ And, typically, they can be answered only via scientific analysis (calling for sustained and patient investigation by team of competent social scientists who are also area experts) of successful mass-communication operations in the target country.

It cannot be overemphasized, however, that in any field army psywar operation for which no such manual has been prepared beforehand, the indicated course of action is probably that which EUSAK Psywar, in general, now follows: stress situational themes that call primarily for situational data that only PWs can supply; use the PWs also as advisers on how to communicate; seek to develop procedures and skills calculated to exploit PWs as advisers, turn to indigenous civilian employees only as a last resort and only with questions that can be answered in no other way.

Leaflet texts, when the moment comes to turn them over to Production, have gone through the following steps: A rough draft is prepared in English by one or more of the Projects officers, tenatively approved, and assigned to a

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47/ Some of the functions regularly performed in an army-level psywar operation (e.g., the collection and processing of situational intelligience, leaflet dissemination, etcetera.) could safely be entrusted to officers entirely innocent of background knowledge about the target audience.

48/ For example: How often does this word, which we should like to use in a projected leaflet, appear per million words of popular journalism in the target country? With what kind of subject-matter are the members of this target audience likely to associate this type-face?

translator for translation into Korean or Chinese or both.49/ The translation sub-section makes the required translation, and returns it to the responsible Projects officer with a "re-translation" accomplished by a translator who has not seen the original English text. The re-translation frequently enables the responsible officer to spot points at which the assigned English text has been misunderstood, and serves, in any case, as a basis for discussing any questions of nuancing, diction, etcetera, that may be suggested by discrepancies between it and the original. The result of this discussion is a semi-final draft, which must be pre-tested in one of the ways outlined. The final stage is a further conference between Projects officer and translator, in which the former decides what changes he is prepared to make in the light of the pre-test, and has them embodied in the translation.50/51/

In order to evaluate the above procedure, three facts, one of which has been briefly noted in an earlier connection, must be kept in mind: (1) None of the officers or enlisted men in the entire EUSAK Psywar Division knows either Korean or Chinese. The linguistic skills required in the translation phase of the procedure are, then, a monopoly of the Division's Oriental civilian employees. (2) The Oriental civilian

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49/ Sometimes the translator actually performs the leaflet writer's function as well, in which case he is given, in the first instance, an "idea" that he is to develop in his own way. Translation is then from the Oriental language into English, and the subsequent procedure is different at every point from that described in the present paragraph.

50/ The final draft leaflet must be approved by the Psywar Chief and by G-3. If it is highly tailored to an existing tactical situation, G-3 may insist on its being approved first by the Chief of Staff. The approval procedure is frequently time-consuming, even when the leaflet is hand-carried to G-3 by the Psywar Chief or the Media officer. Often several hours are lost before the necessary endorsements have been obtained.

51/ Leaflets are often checked again by the announcer-linguists at the air-strip, who are always physically separated from the Projects section's translators. Occasionally advice has been sought on translation problems from Chinese-speaking US officers in G-2 or in the 164th MISD, most frequently when a leaflet's effectiveness has seemed to depend on its being translated with absolute precision.

employees, whatever their competence in their respective mother tongue, have an imperfect knowledge of English; they are not, that is to say, "real" bilinguals. (3) The Oriental employees in question stand at the very bottom of the psywar hierarchy: they earn a bare living wage,52/ and have only such status and authority as they happen to acquire via their personal relations with one another and with the military.

These facts are important because they underlie a problem that has taxed the resources of EUSAK Psywar's personnel throughout the organization's history, namely, that of learning how to use native translators on a psywar operation without virtually abandoning control of it into their hands. This, be it noted, is a problem which, in the absence of prior preventive action, will probably, with this or that minor variation, present itself in any army-level psywar operation the US is likely to attempt within the forseeable future; i.e., it should not, from the standpoint of psychological warfare doctrine, be regarded as peculiar to the situation in Korea. Psywar planners dare not assume that all or even most future Army-level organizations will have at their disposal bilingual US officers or even (to the limited extent that they could perform the control function) bilingual US enlisted men, for the following reasons: the incidence of people in the US who know the languages of the Nation's most probable future enemies is not large. By no means all of those who know one or another of the languages needed know that language well enough -- and English well enough -- to say with any confidence whether or not two texts they hold in their hand, one in that language, and one in English, are equivalent, or, given a text in one of the languages, to produce an equivalent text in the other. By no means all who would meet that test possess the age and physical qualifications for military service; by no means all who do possess them will find their way into the armed services; by no means all of those who do will find their way into the Army; and, even on the most favorable assumptions about Army personnel policy, by no means all of the few who do find their way into the Army will find their way into the projects section (or its equivalent) or an army-level psywar operation. Thus, failing large-scale forehanded measures by

52/ The wage is fixed by the Korean government, and EUSAK's translators are usually able, after they have had some experience in the Division, to find more remunerative jobs with other agencies, some of which supplement money wages with payments in kind (especially cigarettes). The Psywar Division has not been in position to offer inducements of this kind to its civilian employees. PWD's officers must, in consequence, devote large amounts of time and energy to persuading their translators not to seek jobs elsewhere.

US Army psywar organization as a whole, alien civilians hired for their knowledge of the enemy's language plus a greater or lesser knowledge of English, will continue to play an important role in Army-level psywar operations. A firm grasp of the difficulties their presence within the organization creates thus becomes an unavoidable necessity for psywar planners and theorists.

These difficulties, as revealed by EUSAK psywar experience, are as follows: No matter how well the Intelligence section performs its tasks, no matter how wisely themes are selected, no matter how skillfully leaflets are written and tailored (in the sense in which we have been using this term above), the organization's efforts will be largely wasted unless the texts it produces are faithfully translated into the language of the target audience. As far as its impact on the enemy audience is concerned, that is to say, the psywar operation as a whole is and can be no better than the work of its translators.53/ The task of rendering even the simplest text faithfully into another language, however, is a difficult one even for the man who is equally at home in both languages, and progressively more difficult just to the extent that the translator, like EUSAK's translators, is not equally at home in both. Those who are ultimately responsible for the operation, even after they have done everything within their power to bring in the best translators available, to brief them fully as to the importance of translating faithfully, and to establish and maintain personal relations with them of a kind that will maximize the likelihood of their trying to translate faithfully, thus cannot content themselves with assuming that the task will be performed well, or even as well as the translators in question are capable of performing it. The translator may, with the best will in the world, misconstrue a sentence or miss a nuance. He may, again with the best will in the world, lack the "feel" for words needed for getting a given nuance, even if he understands it in English, into his own language, and this nuance may be the essence of the leaflet's strategy. He may, still again with the best will in the world, perhaps even out of a devotion to the cause that the operation is

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53/ The theoretical possibility that the translators may "improve" a leaflet by (intentionally or unintentionally) mistranslating it may be dismissed at once. Organizationally speaking, the "best" final leaflet is that which embodies to the fullest the results of the process that produces the English text that is certified to the translators. To speak of "improving" it at the translation stage is to misunderstand the entire concept of psywar organiztion.

attempting to forward (e.g., the struggle against Communism), decide that he knows better than his employers what ought to be said to the enemy, and he may twist the text, as he translates it, accordingly. He may not have the best will in the world: he may develop a patronizing attitude toward his superiors, e.g., because they know only one language and he knows two, or because he thinks poorly of Americans in general, and substitute his judgment for theirs at every opportunity. He may, since security procedures in an Army field situation are at best less dependable than those in the ZI, be "disloyal", and mistranslate in order to deprive the leaflet of effect; he may, by temperament, be a careless fellow or a poor worker,

An army-level psywar organization must therefore try to ride herd on its translators, which means (as we have noted briefly above) developing procedures, usually time-consuming in the extreme, for forcing out of them the best performance of which they are capable. It also means that it must keep itself reminded that the best performance of which they are capable may yet fall short of fidelity, and take steps to assure itself that this is not happening. But the procedures for forcing optimum performance necessarily take the form of using the translators to check one another (as we have seen, translator A translates the leaflet from English into A's language, and translator B, who has not seen the English text, translates the translation back into English), and subsequently ironing out any discrepancies, and the translation problems and/or misunderstandings that underlie them. This calls for conferences, conducted primarily in English, between the psywar officer concerned and the translators. The psywar officer must try to find out, for example, whether the discrepancy between the two English versons he holds in his hand has resulted from a mistake by the translator who put the leaflet into Korean, or one by the translator who put it back into English. He must try to discover, if the translators disagree as to what the Korean equivalent of a given English expression is, whether they are arguing about Korean or about English and, in either case, which of them is right. If he is to do this, he must listen to reasons on both sides; and remain alert to the possibility that arguments may veer away from the linguistic issue toward some cultural or psychological issue (e.g., what expression the troops opposite will react to more positively). The leaflet in English, again for example, may express and idea that it is nearly impossible to put into Korean, and the officer must try to find out whether this is the case; in order to do this he must have the translation problem explained to him, again in English, and make a decision as to whether to negotiate a change in the English text, or take a chance on the best Korean equivalent he can get from the translators. The discrepancy may be the result of translator B's having given him a literal rendition into English

of a superb idiomatic translation of an English expression; in which case translator A is right and B wrong. This, however, is no guarantee that B will be able to understand, or A to explain, why it is a superb translation. Moreover, these conferences are complicated by the fact, familiar to anyone who has participated in a translation operation, that human beings get deeply committed to what they have written on pieces of paper: they are likely, if they do not get their way, to be offended, and so perform less well tomorrow.

The preceding paragraph, though not intended to provide an exhaustive list of the difficulties the unilingual psywar officer faces in working a staff of translators, should suffice to make clear the main outlines of the problem: the psywar officer is called upon to perform a function (namely, that of getting English texts faithfully translated) that is crucial to the rationality of the operation as a whole, but for which he by definition lacks the indispensable skills. He cannot make the translations himself, yet the devices at his disposal for getting them made all require, in the end, the very skills (i.e., those of the accomplished bilingual translator) that he would need in order to make them himself. In using these devices, he is at a permanent disadvantage vis-a-vis his subordinates, and has no realistic alternative to either accepting as a faithful translation whatever text the translators finally agree upon, or, if they cannot agree, deciding on personal or impressionistic grounds on which of his bilinguals to rely. In either case actual control of the translation operation passes out of his hands and, for the reason noted, the organization is left without any sure means of controlling from moment to moment what it is saying to the enemy.

The indicated conclusions appears to be:

1. <u>There is no substitute, even in an army-level psywar organization, for at least one thoroughly bilingual US officer</u>.

2. Any army-level psywar organization that does not have on its staff a thoroughly bilingual US officer should regard the procurement of such an officer as its major unsolved problem.

3. The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare should recognize the predictable unavailability of thoroughly bilingual US psywar officers for future army-level psywar operations as a primary obstacle to the waging of effective combat psywar in any future world conflict. It should therefore take vigorous steps to make an adequate supply of such officers available to itself. This appears, in the short term, to call for the working out of arrangements for bringing such "real" bilinguals as

as it can locate into Psywar on direct commissions, and, in the long term, an ambitious language training program for psywar officers of demonstrated capacity to master new languages.

The Production of Leaflets

All Eighth Army leaflets, except as noted previously, are printed by the production platoon of the FLLC. The latter's facilities have been expanded greatly since the PWD's creation, but are still, as this memorandum is written, incapable of meeting the demands upon them. The extent and nature of these demands will be discussed; the immediate task is to take account (see Table I) of the monthly leaflet production figures for March through September and to explain the significance of these figures in terms of the kinds of production facilities that have turned out the quantities of leaflets in question, the kinds of leaflets that have been produced month-by-month, and attempts to improve the quality of the leaflets produced.

TABLE I

MONTHLY LEAFLET PRODUCTION

Month (1951)	Number of Leaflets
March	1,560,000
April	2,790,000
May	7,800,000
June	10,300,000
July	5,800,000
August	5,400,000
September	11,480,000

As Table I makes clear, the volume of leaflet production increased between March and September by a factor of between seven and eight, while production capacity increased by a factor of only four or five. The reason for this discrepancy will emerge from the following review of operating conditions through the relevant months.

The table includes no production figures for February, when the platoon printed only a few hundred thousand leaflets. The earliest totals available, then, are for March and April, and these are strikingly low by comparison with those for

May and June, the explanation being that even as late as 8 April the platoon had at its disposal a single Harris press, which was inoperational much of the time, and that the three Davidsons presses authorized in the original T/O and E, 20-77, 1 September 1950, though they were delivered in April, did not begin to affect production totals significantly until May. The March figures, in other words, and to some extent the April figures as well, include an indeterminate but certainly considerable number of leaflets whose production was farmed out to Korean job-printing firms. By 1 May, however, the platoon had acquired, in addition to the three Davidsons, another Harris press, and it was able, by continuous cannibalization of one of the two, to keep the other operational through the next two months. The May and June totals, in other words, were made possible by the more or less continuous availability of one Harris press and three Davidsons. Even as of the end of June, however, the platoon was confining its efforts to leaflets of simple design and printed in a single color.

In July, the platoon procured and put into operation its third Harris press, but was obliged to report its three Davidsons inoperational through most of the month. As a matter of fact, it rarely pressed the Davidsons into service even during the ensuing months. As of this writing the Davidsons are, strictly speaking, operational, but the demands made upon them through the spring months left them in such condition that they cannot withstand more than a few days' continuous operation. The operators estimate that the three Davidsons together gave, in all, some 90 18-hour days' service, and can now be regarded, practically speaking, as marginally salvageable junk. Actual production figures for July are not, however, as high as might have been expected, other things being equal, with two Harris presses operational. The major reasons for this are that the platoon's move from EUSAK Main at Taegu to EUSAK Advance at Seoul occurred during the month, and interrupted operations for several days, and that ten days' production were lost toward the end of a month because of a power failure at Seoul.

The figure for August, during which month the quality of the leaflets produced was substantially improved (as witness, e.g., the production of ore three-color leaflet) is deceptively low, for that same reason, by comparison with July. Had the quality of the printing remained unchanged, the August total would, in the opinion of the responsible officer, have exceeded 7,000,000.

In short, September has been the first month of stable and familiar operations with two Harris presses, and total

September production (11,480,000) may perhaps be regarded as representing maximum production on the current level as regards quality and with the present equipment. No major breakdown has occurred during the month, and for one 10 day period the presses operated without interruption (i.e., 24 hours a day). Average daily production during the period has been approximately 520,000 leaflets, all printed on both sides but in a single color of ink on each side. The operators are convinced, on the basis of their experience through the month, that attempts to maintain production 24 hours a day involve costs that are not justified by the results, and that 18 hours of daily operation are as much as can be hoped for. They see no reason to believe that future attempts to maintain continuous production will run up against fewer difficulties than have been encountered in September: frequent power failures (243 hours lost in the course of the month), the "cutting in" of the platoon's own generators when power failures occur (they can supply the needed power only after a delay of approximately fifteen minutes), and unavoidable interruptions of the presses for adjustment of the feeder mechanism, for reinking or readjustment of rollers, or for changing press plates.

As has been indicated above, the major change in the platoon's production facilities that occured between the two production totals under comparison was the authorization and procurement of the Harris presses to replace the T/O authorized Davidsons. Some of the problems to which this basic change has given rise, and the measures the platoon has adopted in its attempt to solve them, are discussed subsequently. In order to set that discussion in its proper context, however, we must take note of the demands the rapidly expanding EUSAK psywar program has made upon the platoon, and of the resultant pressure exerted upon it to increase its productive capacity.

The following preliminary considerations must be kept in mind: Running a printing plant at the headquarters of a field army in a devastated city is a difficult task even on the most favorable assumptions (which in the present case would be unrealistic) with regard to logistical support. Moreover, all the leaflets printed at EUSAK are printed within a few hours by air from Tokyo, one of the great printing centers of the world, and the supply of aerial transport in in the Theater has at all times been capable of keeping up a constant flow of leaflets from Theater to Army. Production facilities at Army have not, in other words, been expanded for reasons of pshsical convenience (in the ordinary meaning of this term), but rather for reasons having to do with the time it takes, starting from scratch, to cause a particular leaflet, conceived at Army and needed for dissemination

over available or anticipated targets, to be printed at Theater and delivered at Army. These reasons have their roots in the kind of psywar EUSAK is called upon to wage, and may be recapitulated as follows:

1. EUSAK operations are planned, in the main, from day-to-day, in the light of new intelligence concerning tactical situations along the front, and consist primarily of strikes over selected targets with situationally tailored leaflets. EUSAK cannot, in the nature of the case, know today what kind of targets it will be hitting tomorrow or the next day, and it must keep itself in readiness to adjust its operations to tomorrow's situation as reported by tomorrow's intelligence. This it does in part by maintaining a stockpile of leaflets of the type it believes itself most likely to need. By definition, however, stockpiled leaflets are tailored to types of situations--not specific situations. Just to the extent that they lend themselves to stockpiling, therefore, they lack the characteristics that EUSAK's operating procedures are intended to assure. Insofar as it disseminates leaflets that are tailored to detailed fresh situational intelligence, then, it must be in position to produce them itself, because the time it takes a new leaflet to be produced in and delivered from Theater is long by comparison with the probable duration of any fresh tactical situation.

2. The same thing is true with respect to maintaining and replenishing the stockpile as drafts are made upon it in response to unforseeable tactical developments. The stockpiling requirement has, as a matter of record, placed a heavy tax on the scant production facilities originally authorized for the platoon, the reason being that EUSAK could not, given the division of responsibility for front-line leaflet coverage, wait upon Tokyo-produced leaflets to replenish the stockpile without courting the danger of being caught without an adequate supply of the relevant type of leaflet. Although GHQ prints, to be sure, between 35 million and 40 million leaflets a month for dissemination by EUSAK, only approximately 14.5 million of these can be regarded as available for the EUSAK stockpile. The remainder are dropped in accordance with the weekly dissemination schedule, which prescribes which leaflets are to be dropped in what quantities and on what dates. Thus EUSAK has good reason for keeping its own production facilities busy, insofar as they are not serving current operations, building up the stockpile.

3. Psychological warfare operations conducted without benefit of area experts or expert area knowledge must go forward without any precise idea in the minds of operators as to what a leaflet can be expected to accomplish when it gets into the hands of enemy soldiers. Where operators

cannot pin-point targets in terms of known enemy groups e-garded as susceptible to certain psywar appeals, leaflets tend to be written for mass consumption, modified at most by a high degree of strictly situational tailoring. The major objective of psywar operations then tends to become (as, at least tacitly, it has become in EUSAK): To get as many leaflets as you can into the hands of as many enemy soldiers as you can as often as you can. Reliance upon any such largely quantitative criterion of psywar operational effectiveness unavoidably results in increased demands upon all available production facilities, including those close at hand.

4. As psychological warfare operations have become more refined, i.e., as effective leaflet preparation techniques have been developed, EUSAK has made increasing use of types of leaflets which, from the production standpoint, are extremely elaborate by comparison with the types in use six or seven months ago. (For example, EUSAK now disseminates numerous multi-colored leaflets, and PWD carefully watches the quality of the printing and the fidelity of the graphic reproductions. Since a printing shop with given equipment can, as noted above, turn out higher quality printing only at the price of reduced production totals, and since EUSAK dissemination requirements have tended to increase during the period in question, the platoon could satisy both requirements simultaneously only by expanding its facilities.

5. Finally, as we shall see at greater length in the discussion of dissemination problems, certain features of Korea's topography, as well as certain material shortages, have driven EUSAK to adopt the principle of "saturation" as opposed to "precision" dissemination. This has naturally contributed to the demand for maintaining production totals at a relatively high level.

In response to this demand the platoon, as we have noted briefly above, has obtained authorization for, and has procured, equipment far in excess of that provided for in its original T/O, so that its physical plant now overflows a sizable factory. The factory's main building houses the platoon's three Harris and its three Davidson presses, a stockpile of 5,000 reams of paper (approximately 1,500 cubic feet), and miscellaneous pieces of equipment. In a recent addition to this same building stands a four-ton US-made paper cutter, the acquisition of which appears to have been dictated by the switch to Harris presses: the platoon could maintain its present level of production with a cutter approximately half its size but no other cutter available in the Theater (it was brought from Japan) would have met EUSAK's

minimum needs.54/ The main building also houses the leaflet packaging operation described below. A second building houses a three-thousand pound press plate regrainer, which is also an indispensable adjunct of a Harris press printing plant (the Davidson press requires a plate regrainer about half as large). In front of the main factory building the platoon has improvised a shelter for its two thirty KW Diesel generators, which it was obliged to acquire when its five T/O-authorized KW generators broke down under the strain imposed by the heavy equipment just described. Finally, two vans parked outside the plate regraining shop accommodate the camera and plate section's equipment.

As the preceding paragraph implies, the platoon's present equipment has not only been rendered necessary by the switch from Davidson to Harris presses, but owes its character to the differences between them. Some of these differences emerge clearly from Table II, which compares the two types of press on the basis, not of contract specification, but of actual performance at EUSAK.55/

54/ The T/O-authorized a hand cutter, which cannot be used in an operation employing Harris presses. The platoon could use a 24 inch cutter, if the Quartermaster were able to supply it with appropriate stock. The present stock comes in 22 by 34 inch sheets, which must be cut to 17 by 22 before they will fit into the presses, and this calls as a matter of course for a 36 inch cutter. Had it been available, a 36 inch Sebold cutter, weighing half as mcuh as the present cutter, would have met requirements.

55/ Since, as is pointed out in the text, EUSAK's Davidson presses were never in good condition, the comparison does not do full justice to the merits of Davidsons, which, however, are not in question in this memorandum.

TABLE II

EUSAK PSYWAR LEAFLET PRODUCTION BY PRESS TYPE

	HARRIS	DAVIDSON
Number of hours operational per day	18	12
Number of sheets per hour	4,000	3,500
Number of leaflets (5"x6") per sheet[a]	9	2
Number of leaflets per hour (printed on both sides in single color)	18,000	3,500
Number of leaflets per day (printed on both sides in single color)	324,000	42,000

[a] Eighty percent of the paper stock available is 22 inches by 34 inches, obtained from the QM. Other paper stock, obtained from the Corps of Engineers, is available in 22 inches by 29 inches (cut to 20 inches by 22 1/2 inches for use on the Harris press) and 45 inches by 35 inches (cut to 17 1/2 inches by 22 1/2 inches). If all the available paper stock were in sheets of 20 inches by 22 1/2 inches there would be a saving equivalent to three leaflets per sheet of the present QM stock, and daily production would rise to 432,000 leaflets without and increase in the amount of paper consumed. With the present QM paper stock this increase could be accomplished by changing the shape of the leaflet to 4 1/4 inches by 7 inches.

The totals listed in Table II cannot be used as a basis for calculating monthly production figures, which are always considerably (about 25 percent) smaller than the hourly and daily totals would suggest because of power failures, the difficulties involved in producing multi-colored leaflets, etcetera. If we take the September production figure for the platoon's two Harris presses (i.e., 11,480,000 leaflets), and assume that it represents the probable maximum production of Harris presses in present circumstances, and that the ratio between daily production and probable maximum monthly production for the three Davidson presses would be roughly equal to that for the Harris presses, we arrive at a probable maximum monthly production of 2,750,000 leaflets for the Davidson presses (i.e., less than 25 percent of the relevant figure for Harris presses).

The platoon has also been under pressure as regards the speed with which it can respond to requests for a specific

quantity of a particular leaflet. The prerequisites of adequate performance here are continuous operational readiness of all equipment, and adequate supplies of all critical expendables: paper, egg albumen, ink, graining sand, graining stones, lithotype film, photo contact printing paper, etcetera. The equipment and supply shortages[56] that have hindered the platoon's operations in the past seem, as of this writing, unlikely to prevent prompt compliance with orders for leaflets in the predictable future.[57] Similarly, given the consistent performance of the platoon's present equipment in recent weeks, and given the fact that a single Harris press can, in a pinch, produce in a few hours enough copies of a given leaflet to satisfy most requests for rapid production, it seems unlikely that future breakdowns will prevent compliance with such requests.[58]

The procedure for leaflet production sticks fairly close to the following pattern: The Projects section of the Psywar Division certifies the final copy (text plus graphic) for a new leaflet to the production platoon. The latter's camera and plate section reproduces it in the form of press plates (it delivers the plates for a straight-line leaflet in approximately two hours, those for a leaflet in which half-tones are used in approximately three). After the plates have been prepared they are sent to the print shop, where the paper needed for the contemplated leaflet run, cut to size, is already in the presses. Before production can begin, the presses must be adjusted for proper register, which may take ten minutes if the operator is experienced, or longer if he is not.

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[56] Supplies of film and printing paper, though still short from the standpoint of adequate reserves, have never fallen so low as to hinder operations.

[57] The commander of the FLLC still finds it necessary, however, to keep one or more enlisted men travelling about Korea in search of supplies, presumably because he cannot count on automatic replenishment of present reserves as they are exhausted. He also devotes much of his own time to travelling in quest of supplies, and -- since the T/O provides for only one officer (himself) at company headquarters -- not infrequently relieves a subordinate officer of operational duties in order to send him in his stead.

[58] For a more precise estimate of the time required for carrying out an order for rapid production of a new leaflet, see the sequel to the following paragraph, which summarizes production procedure.

As noted, the time it takes to turn out a run of 5-inch by 6-inch leaflets depends upon several variables: how many colors are used (if more than one, the printing operation will consume more time); whether the leaflet is to be printed on both sides or only one side (if on one only, the run can be completed in much less time); whether both presses are used, or only one (if both are used, the specified number of leaflets can be run off much more rapidly.)59/ As the finished sheets come off the press they are carried, in piles, to the paper-cutter, where they are converted into leaflets. The leaflets are then stacked in bundles,60/ and the bundles are tied with twine. A given bundle is then either stored in the print shop, or shipped to the airstrip either for immediate dissemination, or stockpiling for dissemination at a later date.

The data set forth, seem to warrant the following estimate: a single-line, one color 5-inch by 6-inch leaflet printed on one side can be produced in the quantity needed for dissemination over most targets of opportunity in about five hours on a single press, and two and a half hours on two presses. The Projects section, as we have seen, needs approximately four hours to prepare, clear, and deliver a leaflet text to the production platoon. An additional hour must be allowed for delivery of a completed leaflet run to the airstrip. Thus the time needed for preparing and producing a leaflet for a target of opportunity (from the moment at which the Operations officer gets the request and turns it over to the Projects section until the moment at which bundles of the finished leaflet are ready for loading at the airstrip), is approximately nine hours if both presses are used, and twelve hours if only one press is used.

The data set forth in the present section appear to justify at least the following conclusions.

59/ Leaflets for targets of opportunity are normally printed on only one side, on a single press (because few targets of opportunity are urgent enough to justify complete suspension of current operations) and in whatever color of ink happens to be on the rolls when the copy is received from the Projects section. Approximately 36,000 leaflets will be ready for cutting in one hour (72,000 if both presses are called into service). The normal order for a target of opportunity calls for 150,000 to 200,000 leaflets, which is six hours' work for one press and three hours' work for two.

60/ Until recently, each bundle contained 2,500 leaflets. At present, leaflets are stocked in bundles of 1,250.

1. T/O 20-77 seriously underestimated the materiel requirements for Army-level psywar, as this is today understood in EUSAK. The authorized Davidson presses, despite the relative ease with which EUSAK production could be supplemented by leaflets printed in Tokyo, were able to supply only a fraction of EUSAK's minimum needs for locally-produced leaflets.

2. Bringing the Army-level T/O in line with minimum requirements for waging tactical psywar is not, however, merely a matter of substituting Harris presses for Davidson presses. Once Harris presses are installed, other adjustments on the materiel side must be made as a matter of course: more powerful generators must be obtained, along with a larger paper cutter, a larger plate regrainer, and a larger paper stock.

3. The premise of mobility that underlay the original T/O should be re-examined in the light of EUSAK experiences. EUSAK Psywar's Harris presses, together with the thirty-KW generators, the plate regrainer, the paper cutter, and the paper stock, could today be moved from place to place only by pressing into service the equivalent of five boxcars and three flat cars. Even if these were available a crane would be needed for the relevant loading operation, which, in the opinion of FLLC officers, would take not less than 48 hours. If the crane and the railroad cars were not available, they add, the platoon's camera and plate equipment, a single Harris press, a single thirty-KW generator, and the plate regrainer would, given Army-level transport facilities, be as much as it could hope to move in the manner envisaged by T/O 20-77. (The company personnel would have, for the most part, to move by foot, and the equipment and supplies that could not be moved would have to be destroyed, or at least made inoperable.)

4. Any re-examination of the premise of mobility (see preceding paragraph) must take into account the probable vulnerability of any immobile Army-level psywar production unit in time of war. Seoul lies a scant 40 miles from the front, in the direct path of the main ground route south, i.e., the Han River valley: that is, however, where the platoon ought to be so long as PWD itself, expecially the Projects section, is there. Moreover, just to the extent that greater emphasis is placed, as it has in EUSAK since the end of July, upon operations of opportunity, so that time becomes a critical factor in leaflet preparation and production, physical proximity to the Projects section (which, in its turn, must remain at least as far forward as Army Advance in order to be close to the sources of intelligence) is the more necessary. In short: the production platoon is obliged, given the

character of tactical psywar as it is waged today at Army-level, to produce leaflets in large quantities; this it can do only if it has heavy equipment, which is virtually immobile; it must install this heavy equipment as far forward as possible, and this means that it is constantly exposed to the hazard of losing its equipment in the event of any sudden enemy advance of a significant character. These considerations appear to point to early and drastic revision of the production platoon T/O and E, which must, in future, provide for an Army-level printing shop capable of turning out at least 20 million leaflets a month (which calls for heavy press units and regraining equipment, generators, a power paper cutter, and a large stockpile of supplies), and must have at its disposal enough transport to place itself beyond the enemy's reach in case of a rapid withdrawal on the part of US forces. The T/O and E of the Engineer's Topgraphic Group appears to have some of the features the new psywar T/O and E should embody.

Leaflet Dissemination

All leaflets dropped on targets selected by Eighth Army Psywar are disseminated by one of two planes supplied by the Special Air Missions Detachment, Flight Baker, 5th Air Force.61/ This phase of EUSAK Psywar's activities is entrusted to the Psywar Air-Ground Liaison Officer and/or the Assistant Air-Ground Liaison Officer, under the over-all supervision of the Media Officer.

The planes mentioned above are both C-47's, both are equipped with loudspeakers. When either of them is inoperational, the Air Missions Detachment sometimes supplies ordinary C-47's for leaflet missions, but the bulk of EUSAK"s air-disseminated leaflets have been delivered by voiceplanes. Since (see section on air loudspeaker operations) loudspeaker equipment weighs approximately a ton, leaflet loads are theoretically smaller by that amount than they would be with planes specialized to this function. This does not, however, appear to have affected EUSAK psywar operations unfavorably: a voice plane can carry approximately 1,000,000 leaflets of the kind now being produced in EUSAK, and few target runs call for larger amounts.62/

61/ It is based at K-16, about ten miles from the EUSAK Psywar Headquarters.

62/ Even if this were not the case, the gains from combined leaflet and loudspeaker missions would presumably compensate to some extent from any loss in effectiveness attributable to the reduced leaflet capacity.

EUSAK Psywar at no time has had at its disposal even the leaflet bomb used in World War II psywar operations. The leaflet dissemination procedure currently in use was improvised early in EUSAK Psywar's history by the present Air-Ground Liaison Officer, and is a further instance of the organizations successful adjustment to the equipment shortages characteristic of the entire Korean campaign. Leaflets have normally been delivered to the airstrip in bundles of about 2,500 held together with twine. They are initially loaded in the forward area of the C-47, in such fashion that there is a separate pile for each type of leaflet to be "mixed" in the drop. Once the plane is airborne, the personnel who perform the actual dissemination (late teen-age Korean boys) shift the piles to the platform in front and on either side of the rear cargo door (which always remains open during air-drop flights) Meanwhile, the Air-Ground Liaison Officer is in constant consultation with the pilot and co-pilot: the plane must be cleared to enter the target area; details of the actual strike--the width and depth of the sector to be hit, the direction of flight during the strike, the speed at which the plane is to fly, etcetera--must be worked out with them. When the plane is over the target, a red light beside the cargo door flashes, and the "disseminators" begin the drop: the bundles, taken from different piles in a specified ratio (to provide the right mix all along the course), are tossed through the open door at specified intervals (equal to the number of seconds the plane is to remain over the target divided by the number of leaflet bundles to be dropped). Approximately ten percent of the bundles are immediately torn apart by the slipstream, and are carried by the wind every which way over the area. The remainder hold together until they hit the ground, where they can be seen to billow up like small artillery bursts; the wind then picks them up and scatters them over a relatively small area.

The drops are known to have been highly inaccurate through an early period of experimentation, leaflets often missing their targets by as much as ten miles. Now, however, the operators claim, on the basis of both observation during actual leaflet drops and of tests conducted in friendly territory, that the drops are about 90 percent accurate. In the present phase of the war, at least, air dissemination of leaflets is not regarded as posing any considerable unsolved problems;63/ i.e., the operators' are confident that the liaison

63/ This, like many of the more or less impressionistic judgments of EUSAK psywar personnel recorded in the present memorandum, must await clarification in the light of the systematic interrogations of PWs conducted by ORO field teams in August and September.

officers despite the difficulty, given the high altitude at which the plane flies, of accurate observation during the drop now possess great skill at handling the numerous variables that determine what happens to a bundle of leaflets after it is caught by the slipstream.

As has already been noticed, a typical air drop accounts for a million leaflets; the typical mix includes two leaflets; the typical target is at a sector only a few miles wide. It is by no means clear, however, what is meant by the statement (or its variants) that the drops are 90 percent accurate, since the central idea of this method of dissemination is that of dropping x leaflets of a given type for each enemy soldier in the sector (where x is an unknown, but almost certainly in excess of 15). Evidently, therefore, the accuracy of an accurate hit is not a matter of its actually delivering leaflets to enemy soldiers, but rather of placing a given bundle of leaflets approximately at that point which, from the elevation of 6,000 feet imposed by the USAF, the Air-Ground Liaison Officer has selected as a promising place to put it. Whether the leaflets in the bundle ever get read depends on the correctness of the intelligence reports to the effect that there are enemy troops thereabouts, on the actual disposition of such enemy troops, on the extent to which these troops move about, on the direction and velocity of the wind, and to no small extent, on chance. It could not possibly be claimed that this is an efficient method of distributing leaflets. Assuming, however, that the bundles do land where they are intended to, there are strong reasons for believing that it is the best method available at the present time in Korea, where intelligence normally does not provide detailed information about the disposition of enemy troops, and where operations must always be evaluated in the light of materiel shortages that the operators are not in a position to effect. But the method's inherent wastefulness should be a matter of continuing concern for psywar planners, both in Korea and in the Zone of Interior.

It remains to notice certain factors, other than the character and extent of UN intelligence regarding the location of the enemy, that have obliged EUSAK Psywar to settle for saturation leaflet drops (as opposed to precision drops) of the type just described. Most leaflet targets in Korea are at present located in terrain that is typically mountainous, with steep slopes (the angle exceeds 30 degrees). The highest ranges (Northern and Southern T'aebaek) stretch southward from the extreme northeast across half the peninsula to the Naktong-gang basin and hills, from about 50 miles north of Pusan on the East Coast to about 70 miles southwest of Taejon in the west. Numerous east-west spur-ranges cut the peninsula at

increasingly short intervals from just below the 38th parallel north: lowlands, plains, and plateaus are infrequent, and the enemy does not, in any case, maintain troop concentrations on them. His troops are to be found among the countless small hills, whose valleys, from the standpoint of an Air-Ground Liaison Officer, are so many distinct "pockets", within each of which surface winds are quite unpredictable. Throughout the summer months rain falls almost every day, and the targets are largely hidden by low overcasts. Average weather conditions for the Seoul area and east approximately half way across the peninsula offer, for example, no more than two completely clear days per month during June, July and August; east of this area, all the way to the coast, the relevant figure varies between two and four. Finally, the enemy is known to deploy his troops in depth when he is on the defensive, as he has been, in general, through the late spring and summer months: elements forming the Outpost Line of Resistance are usually along carefully-selected hilltop and ridge positions, while the larger elements forming the Main Line of Resistance are several thousand yards to the rear in the valleys and lowlands. UN contact with CCF and NKPA forces has been almost exclusively along the OLR through the summer (the one notable exception being the area between the US IX and X Corps, in the east central sector of the front). Thus the most promising targets for surrender-mission psywar have normally been the enemy elements along the hill and ridge positions of the OLR. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the enemy uses his best troops, that is, those least likely to be susceptible to psywar appeals, in these positions. Precision drops on such targets, even if they were feasible from the standpoint of intelligence and equipment, thus seem less promising than the present saturation drops, which aim simultaneously at the main enemy forces (usually deployed in the valleys) and the forward enemy forces (usually deployed on the hills and ridges).

The dissemination procedure described, according to the operators interviewed by the ORO field team, is neither more nor less precise than the normal bomb pattern. The Psywar Air-Ground Liaison Officers estimate, for example, that an area 600 feet square can be pin-pointed and covered with a reasonably high degree of accuracy under most weather conditions, even given the difficulties of Korean terrain. They nevertheless agree that the method now in use is not nearly so accurate as artillery-delivered leaflets, for which a ridge-position target the size of a company CP, can be accurately pin-pointed. As is pointed out elsewhere, however, artillery dissemination has not up to the present, been a realistic alternative for EUSAK Psywar.

As will be noted in more detail in the discussion of air loudspeakers, the chance inherent in the dissemination

procedure is somewhat reduced by the fact that the plane is equipped with SHORAN and maintains radio contact with corps air-ground control, SCR 300 radio contact with forward tactical air-ground control points. Thus it is by no means entirely dependent upon the intelligence PWD has received at take-off time. This makes not only for greater precision in locating intended targets, about which forward ground units may get new information at any moment during flight, but also permits strikes at targets whose existence becomes known after the plane is airborne.

EUSAK Psywar disseminates leaflets over and behind the enemy lines in two other ways.

1. Via organic light aircraft at corps and division The psychological warfare officer in the US I Corps estimates that on the average each of the corps' three divisions uses its light aircraft for leaflet drops every other day. (No estimates for the other corps are available, but the comparable figures would undoubtedly be much lower. I Corps has been decidedly more active in psywar than IX and X Corps.) The planes usually carry several bundles of leaflets and drop them, leaflet by leaflet, on enemy elements that they locate as they proceed. They fly at low altitude, in order to observe and radio back to interested units enemy concentrations and positions, with special attention to weapons installations. There they have excellent opportunities for identifying and exploiting likely psywar targets, and in general, enjoy a high degree of immunity from enemy fire. Enemy gunners, in order to fire at them, would have to reveal their positions, and risk destruction by UN artillery and tactical air. Leaflets disseminated in this way are supplied to the spotter pilots by the division psywar officer, who regularly receives from the Psywar Division small stocks of standard situational leaflets which, as a rule, he stores in his tent or at the divisional light-aircraft landing-strips.

2. Via propaganda shell Psywar operations in EUSAK have been conducted, until very recently at least, with scant reliance on this method of dissemination. This is not because of unawareness on the part of EUSAK psywar operators of the extent to which many of their targets, particularly those on the ridges, lend themselves to exploitation by propaganda-shell and virtually defy exploitation by air-drops. The 105-mm delivered HE shell (loaded with approximately 400 to 500 leaflets) can pin-point targets as small as command posts, artillery emplacements, or machine-gun positions, and the altitude of its burst can be controlled within a few feet (thus where targets are blanketed with high ground-winds, leaflet-scattering can be minimized by setting the fuse for detonation a few feet above the ground). Moreover, the range of the 105-mm is

sufficiently great to enable coverage of almost any enemy elements in positions along the ÓPLR.

Until 1 September 1951, however, EUSAK Psywar had disseminated only safe conduct passes by shell, and even these in relatively small quantities (an estimated 2,000,000 since the beginning of the Korean War). The practice here may, however, be about to change. Sizable quantities of each of three surrender-mission leaflets were recently loaded in propaganda-shell by the army-level ordinance company, and the PWD, which supervised the loading, will presumably take steps to get them used. It remains to notice the factors that have militated against more extensive use of propaganda shell for leaflet dissemination in the Korean War.

1. All EUSAK-operated leaflet production facilities are located at Seoul (formerly, until mid-July, at Taegu), i.e., some 35 miles from the nearest forward division CP. In general, only propaganda-shell readied at army-level have been available to the artillery units, and it has been necessary to transport these at least 35 miles and often as many as 90 miles or more. Transportation has been mostly by truck (a few shells have been delivered by plane), which means a delay of several hours between dispatch and delivery, this being too long, by comparison with dissemination via voiceplane, for genuine targets of opportunity. During the early part of September the railroad between Seoul and Chunchon has been reopened (another line, also reopened recently, connects Chunchon with Taegu), and arrangements have been made by the Psywar Division to ship loaded leaflets forward to the US IX, and I, Corps and I ROK Corps by rail. This method of shipment is even slower than shipment by truck, but for that same reason propaganda-shell may compete more successfully with ordinary shell for space than it has hitherto.

2. Artillery units have, in general, taken the position that their logistical problems (the Korean terrain, the overloading of the north-south arteries, and the absence of lateral highways) are difficult enough even if they confine their basic load to indispensable high explosive shell, and must not be further complicated by less than indispensable items like propaganda-shell. The premise that underlies this position, namely, that leaflets are as a matter of course inferior, militarily, to shrapnel and napalm, seems inconsistent with the high priority EUSAK assigns to leaflet dissemination in other contexts. It should be disposed of by a directive instructing artillery units to include a certain percentage of propaganda-shell in their basic loads.

3. The fact that aerial dissemination has been feasible throughout the war, and that there has been some reason to

believe that it has been getting leaflets into the hands of enemy soldiers, has served as a powerful argument against placing upon EUSAK logistics the added burden of transporting propaganda-shell. The question, "Why load 40,000 to 50,000 leaflets into HE 105-mm shells and truck them forward increasing the basic load of the artillery units, when a single C-47 can drop a far greater quantity of the same leaflets on the same enemy positions with much less effort and in a much shorter time?", is difficult for the psywar operators to answer without discrediting their current operations. Nevertheless the answer, which tends to reenforce the recommendation implicit in the foregoing paragraph, is clear enough, namely: there is no convincing evidence that C-47's can hit all of the same targets with the same accuracy.

4. Since the heaviest concentrations of enemy troops are along the MLR, which is frequently out of range not only of 105's but of artillery observation as well, the bulk of the enemy's forces cannot be reached by propaganda-shell. This, like (2) and (3), has been used as an argument in favor of complete reliance on aerial dissemination. Like (2) and (3) again, however, it fails to meet the objection that there are some targets to which propaganda-shell is eminently, perhaps uniquely, suited. (Propaganda-shell for 155's which bring the MLR within range, have seldom been available during the Korean campaign.)

5. In order for a 105-mm to cover a given concentration of troops effectively with leaflets, it must expend a number of rounds whose cost is, from a strictly fiscal point of view, high by comparison with that of aerial dissemination for the same kind of target. This also, as an argument against propaganda-shell, fails insofar as there are targets that aerial dissemination cannot be counted on to reach.

It should be noticed, in connection with all these arguments in favor of dissemination exclusively by air, that unit commanders along the eastern sector of the front have recently sent in to Army an increasing number of requests for propaganda-shell, presumably for use against enemy elements dug in along ridge positions. This trend may indicate a shift of opinion in the artillery units concerning the comparative effectiveness of artillery and aerial dissemination should it continue, propaganda-shell will play a considerably more important role in future EUSAK psywar operations than it has in the past. It should also be noticed that the arguments in question are, in some degree tied up with the nature of Korean topography and/or the special characteristics of the Korean war. Even insofar as they are valid with respect to current psywar operations, therefore, this would create no presumption

that artillery-disseminated leaflets cannot be used profitably in different battle conditions--e.g., where there are adequate highways for the transport of ammunition, where enemy air and/or flak are on a sufficient scale to discourage airborne leaflet missions, or where leaflet production facilities are located, because of a different approach to the problem of waging tactical psywar, further forward.

The following general conclusion seems warranted. Intensive employment of artillery-delivered leaflets in Korea at the present time would undoubtedly place an added burden on EUSAK logistics. The extent to which this burden would be justified by the gains from more adequate pin-pointing of targets, especially targets along the enemy OPLR, could be precisely estimated only in the light of more reliable data than are now available as to whether or not the C-47's are actually hitting these targets. Meantime, however, the very uncertainty as to whether or not the C-47's are hitting them creates a presumption in favor of using propaganda-shell for pin-point targets that are regarded as critical, and thus in favor of somewhat wider use of artillery—disseminated leaflets even at the cost of some added burden upon existing logistical facilities. It should be remembered, however, that such targets often call for a special leaflets, i.e., leaflets addressed to specific units and tailored in the light of extensive situational intelligence concerning these units. Insofar as EUSAK Psywar remains unable to produce and deliver such leaflets in time to exploit the transient vulnerabilities characteristic of targets of opportunity, the case for increased use of propaganda-shell is weakened. Increased use of propaganda-shell should be accompanied by measures calculated to increase tailoring of leaflets to particular units, and to assure their prompt delivery to forward batteries.

Air Loudspeakers

The Psywar Division theoretically has at its disposal two heavy airborne loudspeakers, or "voice-planes". One of them, however, has been inoperational for voicecast purposes since late May, and the other since late August.64/ This section is

64/ The C-47's in which the loudspeaker systems are mounted can be and are still being used for leaflet dissemination.

therefore concerned, to a much greater extent than other sections, with EUSAK psywar activities in the past.65/

Both of EUSAK's airborne loudspeakers were obsolescent even at the time they were ordered to FECOM: indeed the Bell Laboratories expert who helped ready them for their present mission emphasized that they would withstand, at best, brief experimental use, and that, if found useful, they should be promptly replaced. As is pointed out in ORO-S-84, A Preliminary Evaluation of Airborne Loudspeakers, where FECOM's early experience with them is subjected to detailed analysis, the fact that they were kept operational over a period of several months can be explained only in terms of remarkable feats of maintenance and improvisation. This is true since both planes were burdened, from an early moment in their service in FECOM, with additional pieces of equipment that could get out of kilter. Both were equipped with SHORAN, to enable flight personnel to locate targets with greater precision during bad weather; beginning in April both carried, in addition to standard radio equipment SCR-300 radios, to enable them to maintain contact with forward ground units and exploit such targets of opportunity as these units might discover after the plane was airborne.

We may distinguish two periods in the history of EUSAK airborne loudspeaker operations: that prior to 15 May 1951, when both planes were operational some of the time; that after 19 May, during which a single but somewhat improved voice-plane was kept operational. The 15 to 19 May period was a turning point, as prior to that time, neither plane actually met the minimum requirements for airborne loudspeaker operations in Korean conditions. The speaker horns were mounted in the rear cargo doors, and could not broadcast vertically to the ground unless the plane banked continuously over the target at the appropriate angle. Continuous banking over targets was not regarded as feasible, in part for a reason

65/ Paradoxically, current EUSAK operations are actually handicapped by the "availability" of the two heavy airborne loudspeakers. The Special Air Mission Detachment supplies PWD with ordinary C-47's only when and to the extent that the loudspeaker planes are not operational. In practice, this now means that many EUSAK aerial-dissemination missions must carry 2,000 pounds of dead weight, i.e., the weight of the currently useless loudspeaker equipment. The result is a considerable reduction of EUSAK's leaflet dissemination capabilities.

analagous to that which has driven EUSAK to saturation-type leaflet dissemination (i.e., the difficulty of locating pin-point targets with precision), in part because the terrain discouraged banking at altitudes from which the broadcasts could be heard. It was soon discovered that the voiceplanes could not be heard from altitudes above 1,500 feet, and that effective broadcasting was possible only at an altitude of 800 feet or less, where the planes became vulnerable even to fire from small arms. It is remarkable, in this context, that any successful missions were flown at all. The operators report that on several occasions, when addressing targets situated in valleys, the planes drew small-arms fire simultaneously from three quarters: from below, i.e., from the valley itself, from the side, i.e., from the tops of small neighboring hills, and from above i.e., from the tops of small mountains within rifle range. The planes therefore suffered continuous battle damage, frequently of such character as to render them inoperational for greater or lesser periods while necessary repairs were being accomplished. Little by little the operators became convinced, via PW interrogations, that most of the messages being broadcast were inaudible even at the low altitudes mentioned because they were being drowned out by the plane's own engines, because of interruptions by small arms fire from within the target audience, and because of the plane's inability, given certain terrain conditions, to maintain the speaker at the appropriate angle to the target. The indicated solution, as EUSAK psywar operators seem to have realized early in this initial period, was to install the speaker horns in the hulls between the wings, so that the planes would be able to broadcast vertically to the ground while flying horizontally. By 15 May, the necessary authorizations had been obtained, and the planes were taken to Tachikawa Air Base in Japan to undergo the desired modification, which it was quickly discovered could be accomplished only by cannibalizing the speaker equipment in one of the planes for repairs to the other. On 20 May one satisfactorily-modified plane was flown to Korea. Its sister followed it, a few days later, with the dual mission of disseminating leaflets and serving as a graveyard from which speaker parts could be taken as needed.

A flight test on 20 May indicated that the modified plane's audibility was excellent at 5,000 feet. On 21 May it flew its first mission, a 120-minute voicecast over targets requested by officers in the US IX and X Corps. On 23 May the Far East Air Force granted its pilots permission to fly daylight voiceplane missions, witnin two miles of the front and away from known enemy flak areas, at a minimum altitude of 6,000 feet. Throughout the balance of May and during June and July EUSAK's one voiceplane was in regular use, as can be seen from Table III.

TABLE III

VOICEPLANE MISSIONS FLOWN OVER VARIOUS TARGETS
(Jan-July 1951)a/

1951	CCF	NKPA	Guerilla	Civilians	Unspecified	Total
Jan	1	4	0	3	0	8
Feb	4	2	1	1	2	10
Mar	9	5	1	1	11	27
Apr	13	9	4	5	21	52
May	4	2	7	0	15	28
Jun	0	1	3	1	35	40
Jul	15	13	5	1	32	66
TOTAL	46	36	21	12	116	231

a/ August figures are not included, because early in that month the plane became only semi-operational, due to the burning out of half of the coils in its speaker horns. Toward the end of the month the remainder burned out also, and the plane ceased to fly voice-missions at all. During the semi-operational period, the plane was committed only to missions supporting important UN operations, and targets regarded as crucial or extremely promising.

Table III shows that the modified plane flew 106 missions in two months, which maybe compared with the 125 missions flown by the two planes together over the preceding four months. If we add to the missions it flew in June and July its share of the missions flown in May, i.e., 12 out of the May total of 28 (it was in service for only 10 days at the end of May), we find that it flew more missions (118) in two months and ten days then the two planes had flown together in four months and twenty days (113).

The reasons for this sharp increase in missions flown appear to have been as follows:

1. The modified plane, because it was audible at greater altitudes, was able to do its work in large part safely outside the range of small arms fire; thus it did not have to take time out, as the two planes had in the past, for battle-damage repairs.

2. It was able, for the same reason, to attempt a great many missions that would have been out of the question prior to the modification.

Part II

3. The modification of FEAF restrictions on daylight voice-missions made it possible to exploit numerous momentary enemy vulnerabilities, reported to PWD by forward observers along the line, that previously would have had to be passed up altogether. However, even in the absence of the modification and of the lifting of FEAF restrictions, there would presumably have been some increase in the frequency of missions as flight personnel had by this time learned a great deal about conducting airborne loudspeaker missions; they had become increasingly skillful in using radio as an indirect means, and their own eyes--plus their own increased familiarity with the front and how it looks from the air--as a direct means, of identifying targets while in flight.

Target Selection

As Table III shows, voice-missions were flown over three distinct types of targets: front line enemy troops, enemy guerrillas in rear areas, and friendly civilians in rear areas. Target selection for the first of these types of mission closely paralleled that described previously for leaflet operations of opportunity, and proceeded approximately as follows: Psychological warfare officers at corps and/or division, in reviewing day-to-day intelligence reports from forward G-2 sources along with the changes recorded on the corps and/or division situation maps, kept on the look-out for isolated enemy units, positions that had been under continuous UN fire, units from which enemy soldiers had been surrendering in significant numbers, etcetera. They relayed to the Army Psywar Media Officer full information concerning any promising targets that lent themselves to air loudspeaker exploitation, together with their estimate of the probable duration of the relevant vulnerability. Frequently they went even further, and recommended a particular message for use in the voicecast and the records show that recommendations of this kind were normally disallowed only when they violated a policy directive. The Media Officer, organizationally speaking, made the actual selection of targets, balancing as best he could the number of prisoners that the mission could fairly be expected to bring in against the anticipated yield of other requested missions, and against the wear and tear on his obsolescent equipment.

Although target selection went forward as described above, it should be noted that during those periods when the voiceplanes were operational they averaged between two and three flights a day, considerably in excess of the average number of requests from forward positions. The flights were usually projected by

the Media Officer, after he had conferenced with the Air-Ground Liaison Officers over the intelligence reports for the preceding 24 hours. The results of these conferences were embodied in a flight plan, which was presented and discussed at the 1000 hours briefing. If no requests had been received up to the time at which the flight plan was prepared, the latter necessarily became a plan for striking areas of general activity along the front. Flight plans were, however, always regarded as open-ended, and if in the course of the day the Media Officer received requests from forward units, he was usually able to fit them in.

One important variant of the target selection procedure remains to be noticed. While actual flights were in progress the Air-Ground Liaison Officers, one of whom accompanied each voice mission, were in constant communication with ground units. For example, the plane was obliged to check in with corps tactical air-ground control before it could enter the corps area, and this enabled the corps psychological warfare officer to provide flight personnel with the latest information on the location and condition of enemy elements in the target area: the number of enemy soldiers surrendering, the intensity and character of recent UN fire on the target area, etcetera. It also enabled him to call attention to any promising targets that recent tactical intelligence might have revealed.

Flight personnel could, again, establish communication with UN units further forward via the SCR-300 radio. This enabled them to further specify the location and condition of the proposed target, and to weigh the claims of any promising targets recommended by officers in these forward units. The Air-Ground Liaison Officer was left free to make the necessary choices in terms of his own final estimate of the relative promise of alternative targets and the demands they would make on his personnel and equipment.

Target selection for operations conducted over enemy guerrilla forces in UN rear areas was a responsibility of KMAG in Taegu. Normally, two guerrilla flights were flown each week. Requests for further missions to exploit momentary vulnerabilities of guerrilla forces were processed in the same manner as requests from forward units in the line.

Target selection for missions conducted over friendly civilians were, as a rule, requested by unit commanders, and were used to control refugee traffic along military roads. Unit commanders occasionally requested voice missions over targets selected, not on the basis of tactical intelligence, but on the basis of UN operational plans. The voice missions in conjunction with "Operation Tomahawk" offer the prime examples of this kind of target selection.

Preparation of Loudspeaker Messages

The messages broadcast by EUSAK's heavy airborne loudspeakers were normally drawn from a Master Sheet, prepared by the Projects section of PWD. This six-page document, comparable to the "phrase-books" used by people travelling in a country whose language they do not know, grouped messages under four main headings.

1. Expressions Regarding Situation (e.g., you are surrounded, you are cut off, all mountain trails are cut off).

2. Expressions of Warning (e.g., UN troops will attack you, an Air attack will come immediately, your positions will be leveled to the ground).

3. Expressions of Advice (e.g., stop shooting, cease fighting, stay in your foxholes, come out now, wave anything white).

4. Expressions Regarding Treatment (e.g., you'll be safe on the UN side, we will not mistreat you, we will treat you like firends, your comrades are all happy and safe).

Each message was accompanied by translations into Korean and Chinese. Each of the Air-Ground Liaison Officers carried a copy of the Master Sheet with him on all voicecast flights. His task, as the plane proceeded to a fresh target, was to select from the Master Sheet a message or combination of messages appropriate to the supposed situational peculiarities of the target. By the time the Master Sheet had assumed its present shape there were 40 to 50 messages under each of the four headings, and the evidence indicates that, in general, the Air-Ground Liaison Officer could count on finding in it what he needed.

As noted, the psywar officers at corps or division sometimes accompanied requests for voiceplane missions with proposed messages. The general practice, where the proposal did not violate any of the "don't's" of loudspeaker broadcasting (e.g., no information or promises concerning the ultimate disposition of prisoners), was to have it translated by the Project Section's translators and use it, i.e., to defer to the forward psywar officer's judgment as to what should be said over an intended target. Sometimes, however, when forward ground units requested specific messages or provided new situational intelligence while the plane was airborne, messages were translated or improvised. The translations, in these cases, were made by the Chinese or Korean announcer accompanying the flight, necessarily without the routine checks for accuracy normally used in the Projects

Section. Given, however, the brevity and simplicity of the usual loudspeaker message, the added flexibility that this practice conferred upon the equipment while it was in flight, and the fact that announcers were chosen with an eye to their ability to double as translators in such emergencies, there departures from normal procedures seem to have been wise.

It remains to notice two further uses to which voiceplanes were put during their service in Korea.

1. A loudspeaker and leaflet mission flown on 5 February 1951 broadcast Chinese New Year's music, presumably as a means of getting attention and creating "atmosphere" for the intended message. This appears to be the only instance on record of the voiceplanes being used for psywar content other than spoken messages. (A recording had been prepared in advance by the Projects Section.)

2. On several occasions, trusted PWs addressed former fellow soldiers over the loudspeaker equipment. On 27 February, for example, a Chinese lieutenant colonel who had surrendered to UN forces some three weeks earlier, broadcast to CCF units along the front in the IX and X Corps sectors an appeal that he had himself written and cleared with the Projects Section before take-off. EUSAK operators estimate, on the basis of subsequent interrogations, that approximately 50 enemy soldiers surrendered in response to his message. In general, however, EUSAK Psywar appears to have made little effort to exploit the rich "stunt potentialities of the voiceplanes. If its airborne loudspeaker operations are to be considerably expanded in future, careful attention should be given to the possibility of strengthening this aspect of its program.

Production

The production of voiceplane broadcasts proceeded as follows: As the plane approached the target area the speaker generators were turned on and warmed up. The announcer-linguist seated himself at a small table just behind the cockpit, adjusted the microphone, and awaited the signal to begin speaking. Once the plane was over the target, the Air-Ground Liaison Officer gave him a signal, and he began to read the prepared message, which seldom exceeded 20 seconds in length.66/ Announcers were trained to read at

66/ EUSAK operators report experiments, conducted of course in friendly territory and without interference from small arms fire on the ground, in which the voiceplane demonstrated its capacity to get across a message 70 seconds in length.

an extremely slow pace, and to articulate each word with maximum precision, partly for acoustical reasons, partly to convey an impression of deliberateness and gravity appropriate to speech descending from the heavens. Normal practice was to repeat the same message again and again while the plane was over the target area which was frequently as long as 40 minutes. (Most flights carried the plane back and forth over a number of enemy elements deployed along a relatively broad segment of the front, so that repetition, besides lending emphasis to the message, afforded greatly increased coverage.)

The Division used indigenous personnel as announcers. Two Chinese-speaking men and two Chinese- and Korean-speaking women. These four announcers were selected after careful testing, particularly for enunciation and for the carrying power of the voice. Early tests had shown that high-pitched voices could be heard more distinctly than low-pitched voices over a given distance or from a given altitude, and the Division preferred in general, to use women for announcers partly for the reason just given, partly because of PW assurances that most target audiences welcome the sound of woman's voice.

Dissemination

Airborne loudspeakers, in their present stage of development, have numerous inherent limitations as a medium for disseminating psychological warfare materials. These limitations are identified, and discussed at length, in ORO-S-84. In general, however, the performance of the voiceplanes in Korea seems to have exceeded the expectations implicit in that memorandum; e.g., the modification of the equipment accomplished in May seems to have afforded more, and more controlable, audibility from the elevation called for by the current (USAF-imposed) floor under air-speaker operations than seemed likely at the time the memorandum was written. The equipment considerably surpassed in point of hours of service, the maximum expectations that seemed warranted by the evidence then available. This performance is reflected in the psywar operators' estimates, as communicated to the ORO field team, of the usefulness of additional airborne loudspeaker equipment in Korea, assuming the continuance of hostilities, when and if it can be obtained from the ZI. The operators appear to regard the present unavailability of operational air-loudspeakers as their most urgent materiel problem. Requests for additional airborne speakers appear to have been made and followed up with more vigorous insistence than requests relating to other EUSAK Psywar shortages (e.g., the shortage of propaganda-shell for 155's, or the unavailability of bilingual psywar officers). None of the evidence

available to the ORO field team suggests that these extimates are necessarily over-optimistic, provided they are confined (as there is no reason to suppose they are not) to the present campaign, and to such future campaigns as will, predictably, reproduce certain characteristics of the present campaign. From the standpoint of Army-level psychological warfare doctrine, however, it is of the first importance that the apparent accomplishments of heavy airborne loudspeaker equipment in Korea not be permitted to obscure the inherent limitations of the weapon in the minds of US psywar planners. Here, as in other phases of the Korean war, the danger is that certain peculiarities of an existing local situation, most particularly the absence of enemy air and the ineffectiveness of enemy anti-aircraft weapons, will come to dominate US tactical thinking in a manner that will render it inappropropriate to future military operations. The major considerations that should be borne in mind in this connection appear to be as follows.

1. Current estimates of the past accomplishments of heavy airborne loudspeaker equipment in Korea, apart from a handful of dramatic but isolated incidents in which UN personnel have looked on as a voiceplane talked a group of enemy soldiers out of a hopeless position67/ and along a stipulated path leading to surrender, rest upon evidence that is open to all of the objections urged above against EUSAK evaluations and evaluation procedures in general. The more scientific evaluations now being processed by ORO in Washington may or may not confirm the belief, widely held in EUSAK, that a considerable percentage of the prisoners now in the compounds were notably influenced in their decision to surrender by the air-loudspeaker broadcasts that they had heard (even ORO's current evaluation procedures, however,

67/ To the extent that the position of a group of enemy soldiers is genuinely and obviously hopeless at the time of the airspeaker strike, i.e., to the extent that the broadcast merely tells them how to implement a decision to surrender literally forced on them by the objective situation, such an incident teaches us very little about the effectiveness of voiceplanes as a means of influencing target audiences. It is not suggested, of course, that no useful military purpose is served by getting across to enemy soldiers who know they must give up instructions as to how to do it. But psywar's major task, as now understood, is presumably that of influencing the decision itself.

do not, in general, treat the effectiveness of airborne loudspeakers as a distinct evaluation problem). Thus entirely apart from the special characteristics of the Korean War, evidence is still lacking of results that would justify any considerable bets on heavy airborne loudspeaker equipment in future wars--or, for that matter, current expectations regarding their future accomplishments in the Korean War.

2. If we take as our measure of effectiveness not surrenders that can be attributed in whole or in part to voiceplane operations, but mere penetration of target audiences with psywar messages, the evidence of accomplishment is also far from satisfactory. The modified plane is known to be audible from a maximum altitude of 5,000 to 7,000 feet under test conditions. Tests conducted in friendly territory do not, however, warrant firm conclusions about audibility in combat conditions and in unfamiliar terrain. The irregularity of Korean topography has been pointed out. It remains to note (in sharp contrast to PWD personnel freely-expressed confidence in the ability of present-day voiceplanes to penetrate targets in e.g., small valleys) the ground loudspeaker operators' statements regarding the difficulties they have encountered in the apparently simple process of setting up a stationary speaker, pointing it at the enemy, and talking to him.68/ One ground loudspeaker team chief, for example, explained to the ORO field team that the peculiar acoustical characteristics of certain positions along the east central front (e.g., erratic winds) have sometimes made it necessary to point speakers away from supposed enemy troop concentrations in order for them to be heard at all in the target zone; and the behavior of sound waves after leaving the voiceplanes' speaker horns is not only (as was pointed out in ORO-S-84) equally unpredictable, but impossible to spot-check at intermediate points above the line leading to the target. Furthermore, the evidence on audibility gleaned by EUSAK Psywar's interrogations, although it points convincingly to the conclusion that the equipment was more audible after modification than before, includes testimony from numerous prisoners who witnessed strikes but were unable to understand the message being broadcast.

68/ The voiceplane undoubtedly enjoys certain compensating advantages; ground loudspeaker targets tend to be small, i.e., genuine pin-points, by comparison with airborne loudspeaker targets; ground loudspeaker broadcasts, even over relatively short distances, are sometimes rendered quite impossible by terrain features; etcetra.

3. The conspicuous absence of enemy air from the sectors in which most voiceplane missions have been flown, as also the ineffectiveness of enemy antiaircraft weapons, cannot be over-emphasized as indispensable presuppositions of any supposed accomplishments of EUSAK's heavy airborne loudspeaker equipment. Even when both planes were operational a single MIG, supported by even a minimal flow of intelligence, could have knocked the entire operation out of the skies in a few days' time.69/ It cannot be overemphasized that a voiceplane is, as a matter of course, a "sitting duck" for enemy fighters and, when it is cruising at 6,000 feet, for reasonably efficient enemy antiaircraft weapons as well. This is not merely a matter of the safety of the equipment and of the accompanying personnel: EUSAK's voiceplanes have enjoyed, as a result of it, a freedom of manoeuver that would have been quite impossible had there been any question of their encountering enemy air while in flight. They have, in consequence, been able to fly a much larger number of missions than they could otherwise have attempted.

The indicated conclusion is that heavy airborne loudspeakers should figure prominently in US planning for future (post-Korean) psywar operations only to the extent that there is reason to believe that these future wars will, like the Korean war, offer to US psywar operators a steady "flow" of relatively undefended targets; or the technological problems involved in reducing the vulnerability of the present-day equipment can be solved by development research; and existing impressions in EUSAK's PWD concerning the effectiveness of the missions flown between late May and the end of July will be confirmed by the evaluation projects now under way.

On the other hand, the advantages that future US tactical psywar operations would derive from having at their disposal airborne loudspeaker equipment that would not invite prompt destruction by the enemy have been to some extent substantiated by the US experience in the Korean war, most particularly by the sheer number of attractive targets EUSAK psywar operators have been able to identify. There is reason to believe that these advantages would be correspondingly greater to the extent that future US tactical psywar operations were called upon, in the manner repeatedly contemplated in this memorandum, to try to influence the behavior of enemy troops for purposes

69/ It is not suggested that the enemy's failure to knock it out of the skies tells us anything about the enemy's estimate of its effectiveness. The enemy's decision to keep his MIG's out of the combat zone has evidently been dictated by other considerations than the countering of UN propaganda.

other than that of maximizing surrenders. The future usefulness of airborne loudspeakers will depend, in this context, upon the feasibility of operations analagous to the dissemination of leaflets by organic liaison planes, i.e., upon the feasibility of combining in a single piece of equipment the function of observation over and beyond the enemy's lines and that of broadcasting from the air to vulnerable enemy units. Current experiments with mounting loudspeaker equipment in light planes, such as the L-19, should for this reason be given maximum encouragement and support by US psywar planners at all levels.

Ground Loudspeakers

Ground loudspeaker operations are conducted by the officers and men of the Loudspeaker Platoon of the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.

As noted in Part I of this memorandum, the platoon is made up of three sections, each of which, at the present time, includes one officer, the "section leader", seven enlisted men, and three civilians. Each section is responsible for ground loudspeaker operations in one of the three EUSAK corps. Each of the sections, in turn, is made up of three-man teams, each with its own vehicles and loudspeaker sets, which operate with forward units in Eighth Army.

Although the platoon now has at its disposal 13 loudspeaker sets, the number of these actually in the field at any moment during the past four months has rarely exceeded nine, and sometimes has fallen as low as six. The fact that the number of sets in operation varies over so wide a range is due to temporary breakdowns of either vehicular or loudspeaker equipment, and/or unavailability of personnel trained to operate speakers. With the facilities now available, the loudspeaker platoon attempts to keep nine teams and sets operating at all times, a figure which would give each US division in each corps one team ready for action at all times.70/ The teams normally remain with the division to which they are assigned for a period of not longer than one month, though not necessarily at divisional headquarters. They are usually sent forward to one or another of the division's regiments, and conduct their operations from its command post. This being the case, the teams are to a considerable extent independent of the Psywar Division at Army-level

70/ As this report is being written, steps are being taken by PWD to acquire eight additional teams from ROKA psychological warfare, to work with ROKA units at the front. Some of the personnel of these future teams are now being trained at the FLLC.

(and even of the FLLC), once they are in the field, and their procedures for intelligence collection, target selection, and message preparation differ markedly from those described above in connection with leaflet and air-speaker operations. A brief account of these procedures is a necessary preliminary to a discussion of the teams' actual dissemination operations.

Intelligence Collection

Most of the intelligence for ground loudspeaker operations is procured either by the team chief through his own efforts, or by him from the officer in command of the loudspeaker section to which his team belongs and/or the psywar officer of the division and/or regiment with which his team is operating. No significant amount is collected for the teams by the Psywar Division's own Intelligence Section, or by the Loudspeaker Platoon headquarters in the FLLC.

The four ultimate sources of the intelligence the team chiefs use, whether they procure it themselves or get it at second-hand from the officers mentioned above, are (1) the "Order of Battle" files in G-2 or S-2, (2) IPW team interrogations, (3) direct interrogations of prisoners, and (4) direct observation of the military situation. Almost all of it, therefore, is highly situational in character. The Order of Battle files in the -2 sections concentrate attention upon the enemy units in contact: their location, organization, personnel, weapons, combat experience, present activities, and, on a somewhat lower priority, the physical and psychological state of their troops. The IPW teams at the regimental and divisional levels seek, in general, these same types of intelligence, passing it along in a comparatively raw and unevaluated form, but their EEI's tend, in general, to devote to questions that are of primary interest to psywar operators more time and attention than such questions have thus far claimed from those responsible for the OB files (e.g., they frequently have prisoners interrogated further by the loudspeaker teams' own announcer-linguist and, in many cases, frequently quiz prisoners for details about their own morale, about that of other men in the units to which they belonged, and about the effectiveness of UN psywar operations). As for direct observation of the military situation by psywar officers, section leaders, or team chiefs, it is at best a minor source of intelligence for ground loudspeaker operations, but cannot be ignored because a team chief moving into position not infrequently notes changes in the disposition of enemy forces, and re-makes his plans accordingly.

The situational intelligence obtained from the above sources (at forward echelons) rarely reaches the loudspeaker platoon headquarters: it is collected primarily for immediate

"consumption" by the loudspeaker teams, and, because it is collected for this purpose, provides too small and detailed a picture for most Army-level psywar purposes. Occasionally, however, intelligence regarded as highly significant is telephoned back by the loudspeaker teams, or (especially where it bears upon the effectiveness of psywar operations) included in written reports. Such intelligence, however, rarely has any feed-back effect on ground loudspeaker activities, which, as far as intelligence is concerned, are largely independent of Army-level procedures.

Target Selection

A ground loudspeaker target, in contrast to a target suitable for leaflet or air loudspeaker operations, must be so situated that one or another of the motor vehicles used to transport the team members and the fairly heavy and cumbersome loudspeaker equipment can approach it. It must, since ground loudspeakers cannot function without protective cover, be fairly close to (within a mile or two) friendly ground forces. And it must, finally, from the tactical point of view, be of such character that the teams and covering forces can approach it without excessive risk. Terrain conditions, the distance to be travelled, the distance over which the sound must move before reaching the enemy, and the disposition of front-line forces on both sides are, therefore, all variables that must be taken into account in selecting ground loudspeaker targets. The actual character of the battle at the moment of selection is another variable. If it is noisy, range of audibility may be reduced to half a mile or less; if it is fluid, the teams may be unable to keep their equipment in a given place long enough to complete a broadcast.

The ideal target for ground loudspeaker broadcasts is one for which all the foregoing variables are favorable and, at the same time, one which according to current intelligence, is ripe, for psywar attack. Since moreover ground loudspeaker psywar, like leaflet and air loudspeaker psywar, is dominated by surrender-mission concepts, this means that the ideal target is a unit whose will to fight is presumably at a low-level (e.g., a surrounded and/or cut off enemy unit, or a unit which, though not isolated, has been badly battered in combat, and is so situated that the loudspeaker team can with reasonable safety reach a point from which it can be addressed).

The target-selection process for a ground loudspeaker operation calls for cooperative effort on the part of numerous individuals (one or more of whom may not be concerned in any given instance): the corps, division, regimental, and battalion psywar officers; the section leaders of the loudspeaker platoon; the team chiefs; the lower echelon unit commanders. Which ones

actually participate in the selection of a particular target depends upon a number of factors, which are the subject matter of the following paragraphs. We may note, in passing, that none of the individuals just mentioned is situated at Army-level, which is to say that neither the FLLC as such nor the PWD normally has any role to play in the target-selection process for ground loudspeaker operations.

The extent to which corps, division, regiment, and battalion psywar officers participate in target selection for ground loudspeaker operations varies considerably from unit to unit along the Eighth Army front. Corps psywar officers rarely select targets for ground loudspeaker operations. When a section leader from the loudspeaker platoon reports in with a team to be assigned for duty, the corps psywar officer's estimate of the probability of targets developing at various points affects the decision as to where the team is to proceed. But it leaves the entire question of what point in the line to hit first, and when to hit it, to be worked out with the psywar officer of the relevant division. (Where the divisional psywar officer concerned tends to treat psywar operations as matters of secondary importance, whether because he is overburdened with other duties, or because he is uninteresting and/or insufficiently briefed about psychological warfare, his role in target selection may be taken over by the corps psywar officer; but target selection is not properly speaking, one of his normal concerns.)

Where there is a full-time divisional psywar officer, then, current practice seems to be to leave the task of helping to select targets, of placing teams at those lower echelon units in which targets appear to be developing, and of participating in the last-minute decision as to whether or not to strike at a contemplated target, in his hands. In most of the divisions, however, the psywar officer has other assignments, and while he perhaps obtains from one source or another many of the data relevant to target-selection, his picture of the situation at the front is not sufficiently detailed to enable him to identify ground loudspeaker targets.

Targets are, therefore, usually spotted as ground loudspeaker targets at regimental, battalion, or even company level, and regimental and battalion psywar officers are the main source, or at least the main channel, for ground loudspeaker target selection. The teams do not normally use the headquarters of the division as their base of operations, but rather that of some lower echelon, where they can maintain contact with the psywar officers (and/or unit commanders or staff officers), who are in a position to spot psywar opportunities and prepare the way for the relevant missions. The psywar officer at regiment or battalion, if he is alert and interested, can point

the teams at rewarding targets far more easily than his counterpart at division.

Many of the targets for gound loudspeaker missions, however, are selected by unit commanders, especially those at company and platoon level. Here again the practice varies from unit to unit and from time to time with the commander's (or his staff members') familiarity with or interest in the possibility of affecting a tactical situation via psywar measures. Requests made by unit commanders are usually channelled through the psywar officers at battalion, regiment, or division, often after negotiations with regimental and battalion S-2's and S-3's.

Each of the section leaders of the loudspeaker platoon is in charge of three teams, and supervises their disposition and use. Frequently, due primarily to the inability or unwillingness of psywar officers to seek targets, the section leader must take the initiative in performing this function. His main contacts for this purpose are the division and regimental -3's and -2's, which means that he must move constantly from unit to unit, looking for opportunities to use his teams.

On the whole, however, the most active target-selectors appear to be the team chiefs themselves. When teams go to the front from the FLLC, they check in first at corps headquarters, and are assigned from there to one of the divisions; from the division CP they are normally sent along to that regiment that is regarded as the most promising base for operations. The teams may stay with a single regiment, maintaining contact with their section leader by telephone, or they may move from one regiment to another in search of targets. Much of their time, it appears, is spent at battalion CP's within the regiment with which they are working.

In seeking targets, the team chief deals sometimes with S-3's and S-2's, sometimes with unit commanders; in either case actual identification of targets is likely to depend, to a considerable extent, upon the chief's initiative, resourcefulness, and persuasiveness. If, having discovered a possible target, he can persuade the unit commander of the value of a psywar mission directed against it, he is able (although two of the present team chiefs are sergeants and the remainder corporals) to undertake the mission without prior consultation with army-level psywar (including here the leader of his section in the loudspeaker platoon). Frequently, of course, he does consult, and work with, such psywar officers as might be familiar with the contemplated target, or might be able to give him advice about how to exploit it.

Message Preparation

Ground loudspeaker broadcasts fall into two broad classes, which differ sharply as regards the way in which their content is prepared. These are standard messages and improvised messages.

The standard messages tend to be general in content. They make no reference either to specific enemy units or to specific tactical situations (a few of them, however, have been prepared for use against certain recurrent targets of particular types, e.g., a surrounded enemy unit). The message is usually prepared, well in advance of dissemination, by the Projects Section of the Psywar Division, and carried forward, in the form of written texts or tape recordings, by the ground loudspeaker team when it moves to the front for a tour of duty.

The written texts for ground loudspeaker broadcasts are considerably longer than those for leaflet or air loudspeaker dissemination. The Projects Section has prepared a set of basic texts, each of them developing some representative theme, in English, Chinese, and Korean. It does not, however, prepare texts of this type as a matter of course. When a new theme is adopted, such as a surrender appeal based on imminent armistic negotiations, a decision must be made as to whether to embody it in a prepared ground loudspeaker text. The section also prepares news items, again as a result of ad hoc decisions, to be used in ground loudspeaker broadcasts, and distributes them to the several teams.

The teams, as suggested above, are equipped to broadcast taperecordings, and these also the Projects Section prepares and produces from time to time. One recent tape, for example, consists of a 14 1/2 minute program describing life among prisoners of war in UN camps, and emphasizing the food, medical care, and recreation facilities at the camp. Another is a recording of an aged Chinese woman reading "A Letter to My Son", and is designed to produce nostalgia, homesickness, and lowered morale. Still another dramatizes the story of a successful surrenderee, using the same technique of presentation as the "Lord Calvert" leaflet series. The teams also have in their reportory recordings of various Chinese songs, including the Nationalist Anthem and parodies of popular tunes, and recordings of battle noises. The latter have been taken from the sound tracks of US films, and seem to have been intended to encourage friendly forces and confuse or deceive enemy forces. They do not, however, appear to have been put into use.

The recordings are frequently used to supplement "live" broadcasts from written texts, whether standard or improvised.

They enable the teams to include some music and some performances by professional actors in their programs, which are less monotonous and less dreary in consequence. The theory is that the broadcasts are more likely to capture and hold the audience's attention if the psywar message proper is flavored with entertainment, and if the message itself is communicated with a maximum of persuasive force. Since total broadcast time for one target is often several hours, the recordings also economize the energies of the loudspeaker teams' personnel.

Improvised messages are composed in the context of a particular loudspeaker mission, usually by the team chief but sometimes by a section leader or psywar officer after the intended target has been identified. The announcer-translates the message into Korean or Chinese, thereby familiarizing himself with its contents.

Such messages are often used to supplement standard messages, to pin-point them by naming the unit, or by making reference to individuals in the unit or individuals formerly in the unit, or by commenting on the immediate tactical situation, the local terrain, the day's weather, etcetera. Instructions on how to surrender lend themselves especially to this kind of treatment. When loudspeaker missions are coordinated with air or artillery strikes, or with leaflet dissemination missions such as drops of safe conduct passes, the improvised message enables maximum tailoring of content to the mission in hand.

When psywar officers or loudspeaker section leaders accompany the teams, they usually participate in preparing the messages to be broadcast. In any case, messages written by team chiefs are usually cleared with a psywar officer, or the commander or a staff officer of the host unit, before actual transmission.71/

Whether the messages are prepared beforehand in the Psywar Division, or improvised immediately before broadcast at the level at which a team is operating, they are almost invariably used tactically, to produce immediately discernible results in a specific local situation.

71/ To some extent, the teams have developed standard variations of standard messages, which, because the announcer-translators have often used them before, can be improvised without delays for composition, translation, and clearance.

Dissemination

The loudspeaker platoon has at its disposal a number (see below) of World War II AN/UIQ-1 and Navy Beachmaster public address sets, mounted on vehicles. The capabilities and limitations of this equipment, as reported to the ORO field team by the loudspeaker platoon leader and his section chiefs, are several.

1. The AN/UIQ-1, of which the platoon has ten sets, has a broadcasting range of about two miles, with a 70° cone of sound. The set consists of a generator, a mixing-chamber, two amplifiers, and a speaker horn. The speaker horn and mixer unit, which weights approximately 90 pounds, can be separated from the set, attached to a connecting cable, and carried forward as far as 1,500 feet without noticeably affecting the quality of the broadcast. In situations favorable to this kind of mounting, the team enjoys a certain degree of safety from the small arms and mortar fire that the speaker draws. Having set up the speaker, perhaps under cover of darkness, at a selected vantage point, they withdraw to a more protected position for the broadcasting operations. Separating the speaker from the rest of the set also often enables the team to beam broadcasts from points to which the entire set, which weighs over 800 pounds, cannot be transported.

The AN/UIQ-1 set is carried in a 1/4-ton trailer, pulled by a jeep. The chief advantage of the jeep-trailer combination as a vehicle for loudspeaker equipment is that it is fast and economical to operate wherever there are reasonably good roads. Mechanical failures are relatively easy to diagnose and remedy, and replacement parts are readily available. The disadvantages of the combination, particularly when it is used with the AN/UIQ-1 set, are multiple. The jeep is road-bound. It is too light to pull the trailer and equipment up steep hills. It is too small to accommodate a team with its full complement of personnel (three men) plus equipment. It offers little or no team and equipment protection, even against small arms fire. Because of these defects, other vehicles--the M24 tank, the M4A3 tank, the M39 personnel carrier, and the M20 reconnaissance car--have occasionally been used for special missions. In the opinion of loudspeaker operators, however, no single vehicle is entirely suitable for all loudspeaker missions, and the jeep-and-trailer continues to be the carrier most commonly used.

2. The loudspeaker platoon has three sets of the Navy Beachmaster public address units. This equipment has a speaking range of somewhat less than two miles; in contrast with the AN/UIQ-1, however, it weighs only 300 pounds. It is also

The foregoing helps explain the fact that the average number of completed missions per operational team is extremely low--hardly more than one per team per week during June, July, and August. Some reasons for the small number of completed missions follow.

1. The fact that there is only one team per division means, insofar as loudspeaker operations are conducted at lower echelon units, that large amounts of time must be spent travelling from one unit to another, sometimes in a fruitless search for potential targets, sometimes in pursuit of particular potential targets that do not materialize, or that disappear before the team's arrival. In Korean terrain, the requisite travel is not only difficult, but likely to inflict damage upon the team's equipment. This means further loss of time while repairs are being accomplished.

2. Even if there were a greater number of teams, and each team could spend less of its time moving from one unit to another, the scarcity of alert and experienced psywar officers, plus the fact that psywar officers, whatever their level of alertness and experience, often have other duties, tends to hold down the number of potential targets. The teams are frequently obliged to rely upon their own resources for target-selection.

3. The character of the tactical situation exercises a decisive influence on the number of ground loudspeaker missions, especially for surrender-mission psywar, and through the period here in question the tactical situation tended to restrict the supply of potential targets. The front lines in Korea were stabilized in mid-June, since which time the main lines, for the most part, have been widely separated, and most of the two armies' energies have gone into patrol actions. This means that (a) the distances the teams have to travel to get within range is proportionately greater than it would be in other circumstances, (b) the risks to team and equipment are likewise correspondingly greater, especially if they operate with the patrols, and, in any case, (c) few targets appropriate to ground loudspeaker operations develop. The latter point merits some elaboration here, since it appears to be the key determinant of the number of loudspeaker missions.

The best targets for surrender-mission ground loudspeaker operations are enemy soldiers who have been isolated, hard-hit enemy units still in contact along the Main Line of Resistance, and enemy positions under continuous fire in terrain over which the team can move close enough to the MLR without undue exposure of men and equipment. From mid-June to September 1951 the tactical situation, produced few such targets along the Eighth Army front. Team missions were accordingly aimed at relatively

smaller than the AN/UIQ-1, and can be mounted in the rear of the jeep itself. Each Beachmaster set consists of a PE75 generator, an amplifier, and a battery of nine speaker horns. The speaker is larger than that of the AN/UIQ-1, but has a narrower cone of sound (50° as compared with 70° for the AN/UIQ-1); it can, therefore, pin-point messages with somewhat greater accuracy. However, it is regarded by operating personnel as less hardy, in the extremely difficult field conditions characteristic of Korea, than the AN/UIQ-1. So far, no practicable means of detaching the speaker from the rest of the set has been discovered, and this means that the teams either expose themselves to more fire when using the Beachmaster, or are forced to broadcast from less satisfactory positions.

The equipment described above poses difficult maintenance problems, not only because of its age but also because of the punishment it receives. This means that every team must include one man who can perform minor radio and vehicular repairs. For major repairs of both types, especially those requiring replacement of parts, teams rely upon forward division facilities to some extent. Since, however, division facilities frequently are overloaded with other work, most repairs are accomplished at the loudspeaker platoon's headquarters in Seoul.

Besides the radio and maintenance man, each team includes a team chief and an announcer-linguist. The team chief is usually selected for his demonstrated capacity to assume responsibility (the loudspeaker platoon leader believes that any "good soldier" with a "head on his shoulders" can be trained to become a good team chief). The units now use civilians as announcers, either indigenous personnel or (for Chinese) personnel acquired through Army channels from outside Korea.

When a loudspeaker team undertakes a mission, the public address equipment and vehicle must first be checked, the vehicle and the power unit filled with gasoline, the program decided upon, and the intended messages, if "improvised", composed and translated. The team must inform itself about roads, the location of units, code names, and the names of persons to be contacted. If the team is not already at the using unit, it must travel there (if it is at a division CP for instance, an hour or more of its working-day may be spent travelling to one of the forward units). Once the team is at the using unit, arrangements must be made for coordination with tank or infantry patrols, artillery, or other troops. A position for the broadcast must be chosen, the equipment must be set up, and cover provided. Each step in the process is costly in point of time.

inferior targets, e.g., enemy soldiers in the Outpost Line of Resistance, who because they tend to be better soldiers are less vulnerable to psywar appeals; they are, in any case, widely dispersed, and thus difficult to identify and approach. Great uncertainty surrounds missions directed at such troops. The teams often cannot be sure a target exists when they set out on a mission, so that the incidence of frustrated missions is unavoidably high. The front-line situation over recent months has both reduced the number of potential missions and channeled more and more of the teams' time and energies into abortive ventures.

4. Finally the teams must rely on the loudspeaker platoon at Army for most (according to the platoon leader, 75-80 percent) of their maintenance support. This is partly because the teams do not have adequately trained field radio repairmen, and partly because they lack access to forward signal facilities. Important repairs, therefore, require a minimum of 24 hours out of the line: the round trip from the nearest forward division CP to the FLLC takes, apart from the repair operation itself, approximately eight hours.

The minimum conclusion to which the foregoing data appear to point, especially in the absence of reliable means of evaluating the effectiveness of such missions as are completed, is the following: The question whether, given the length of the front in Korea and the present number of teams, ground loudspeaker operations are paying their way, should be fully examined. The present number of completed missions per team per week, while certainly no reflection on either the competence or the industry of the teams' personnel, could be regarded as good enough for future operations only if there were convincing evidence that completed missions produce, on the average, results approaching the phenomenal. Since no such evidence is available, a strong case could be made out for either drastic measures to increase the number of teams (since the above data clearly show that each team is now called upon to cover too much territory), or concentrating the present number of teams in a single corps, chosen with an eye to the cooperativeness and know-how of its psywar officers.

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